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 Abstract  
 
 
This thesis examines the representation of two broad fields of science – the new physics 
(relativity and quantum mechanics) and the modern biological synthesis (genetics and 
evolutionary theory) – in two genres of writing – popular science writing and narrative fiction. 
Specifically, I consider the representations of determinism in recent works by a number of 
writers from both genres, concentrating on the literary techniques employed by popular science 
writers, and the scientific concepts incorporated by contemporary authors.  
 
I argue that there is a tendency in popular science books on the new physics to emphasise the 
indeterminacy supposedly implied by those theories, and that a number of recurrent metaphors 
are integral to this representation. Similarly, I find that the novelists and playwrights drawing on 
ideas from this field of science (such as Amis, Stoppard, Frayn and McEwan) also emphasise this 
indeterminacy, but in addition that they use these concepts borrowed from physics to question 
the adequacy of science as a monistic epistemological system. 
 
Popular science writing on genetics has a propensity, even while acknowledging the importance 
of environmental factors, to present a ‘gene-centric’ view, prioritising the effect of the genes in 
the development of an organism. Although these writers would (and do) deny the validity of 
genetic determinism, the emphasis on the role of genes and our evolutionary development gives 
support to the idea of the determining function of our biology. The metaphors and narratives 
used by popular science writers are again central to this representation. I go on to show how 
contemporary fiction writers (particularly McEwan and Byatt), in appropriating ideas from these 
scientific fields, critique this idea of biological determinism, and furthermore that they raise 
doubts about an exclusively scientific understanding of the world. I conclude this thesis by 
offering some thoughts on the epistemological role that literature might play in the face of this 
apparent dominance of a scientific conception of knowledge. 
 1 
1 Introduction 
 
 
“Science and fiction both begin with similar questions: What if? Why? How does it all work?” – 
Margaret Atwood 1 
 
A desire for explanation lies at the heart of both fictional narrative and scientific enquiry; tying 
fiction to science is the need not merely to describe but to explain. It also connects the many 
strands of scientific enterprise: “It is widely held [...] that all the sciences are unified at a deeper 
level in that natural processes are governed, at least in significant measure, by cause and effect”.2 
As a result, the physical sciences are intimately connected to the idea of causality – to the process 
of taking one state and explaining what will follow from it, or taking a state and deriving its 
preceding causes. Causality is an essential underpinning of modern scientific rationalism and its 
“explanatory ambitions”; it is also the foundation on which fictional narratives are constructed.3  
 
If narrative is the concatenation of causal connections, then the same extrapolation in science 
seems to imply the idea of causal determinism. Drawing on Carl Hoefer’s discussion, 
determinism can be defined as follows: the world is deterministic if, given a specified ‘way things 
are’ at time t, the way things go afterwards is fixed as a matter of natural law.4 If each new state of 
a given system is caused by the previous state of that system, then it would appear that since its 
beginning the whole universe has been a story which is in some sense already written. 
Determinism and narrative thus resemble each other: both are simply causality iterated. In this 
thesis I examine the representation of determinism in two broad fields of science – the new 
physics and the modern biological synthesis – as presented by two different genres of writing – 
popular science writing and contemporary narrative fiction. 
 
That science has been an important influence on contemporary authors is hardly in question. 
One only has to read, say, Ian McEwan’s introduction to his libretto Or Shall We Die? to realise 
                                                 
1 ‘An interview with Margaret Atwood’, <http://www.oryxandcrake.co.uk/interview.asp> [accessed 8 
April 2010]. 
2  Norton, J.D., ‘Causation as Folk Science’, Philosophers’ Imprint, 3:4 (2003), 1-22 
<http://www.philosophersimprint.org/003004/> [accessed 12 May 2010], (p. 1). 
3  Carl Hoefer, ‘Causal Determinism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy, Spring 2010 edn, ed. by 
Edward N. Zalta <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/determinism-causal/> 
[accessed 10 May 2010], (Section 1, Introduction). 
4  Hoefer, Preface. 
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the extent to which scientific advances have affected his writing. In so far as writers are 
concerned with describing the world and our perceptions of it and interactions with it, the 
alterations in our world-view brought about by, for example, the discoveries in physics at the 
beginning of the twentieth century are clearly momentous. As McEwan says, “Space, time, 
matter, energy, light, all came to be thought of in entirely new ways, and ultimately must affect 
the way we see the world and our place within it”.5 A.S. Byatt, whose writing has been influenced 
more by the biological than the physical sciences, makes a similar observation about the way in 
which paradigm shifts brought about by the sciences can affect novelists: “Recent discoveries 
about the great extent to which DNA patterns are shared by all creatures have perhaps changed 
writers’ ideas of the natural world”.6 
 
Equally clear, though difficult to quantify, is the significant role that popular science writing has 
played in bringing science to the attention of authors. In the same introduction McEwan quotes 
from Gary Zukav’s The Dancing Wu Li Masters, as well as appearing to refer to Fritjof Capra’s The 
Tao of Physics; in her acknowledgements in Cat’s Eye Margaret Atwood notes her debt to the 
“entrancing books” by Paul Davies, Carl Sagan, John Gribbin and Stephen W. Hawking and 
draws one of her epigraphs from A Brief History of Time; for Oryx and Crake Atwood provided a 
list of titles for ‘Further Reading’, almost all of which could be described as popular science 
books and has noted that “My recreational reading — books I read for fun, magazines I read in 
airplanes — is likely to be pop science of the Stephen Jay Gould or Scientific American type”; A.S. 
Byatt dedicates A Whistling Woman to the geneticist and popular science writer Steve Jones and in 
the acknowledgements thanks nearly a dozen other popular science writers, including Matt Ridley 
and Richard Dawkins; Tom Stoppard cites Richard Feynman’s books as a source of much of the 
physics in Hapgood, even lifting a piece of explication for use in that play, and in Arcadia gives to 
one of his characters a close paraphrase of a line from Benoit Mandelbrot, almost certainly drawn 
from James Gleick’s very successful account of chaos theory, Chaos: Making a New Science.7 From 
these and other isolated examples it is reasonable to infer the wider and pervasive – and often 
unacknowledged – influence of popular science writing on contemporary writers.  
 
                                                 
5 Ian McEwan, Or Shall We Die?: Words for an oratorio set to music by Michael Berkeley (London: Jonathan 
Cape, 1983), p. 15.  
6 A.S. Byatt, On Histories and Stories: Selected Essays (London: Chatto & Windus, 2000), p. 80. 
7 McEwan, Or Shall We Die?, pp. 17-18; Margaret  Atwood, Cat’s Eye (London: Virago, 1990), 
Acknowledgements; Margaret  Atwood, ‘Further Reading’ <http://www.oryxandcrake.co.uk/ 
furtherreading.asp> [accessed 10 April 2010]; Margaret Atwood, ‘Perfect Storm: Writing Oryx and 
Crake’ <http://www.oryxandcrake.co.uk/perfectstorm.asp> [accessed 10 April 2010]; A.S. Byatt, A 
Whistling Woman (London: Chatto & Windus, 2002), Acknowledgements, p. 422; Tom Stoppard, 
Hapgood (London: Faber, 1988),  Tom Stoppard, Arcadia (London: Faber, 1993), p. 84.  
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Less frequently acknowledged by their authors, but equally apparent, is the importance of literary 
techniques in popular science books. While formal innovation is relatively scarce (making books 
like Douglas Hofstadter’s Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid8 conspicuous exceptions), 
popular science books are manifestly literary, not to say novelistic.9 All utilize metaphors liberally, 
and in many metaphor plays a prominent role (The Selfish Gene, River Out of Eden, The Dancing Wu 
Li Masters); similarly, all employ characterization to some degree, but some writers place 
characterization, normally of particular scientists, at the heart of their books (Chaos, Wonderful 
Life); most construct narratives, often around the ‘discovery’ of important theories or evidence 
within the relevant scientific field, but as with characterization, some books promote these 
narratives to a structural role (Wonderful Life, The Double Helix, A Short History of Nearly Everything); 
finally, literary epigraphs, references and quotations are commonplace, with some writers again 
making these literary aspects structurally integral to their books (The Ancestor’s Tale, Unweaving the 
Rainbow, The Red Queen).10  
 
Despite the acknowledgements of indebtedness by contemporary authors, or perhaps because of 
it, this thesis is not an influence study: I am not chiefly concerned with tracing the passage of 
ideas from popular science writing into the works of contemporary novelists and playwrights. 
Nor will I attempt to prove the less frequently pursued claim that popular science writers are 
influenced by the techniques, and possibly trends, of contemporary fiction. Rather, while 
acknowledging the complexities, this thesis begins with the assumption that there is a level of 
mutual transmission between the two discourses. There is much truth in Michael Whitworth’s 
argument, referring to the assimilation of the implications of Einstein’s theories of relativity into 
modernist writing, that, even if “we cannot assume the entire society would have been uniformly 
saturated with the new knowledge”, there is still a ‘field of force’ of new ideas that allows us to 
presume the influence of these ideas on the authors of a period, even “in the absence of 
particular reports of reading or of conversations”.11 I will not, therefore, speculate about specific 
lines of influence (i.e. which popular science books an author may have read). Instead, I examine 
                                                 
8  Douglas Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (New York: Basic Books, 1979). 
9 See below, p. 25 n. 67, for an alternative view of  popular science as resembling autobiography. 
10 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Richard Dawkins, 
River Out of  Eden (New York: Basic Books, 1995); Gary Zukav, The Dancing Wu Li Masters (London: 
Fontana, 1979); James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (London: Vintage, 1998); Stephen Jay 
Gould, Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of  History (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991); 
James Watson, The Double Helix: A Personal Account of  the Discovery of  the Structure of  DNA (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968); Bill Bryson, A Short History of  Nearly Everything (London: Black Swan 
Books, 2004); Richard Dawkins, The Ancestor’s Tale: A Pilgrimage to the Dawn of  Evolution (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin, 2004); Richard Dawkins, Unweaving the Rainbow: Science, Delusion and the Appetite for 
Wonder (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1998); Matt Ridley, The Red Queen: Sex and the Evolution of  Human 
Nature (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1994). 
11  Michael H. Whitworth, Einstein’s Wake: Relativity, Metaphor and Modernist Literature (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), p. 18. 
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the consequences – textual and epistemological – of the mutual transfer of ideas and techniques 
between the two genres of writing, concentrating on representations of determinism, and paying 
particular attention to the purpose to which writers in both genres have put these ‘borrowings’.  
 
Central to my argument is the contention that in both genres these appropriations are often 
strategic, serving the ends of implicit agendas. Popular science writing and literary fiction fall 
neatly into the two blocs of a ‘two cultures’ model, as representatives of the sciences and the 
literary arts. The phrase ‘two cultures’ comes, of course, from C.P. Snow’s infamous 1959 Rede 
lecture, in which he argued that there was a growing cultural divide with “[l]iterary intellectuals at 
one pole – at the other scientists [...] Between the two a gulf of mutual incomprehension”.12 
Although “many commentators now see his argument as outdated and redundant” or “reductive 
and simplistic”, his model of culture has been extremely influential and contests between the two 
cultures are still conducted both through the media and in the academy.13 As a result, we might 
expect to find that books from both genres contest the epistemological dominance of the 
opposing genre or discipline, or affirm the epistemological status of their own. In chapter 5 I 
show, for example, how a number of textual strategies in the popular science writing on genetics 
work to emphasise the importance of genes in the development and behaviour of an organism. 
This gene-centric perspective obviously promotes the epistemological status – the explanatory 
power – of genetics, at the expense of other forms of knowledge.  
 
But while popular science texts do seem to utilise literary techniques to support their claims to 
epistemological priority, the relationship between the two genres is not neatly symmetrical. I have 
already mentioned that the borrowing of scientific ideas and images by novelists is more 
frequently acknowledged than the appropriation of literary techniques by popular science writers. 
Similarly, this kind of epistemological contestation is far greater on the part of the fiction writers, 
as they try to carve out an epistemological status for literature in the face of the apparently 
dominant sciences, widely considered the creators and verifiers of knowledge.  
 
Two questions then raise themselves: firstly, do fiction writers draw on scientific ideas just to 
appropriate science’s epistemological credibility for their own ideas – to, as Karen Barad puts it, 
“garner the authority of science for some theory or proposition that someone wanted to advance 
                                                 
12  C.P. Snow, The Two Cultures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 4. Here, as throughout 
this thesis, editorial ellipses are in square brackets – thus, [...] – to distinguish them from ellipses in the 
original text. 
13  Elizabeth Leane, Reading Popular Physics: Disciplinary Skirmishes and Textual Strategies (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2007), p. 1; Whitworth, Einstein’s Wake, p. 18. 
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anyway”?14 Secondly, does this epistemological contestation represent little more than the 
rearguard action by a discipline relinquishing its hold on a right to define knowledge? 
 
In answer to the first question, in chapters 4 and 6 of this thesis I show that literary texts 
normally incorporate scientific ideas as part of broader themes, that they are used where they 
support the wider aims of the text, and that these appropriations are often figurative or 
analogical; but that is not to say that their inclusion is in any way gratuitous. Rather, these authors 
can be frequently seen to be engaging with the ‘borrowed’ ideas epistemologically – not, 
obviously, by contesting or refuting the specifics of the theories in question, but by identifying 
the philosophical implications, and also, sometimes, questioning the “hasty epistemic confidence” 
of science.15 I will offer some thoughts in the conclusion to this thesis towards the second 
question, proposing an epistemological role that literature might play by acting as a standing 
critique of science as the dominant epistemology.  
 
Before turning to such questions, I present, in Chapter 2, a very brief overview of the history of 
popular science writing. I identify the middle of the nineteenth century as the best candidate for 
the moment of the emergence of the genre, while acknowledging that marking the moment in 
this way is essentially arbitrary, especially given a degree of confusion over the definition of 
popular science as a genre. I review the work done by those such as Shinn, Whitley and 
Hilgartner in the last thirty years to correct the dominant reductive view of popular science 
writing as the uni-directional translation – or worse, corruption – of high science for a lay 
audience, and recognise the importance in overturning this view. I conclude the chapter by 
clarifying my own use of terms such as ‘popular science’, ‘public science’ and ‘pop science’ for 
the purposes of this thesis.  
 
The body of the thesis is then divided into four chapters which could be paired in either of two 
ways: by genre or by scientific discipline. They are ordered here so as to accentuate the 
connections between the representations of determinism across different genres of writing, but 
there are also many links that could be made between the depiction of the different sciences in 
the same genre of writing: for example, the implications of the depiction of biological 
determinism, on the one hand, and on the other, physical determinism in recent works of fiction; 
or, the features that are common to all popular science writing, regardless of the scientific 
discipline being explicated. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the representation of the new physics 
                                                 
14 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of  Matter and Meaning 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), p. 18. 
15 Bernard Harrison, Inconvenient Fictions: Literature and the Limits of  Theory (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1991), p. 11. 
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(relativity and quantum mechanics), first in popular science writing (Ch. 3), and then in 
contemporary fiction (Ch. 4). Chapters 5 and 6 turn to the biological sciences. I consider first the 
representation in popular science writing of genetics (Ch. 5.1) and evolutionary theory (Ch. 5.2) 
and then examine the engagement with these same fields of science in recent fiction (Ch. 6). 
 
These two very different areas of science – the new physics and the modern biological synthesis – 
have been chosen because the representations of them by popular science writers share a 
connection to the idea of determinism. But these were also the two areas that received the most 
widespread coverage in popular science books in the 1980s and 1990s. In particular, the popular 
science boom in the 1980s was built around physics with A Brief History of Time at the 
culmination. Then, in the build up to the publication of the HGP in 2000, evolution and genetics 
had their own boom. Patricia Waugh notes that the interest in science shown by novelists broadly 
follows the same pattern.16  
 
The new physics can be interpreted as fatally undermining a fully deterministic understanding of 
the universe. Universal determinism is often associated with Pierre Simon Laplace, and his 
formulation from his 1814 Essai Philosophique sur les Probabilités is surely the most famous one: 
We ought then to regard the present state of  the universe as the effect of  its 
anterior state and as the cause of  the one which is to follow. Given for one 
instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by which nature 
is animated and the respective situation of  the beings who compose it – an 
intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to analysis – it would embrace 
in the same formula the motions of  the greatest bodies of  the universe and 
those of  the lightest atom; for it nothing would be uncertain and the future, as 
the past, would be present to its eyes.17 
The popular science books that I consider in chapter 3 tend to interpret the new physics as 
refuting the mechanistic vision of Laplacian determinism, presenting it as having indeterministic 
or anti-deterministic implications. In that chapter I will show how writers such as Gary Zukav, 
Fritjof Capra, Brian Greene and others explain the complex and sometimes counter-intuitive 
consequences of the new theories in ways that serve to support this emphasis on indeterminism. 
In the first half of chapter 5 I look at genetic determinism, and find that although none of the 
writers subscribe to a ‘hard’ form of genetic determinism and even while these texts explicitly 
acknowledge the role of environment, still the metaphors employed tend to support a gene-
                                                 
16  Patricia Waugh, ‘Science and Fiction in the 1990s’ in British Fiction of  the 1990s, ed. by Nick Bentley 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), pp. 57-77 (p. 57). 
17  Pierre Simon, Marquis de Laplace, A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, trans. by Frederick Wilson 
Truscott and Frederick Lincoln Emory from the sixth French edition (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
1902), p. 4. 
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centric stance – emphasising the determining effect of genes in the development of an organism 
over that of environmental factors. In the second part of chapter 5 I turn to evolutionary biology 
and find a related form of biological determinism in the presentation of evolution as having a 
teleological inevitability which culminates in our own evolutionary development. This is 
supported in part by narrative structures that equate the supposedly linear and cumulative 
progress towards scientific knowledge with a teleological interpretation of evolution.  
 
This link between narrative and determinism that becomes apparent in representations of 
evolution in popular science writing perhaps indicates why these particular fields of science, and 
especially their implications for our ideas about physical and biological determinism, have caught 
the attention of fiction writers. In chapter 4 I show how novelists such as Thomas Pynchon, 
Martin Amis and Ian McEwan and the playwrights Tom Stoppard and Michael Frayn have 
utilised images and ideas from the new physics – and have also picked up on the apparent 
indeterminism implied by them, quite probably influenced by the emphasis on this angle by 
popular science writers. These borrowed concepts are often used in conjunction with a ‘narrative 
indeterminacy’ and a questioning of deterministic causality; but they also open up larger 
epistemological questions about the capacity of science to achieve complete knowledge of the 
world, and therefore the problems of scientific monism. The epigraph to this introduction, from 
an interview with Margaret Atwood, reveals that she sees fiction as tackling the same ‘big’ 
epistemological questions as science and points to the implicit belief that fiction can work 
towards answers to these questions. It is this idea, that science does not have a monopoly on 
answering the big questions, that can be seen in many of the novels that I will look at in chapters 
4 and 6.  
 
In chapter 6 I consider novelists’ engagements with the biological sciences. Concentrating on Ian 
McEwan and A.S. Byatt, but also touching on David Mitchell, Margaret Atwood and Kazuo 
Ishiguro, I identify a loose pattern of resistance to the idea of a biological determinism founded 
either upon genetics or upon instincts resulting from our evolutionary development. McEwan’s 
engagements with these fields are of particular interest, since many of his key protagonists are 
scientists and unashamedly rationalist in outlook, often openly disparaging towards literature; and 
yet his novels tend to enact a more nuanced critique than his characters, not easily shoehorned 
into a two cultures model.  
 
These two chapters on fiction look predominantly, but not exclusively, at British novels of the 
last twenty years, though where relevant I also refer to novels by authors from America and 
Canada and to novels written before 1990. The most significant exception to this concentration is 
 8 
in chapter four, which examines the representation of physics in recent fiction – here, the plays 
of Michael Frayn and Tom Stoppard are too significant to omit from the discussion, and hence 
are included as an important part of that chapter.  
 
Whether literature can create or convey ‘knowledge’, or even be said to contain truth, is open to 
question. ‘No-truth’ theories of literature stretch back, of course, to Plato’s opinion in Book X of 
The Republic that art and literature cannot teach anyone anything because “teaching requires 
something to teach, namely, knowledge, moral or otherwise; and knowledge, according to Plato, 
was something that neither literature nor art had to offer”.18 More recently, Lamarque and Olsen 
argue, in Truth, Fiction and Literature: A Philosophical Perspective (“surely the most comprehensive 
philosophy of literature in the analytic tradition to date”19), that literature’s value does not lie in its 
capacity to contain truth, and that any truths it can contain are not new for the reader, but already 
understood by them.20 Noel Carroll categorises Lamarque and Olsen’s position as a ‘banality 
argument’, one of three categories of no-truth theories that he identifies: ‘no-evidence’ 
arguments, ‘no-argument’ arguments, and ‘banality’ arguments.  
 
No-evidence arguments note that although literature can contend views that are themselves true, 
it cannot confirm the truth of these views itself – few works of art or literature evince evidence 
for their ‘claims’. No-argument theories of literature state that even if works contain truths, 
neither the work itself nor the critical discourse around them argue for these truths: these truths 
just do not seem to be an important feature of works of literature or art. Finally, the banality 
argument may be summed up by the scathing comment of Richard L. Purtill that the truths that 
fiction illustrates “seem so platitudinous and threadbare as to raise serious questions about the 
importance of artistic truth”.21 Critics have put forward pro-truth arguments, but in general they 
appear partial or unconvincing.22 What then, if any, is literature’s epistemological value? 
 
Margaret Atwood’s comment on the similarities between science and fiction that begins this 
introduction also indicates, perhaps inadvertently, one important way in which literature differs 
from science. Literature’s capacity to ask ‘what if?’, to address the counter-factual and speculative, 
has been highlighted by proponents of pro-truth theories as one way in which literature can play 
                                                 
18  Noel Carroll, ‘The Wheel of  Virtue: Art, Literature and Moral Knowledge’, The Journal of  Aesthetics and 
Art Criticism, 60 (2002), 3-26 (p. 3). 
19  Ibid. 
20  Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen, Truth, Fiction, and Literature: A Philosophical Perspective 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1994). 
21  Quoted in Carroll, p. 4. 
22  Carroll; M. W. Rowe, ‘Lamarque and Olsen on Literature and Truth’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 47 
(1997), 322-41; Peter Mew, ‘Facts in Fiction’, The Journal of  Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 31 (1973), 329-
37. 
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an epistemological role – by, for example acting as thought-experiments, or generating 
hypotheses.23 These seem like insignificant concessions, giving to literature functions that are 
fulfilled sufficiently already by other disciplines outside literature. These pro-truth arguments 
almost ignore the ‘literariness’ of literary works and, more importantly, subscribe to precisely the 
criteria for knowledge creation that are established by science, thus affirming them. I will return 
to this question in my conclusion, but it is worth noting now that the engagements with science 
in the literary works that I examine in this thesis might point us towards a possible response to 
the question above and a route out of this bind. As they appropriate scientific ideas for their 
novels and plays these authors also consider them epistemologically, and their attention reveals 
the limitations of scientific knowledge. Literature can act as a reminder of the boundaries of 
scientific knowledge, and of the dangers of a monistic scientific epistemology. As Bernard 
Harrison puts it, “the peculiar value of literature in a culture such as ours, the thing which really 
does make it essential to a civilised society, is its power to act as a standing rebuke and irritant to 
the dominant paradigm of knowledge”.24 
                                                 
23  Carroll, pp. 7-11 et passim; Mew, pp. 329-37. 
24  Harrison, p. 4. 
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2 A Historical and Theoretical Contextualisation of  
Popular Science Writing 
 
 
Any study of popular science writing faces an immediate problem of definition. Quite what is 
considered to constitute popular science as a genre varies depending on the interest of the 
researcher and the nature of their approach to popular science writing; likewise there is only 
limited agreement concerning the common characteristics of popular science writing. 
Additionally, there is no stable vocabulary for discussing popular science – terms such as 
‘popularization’, ‘pop science’, ‘popular science’, ‘public science’, ‘public understanding of 
science’ or ‘expository science’ are used in ways that overlap with and contradict their use by 
other researchers.1 Jon Turney has noted that we “lack an effective critical vocabulary for 
discussing popular science books”, and while Leane is perhaps correct to respond that “one 
could equally argue that we have a superfluity of vocabularies” the problem remains: there is no 
consensus concerning the terminology of the study of popular science.2 The purpose of this 
section is therefore to outline my own conception of the field of popular science and to attempt 
to identify a set of criteria useful for delimiting the genre of popular science writing; finally I will 
clarify my own use of key terms.  
 
As a point of departure for this theoretical background it will be useful to briefly place popular 
science within its historical context. This thesis is not a historical analysis of popular science 
writing, so this will necessarily be an overview of a complex area that has been extensively studied 
by other scholars.  
 
 
2.1 A Brief History of Popular Science 
 
It is a slightly thankless task attempting to identify the moment of the emergence of popular 
science as a genre. Gregory and Miller put forward the possible view that popular science writing 
could be deemed to predate scholarly communication of science – citing Herodotus, Lucretius, 
                                                 
1  Peter Broks, Understanding Popular Science (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2006), p. 1. 
2 Jon Turney, ‘More Than Story-Telling: Reflecting on Popular Science’ in Science Communication in Theory 
and Practice, ed. by Susan M. Stocklmayer, Michael M. Gore and Chris Bryant (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2001), pp. 47-62 (p. 47); Leane, p. 22. 
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Copernicus and Galileo – and it is a not illogical conclusion.3 However, it is sensible to begin with 
the assumption that ‘popular science’, as something sufficiently distinct from ‘science’ as to form 
its own genre, could only really come into being as science became more professionalised – 
though I will discuss the criticisms of this view later. This places the emergence of the popular 
science genre firmly in the nineteenth century – after all, if ‘popular science’ presupposes ‘science’  
then ‘science’, as the title of an academic discipline, only replaces ‘natural history’ during the 
nineteenth century; the term ‘scientist’ is only coined by Whewell in the 1830s.4 Identifying, more 
precisely, a decade, or even half-century, in which popular science can be said to emerge is, 
however, extremely difficult. As Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent concludes in her examination of 
popular science in the twentieth century “there is nothing like a linear process of development of 
the popularization of science [...] it is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon which has 
periods of expansion and relative decline”, and this is as true before the twentieth century as 
within it.5 Nonetheless, in the middle period of the nineteenth century, between 1820 and 1870, 
there was a significant growth of popular science publishing – particularly in periodical form: 
“Popular science periodicals began to appear in the 1820s […and their] production peaked in the 
1860s”, a decade that Ruth Barton refers to as the “high point in popular science periodical 
publishing in nineteenth-century England”.6 Similarly, Sheets-Pyenson tells us that it was in the 
1850s and 1860s that a group of vulgarisateurs began to form in France to disseminate ‘high 
science’.7 
 
John C. Burnham identifies a similar ‘boom’ in the United States, albeit during the following 
decade: “popularization of science reached an unusual peak of intensity in the early part of that 
decade [the 1870s]”.8  This slight delay is fairly explicable given that “Residents of the New 
World had habitually, if reluctantly, looked to the Old World for civilization and learning”, and, 
more directly, that much of the popular science material in the US was actually “reprinted (usually 
pirated) English books” and that “American magazine editors for decades borrowed openly from 
                                                 
3  Jane Gregory and Steve Miller, Science in Public: Communication, Culture and Credibility (Cambridge, MA: 
Basic Books, 2000), p. 19. 
4 David M. Knight, Natural Science Books in English, 1600-1900 (London: Batsford, 1972), p. 1; David M. 
Knight ‘Scientists and their Publics: Popularization of  Science in the Nineteenth Century’ in The 
Cambridge History of  Science, Volume 5: The Modern Physical and Mathematical Sciences, ed. by Mary Jo Nye 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 72-90 (p. 73). 
5 Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent, ‘In the Name of  Science’, Science in the Twentieth Century, ed. by John 
Krige and Dominique Pestre (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1997), pp. 319-38 (p. 336). 
6  Susan Sheets-Pyenson, ‘Popular Science Periodicals in Paris and London: The Emergence of  a Low 
Scientific Culture, 1820-1875’, Annals of  Science, 42 (1985), 549-72 (p. 551); Ruth Barton, ‘Just Before 
Nature: The Purposes of  Science and the Purposes of  Popularization in some English Popular Science 
Journals of  the 1860s’, Annals of  Science, 55 (1998), 1-33 (p. 2). 
7 Sheets-Pyenson, p. 556. 
8 John C. Burnham, How Superstition Won and Science Lost: Popularizing Science and Health in the United States 
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987), p. 159. 
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English magazines”.9 But already by the 1840s Americans had “started using the term ‘popularize’ 
frequently”.10 Even before this, writers were well aware of the rise of popular science: writing in 
1830 one reviewer notes that “[i]t is indeed one of the peculiar and great undertakings of the age, 
to communicate scientific knowledge to the whole intelligent portion of the mass of society […] 
Diffusion is the watch-word of the age”.11 ‘Diffusion’ implies a slightly different process to 
popularization, one in which the scientific knowledge remains unchanged as it is disseminated. 
Whether this is possible even in scholarly scientific texts and communications is open to 
question, but it would certainly seem to place diffusion in a separate category to popular science 
writing.12 Nonetheless, Burnham notes that “diffusion of scientific knowledge in the United 
States turned into popularization early in the nineteenth century” and identifies a “significant 
expansion of popularization and the rise of the term in the 1840s”.13  
 
There are obvious social and historical reasons for this ‘boom’, that are not peculiar to science 
publishing, and are those which gave rise to increased publication in general; indeed, Sheets-
Pyenson observes that the rise of science periodical publication from the 1820s to a peak in 
1860s “follow[s] the contours of general periodical publication”.14 These general factors were the 
increasing literacy of the masses on the one hand, which created a market, and changes in 
printing technology which allowed for cheaper production. Moreover, Sheets-Pyenson notes 
other social and technological conditions that facilitated the success of these “new forms of 
popular literature” – such as less restrictive legislation and lower taxation on advertisements and 
paper, and the use of new transportation facilities like railways for distribution – as well as 
cultural changes, in particular a “more literate and leisured public” and the notion that “[r]eading, 
a purely intellectual pursuit, was praised for producing ‘habits of reflexion’ particularly 
‘favourable to orderly conduct’”.15 Having recognised these general conditions Ruth Barton notes 
that “there were also changes in the form and content of popular science journals which suggest 
changes in the status and nature of the scientific community”.16 Specifically she highlights a shift, 
in the years before the 1860s, from an emphasis on the utility of science, mechanical processes, 
                                                 
9 Burnham, p. 129. 
10  Burnham, p. 32. 
11 ‘Diffusion of  Knowledge’, North American Review, 30 (April 1830), 293-312 (p. 295, p. 297). Quoted in 
Burnham, p. 32.  
12 R.G. Dolby, ‘The Transmission of  Science’, History of  Science, 15 (1977), 1-43.  
13 Burnham, p. 33. 
14 Sheets-Pyenson, p. 551. 
15 Sheets-Pyenson, p. 549, p. 550. For the changing economic and social conditions of  periodical 
publication see also W.H. Brock, ‘The Development of  Commercial Science Journals in Victorian 
Britain’ in Development of  Science Publishing in Europe, ed. by A.J. Meadows (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science 
Publishers, 1980), pp. 95-122. 
16 Barton, p. 3. 
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amateur scientists and a sometimes critical attitude towards theory, to an emphasis on 
professional science and theory, and a “denigratory [attitude towards] interest in mere utility”: 
From the 1820s to the 1850s popular journals had espoused an experiential, 
inductivist science to which all their readers could contribute…[this] began to 
disappear in the new journals of  the 1860s when popularizers sought not 
participation from amateurs but support for professionals.17 
These two forms of popular science periodical writing in the nineteenth century are described by 
Sheets-Pyenson as ‘low science’ and ‘popular science’ respectively. Those periodicals of the early- 
to mid-nineteenth century, which aimed not to ‘translate’ or disseminate scientific knowledge or 
discoveries, but rather to encourage and support amateur science Sheets-Pyenson terms ‘low 
science’ as they “sometimes sought to establish their own canons of scientific investigation, 
criticism, and explanation”, not quite in opposition to, but as separate from, ‘high’ science. 
Popular science, then, is better seen as “a subset of ‘low science’; specifically it is that kind of ‘low 
science’ that attempts to make ‘high’ scientific discourse intelligible to the non-scientists”. By 
contrast ‘low science’ sometimes “vigorously opposed the ‘high’ scientific establishment”.18  
 
This is a useful distinction because it draws attention to the fact that an important element in 
popular science (or popularized science) is the idea of it acting as a ‘translation’ from the 
discourse of ‘high’ science to that of the ‘general public’. This view of popular science as a 
translation has been criticised as part of the ‘dominant view’ of popular science (to use 
Hilgartner’s phrase) by scholars who have rightly noted that translation is often equated with 
simplification or corruption. I will examine these arguments in more detail towards the end of 
this chapter. While I follow these critiques and accept that it is important to adjust our 
conception of how popular science mediates between these two discourses, and how the two 
communities are constituted – specifically, to accept that the mediation is not uni-directional and 
to resist reductive approaches to the genre – I believe that its mediatory role is significant in 
demarcating the genre.  
 
Burnham is in no doubt about this mediatory role, nor indeed as to the relationship between the 
rise of professional scientists and the ‘boom’ in popular science writing in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century: 
The significant expansion of  popularization and rise of  the term in the 1840s 
reflected the appearance in the United States of  professional scientists, people 
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
18 Sheets-Pyenson, p. 551. 
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whose knowledge and activities now clearly differentiated the group from their 
fellow citizens. People within the scientist group tended to speak the same 
language – at least enough to understand each other. Observers therefore 
spoke then and have spoken since of  the need to simplify and interpret or 
translate for the masses outside the expert group.19  
My analysis of the rise of popular science in the nineteenth century does not preclude the fact 
that there is a much longer history of the exposition of ideas for a non-specialist audience within 
natural history and natural philosophy, ideas that we would now categorise as science.  Isaac 
Asimov, in an article for Nature in 1983 called simply ‘Popularizing Science’, suggests that 
Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle, author of Entretien sur la pluralité des mondes (1686), “was perhaps 
the first person to make a reputation in science on the basis of his popular science writing 
alone”.20 Similarly, G.S. Rousseau, in his essay ‘Science Books and their Readers in the Eighteenth 
Century’, uses the phrases ‘popular science’ and ‘popularization’ repeatedly to refer to books 
published in the eighteenth century: “the dissemination of natural philosophy after 1710 or 1720 
caused an unprecedented consumer-interest in popular science books, a consumption that 
continued into the early nineteenth century”.21  
 
However, even though we may retrospectively construct a lineage of popular science writing 
from examples from the eighteenth century and earlier, there are a number of reasons why I 
choose to see the middle of the nineteenth century as the moment of the emergence of popular 
science. To return to Asimov’s article, it is conspicuous, despite his claim for Fontenelle, that the 
other popularizers that he goes on to mention are all writing in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries: “there have been science popularizers ever since, including some important scientists – 
from Davy to Faraday, through Tyndall, Jeans and Eddington, to our contemporaries, Sagan and 
Gould”.22 The nineteenth century sees a qualitative change, and there are some general reasons 
for this. Firstly it is difficult to draw a line between popular science and original expositions of 
science in the eighteenth century. This continues into the nineteenth century, as Knight observes, 
but as the century progresses original science is more rarely written in a form intended for the 
general reading public.23 So that by the beginning of the twentieth century, as Gregory and Miller 
observe, the “great scientist-popularizers of the 19th century (Charles Darwin, for example), who 
would write their new ideas in books accessible to a wide range of people, were replaced by the 
                                                 
19 Burnham, pp. 33-4. 
20 Quoted in Leane, p. 20. 
21 G.S. Rousseau, ‘Science Books and their Readers in the Eighteenth Century’, in Books and their Readers 
in Eighteenth-Century England, ed. by Isabel Rivers (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1982), pp. 197-
255 (p. 211). 
22  Quoted in Leane, p. 20. 
23 Knight, Natural Science Books, p. 190. 
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popular scientists of the early 20th century (such as the astronomer Arthur Eddington), who 
would publish a journal paper and a popular book aimed at different, separate readerships”.24  
 
This reveals, then, another sub-division of popular science writing, since many science books 
written in non-technical language in the nineteenth century, such as Lyell’s Principles of Geology or 
the Origin, were also the original description of theories or scientific evidence, rather than the 
popularization of science that had been published elsewhere, in journals or as monographs. I do 
not wish to present popularization as merely the collation and dissemination of established ideas, 
and I will show below that many popular science books that are exemplars of the recent form of 
the genre exhibit a range of levels of speculativeness and that they are still sometimes used to 
propose new scientific theories rather than explicate old ones; nonetheless, popular science 
writing in recent decades has tended towards the explication of scientific ideas already published 
in other scholarly forms, less often the case in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century science writing. 
 
A second major difference between popular science in the mid- to late-nineteenth century and 
that which had gone before has already been touched upon: the question of audience. It seems 
fair to demand that a popular science book should reach, or at least intend or expect to reach, a 
fairly large audience from a range of backgrounds – that it should be aimed at a ‘general 
readership’. For much of the period before the middle of the nineteenth century science books 
were inaccessible to the general public. Two details from G.S. Rousseau’s essay reveal the 
narrowness of the potential audience for science books in the eighteenth century: on the subject 
of the rise of book clubs he says of the members that they “demanded printed science books and 
could now afford one or two”; in a footnote apparently supporting the “extent the new literate 
public was buying these books” Rousseau admits that “these books averaged £1 1s. so the 
common man could not afford them, but aristocrats, libraries, colleges and other institutions 
bought them”.25 Likewise Bensaude-Vincent describes the eighteenth-century public of science as 
“enlightened ‘amateurs’ who attended public lectures of chemistry and electricity and occasionally 
cultivated science as a leisure activity in their elegant ‘cabinets’” – hardly a ‘general public’ then. It 
was not until the nineteenth century that, for some of the reasons already discussed, “a mass 
consumption of science developed”.26 
 
Finally, it might be admitted that there are pre-nineteenth-century works which do conform 
sufficiently to the criteria that I deem to describe the popular science genre (a set of criteria I will 
                                                 
24  Gregory and Miller, p. 26. 
25 Rousseau, p. 208, p. 247 n. 76. 
26 Bensaude-Vincent, p. 320. 
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propose towards the end of this chapter) as to be called popular science. In other words, just as 
there are pre-eighteenth-century antecedents to the novel form that predate the rise of that genre, 
so these works of popular science are exceptions that foreshadow the nineteenth-century 
emergence of the popular science genre. 
 
* * * * 
 
So far I have argued that the genre that we know as popular science can be traced back to a 
divergence from a different category of science – academic science, or ‘high’ science. Bernadette 
Bensaude-Vincent is, however, resistant to this idea that popular science develops as a “kind of 
side-effect of a universal process of professionalization”.27 Historians of science, she says, are 
“inclined to consider the emergence of the popularization of science as a result of the 
specialization of science. Since scientific knowledge is increasingly specialized, complex and 
esoteric, it is assumed that mediations are required in order to bridge the gulf between a small 
elite of learned scientists and the mass of other citizens”.28 In her implied rejection of the idea of 
the ‘gulf’, Bensaude-Vincent is clearly drawing on the critiques of the ‘dominant view’ of popular 
science by Hilgartner and Whitley, critiques examined in more detail below; in brief, however, 
these studies question the idea of popular science as a uni-directional ‘translation’ of ‘high 
science’ for a lay readership.29 Bensaude-Vincent seems to be arguing that just as popular science 
should not be seen as mediating across the gulf from elite scientists to lay readers, so its 
emergence should not be linked to the increasing specialization and professionalization of science 
in the nineteenth century.  
 
There is, I believe, a slippage in this argument, primarily but not exclusively in the conflation of 
‘specialization’ and ‘professionalization’. This distinction is important: Bensaude-Vincent 
criticises the view that specialization leads to the growth of popular science because it suggests a 
hierarchy of knowledge; in other words, that as scientists become more specialised the science 
becomes more complex and popularizers are required to ‘explain’ this complex science to the 
general public. This is a model that clearly lies within the dominant view of popularisation 
reinforcing the superiority of scientific knowledge. However, to associate the rise of popular 
science with increased ‘professionalization’ is subtly different: this change in the scientific 
                                                 
27 Bensaude-Vincent, p. 319. 
28 Ibid. 
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disciplines created a new audience (or a much larger audience) of other professional scientists 
within one’s field, at which technical scientific writing could now be aimed. As Knight puts it, 
before the nineteenth century “the number of active men of science in the country was small, and 
the number of professionals in the strict sense of being paid as scientists was very small indeed. 
Their books, and to some extent their papers too, had to be written with the inexpert reader in 
mind”.30 This changed, however, in the nineteenth century, and particularly in the second half of 
the nineteenth century, when “the number of scientists increased and scientific books and articles 
were, as a rule, directed at professionals”.31 Bensaude-Vincent is keen to distance herself from 
other historians of science whose approach sees “the emergence of science popularization as a 
necessary consequence of the ‘advancement of science’”.32 But I suggest that the increased 
technicality of non-popular works (and hence the need for popular science writing) should not be 
seen as consequence of the advancement of science, but instead as a result of a shift in the 
intended audience of scientific works. In other words, we need not presume that science itself 
moved away from the public in terms of technicality (although this may also be true) in order to 
explain the rise in popular science, but rather observe that scientists, with a new audience of 
other professional scientists, were no longer writing for a general, if educated, readership. This 
professionalization meant that the “popularizer, and the text-book author, interpreter of the work 
of others, became increasingly necessary”.33 
 
While we should not return to the reductionist ‘canonical’ view of popular science,34 it is 
important to recognise the mediatory role that popular science does play between two discourses. 
Hilgartner’s argument that “‘popularization’ is a matter of degree” is convincing; but this does 
not mean that we should abandon all distinction between ‘real science’ and ‘popularized science’, 
nor does Hilgartner suggest we should: “The boundary between real science and popularized 
science can be drawn at various points depending on what criteria one adopts”.35 In other words, 
drawing a line between the two discourses is often arbitrary; but in order for popular science to 
represent a useful category we must still draw this line and distinguish popular science from real 
science.  
 
To return, then, to the historical emergence of popular science in the nineteenth century, we can 
see that it is only with the creation and development of a discourse of ‘real science’ that popular 
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31 Ibid. 
32 Bensaude-Vincent, p. 336. 
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science can be understood to exist; quite when the two are deemed to part is clearly an arbitrary 
decision. To put it another way, popular science only branches off from science because science 
itself is moving in the opposite direction, away from popular science. Although I do not wish to 
see popular science as discontinuous with, unconnected to, or in opposition to, ‘high science’, 
and although popular science does have a discursive role to play in the formation of scientific 
knowledge, one of its primary functions is nonetheless to mediate between the discourse of 
professional science conducted in journals, at conferences and in laboratories and the discourse 
of the public image of science, and science in popular culture.  
 
* * * * 
 
Following the ‘boom’ period in the 1860s and 1870s there was an “unexpected decline of popular 
science literature [...] at the turn of the century”.36 Bensaude-Vincent attributes this dip in 
‘consumption’ of popular science to a downturn in public confidence in science to provide 
solutions to problems, and a declining interest in the repeated celebration of progress.37 The First 
World War, too, affected the public image of scientists: initially positively, as scientists were seen 
as mobilizing in support of the war effort; and then in the aftermath, negatively, as the use of 
chemical weapons tarnished the image of scientific endeavour. Following the war there was an 
attempt to reinstate the idea of the purity and nobility of science, and this was embodied, at least 
in the media and in popular science, in the figures of Einstein and Marie Curie. This emphasis on 
the individual brilliance of scientists was mirrored in the Nobel Prizes, created in 1901, but 
steadily gaining public exposure in the 1920s. The inter-war years saw another peak in popular 
science and it was during this period that “science popularization was established as a public 
institution in many countries”.38  
 
The 1920s and 1930s saw the rise of the ‘new’ physics, following Eddington’s ‘proof’ of 
Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity in 1919 through observations of the solar eclipse. 
Elizabeth Leane notes that the popularity and visibility of the new physics books prefigures the 
boom that was so widely noted in the last decades of the twentieth century: “The 1920s and 
1930s saw a boom in popular physics books in both Britain and the United States, a publishing 
phenomenon which, like the late twentieth-century boom, was clearly identified by publishers and 
popularizers of the time”.39 Like the later ‘Hawking Phenomenon’, historians of popular science 
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have sought to understand the factors behind this surge in interest in popular science; and, I 
contend, like the later theoretical physicist, Einstein’s appeal has something to do with his own 
persona, but also much to do, paradoxically, with the incomprehensibility of his theories. It is 
widely joked that Hawking’s A Brief History of Time is the bestseller that nobody has read, and 
Hawking’s biographer Michael White records that “it has been estimated that only 1% of buyers 
actually read the book”;40 similarly, the impenetrability of Relativity, or more precisely the 
perception of its impenetrability, is perfectly epitomised by the, probably apocryphal, story that 
when asked if it was true that only three people understood relativity, Eddington replied “Oh, 
who’s the third?”. 
 
After the Second World War there was, as Peter Bowler describes it, an “ignorance of science 
and a suspicion of what it might produce”.41 It is tempting to assume that public attitudes 
towards nuclear weapons were central to this distrust, and certainly there is evidence to support 
this. Peter Broks draws on Mass Observation documents that reveal that “in most cases the initial 
reaction [to the use of the atomic bomb in August 1945] was one of horror”, and also that “when 
asked to think of science ‘most people ... think of the bomb’”.42 Nonetheless he also cautions that 
“we must be careful of adopting such easy formulations” since anti-science sentiment and 
disillusionment had been growing since the early decades of the century.43 Besides, post-war 
reactions to science were “deeply contradictory”.44 For example, he notes that, despite the 
suspicion of science, after the war “the public seems to have had a genuine thirst for knowledge”, 
one that led to a “post-war bonanza” of popular science and an “outpouring of scientific 
information”.45 In the decades after the Second World War “popular science had never been so 
popular”, with the broadcasting of popular science television programmes such as Zoo Quest 
(1954), The Sky at Night (1957- ), Tomorrow’s World (1965-2002), Horizon (1964- ), The Ascent of Man 
(1973) and Carl Sagan’s Cosmos which was seen by an estimated 140 million people in three 
years.46 
 
By the 1980s, then, “there was talk of a popular science ‘boom’”.47 In this thesis I will look at 
popular science books published during this ‘boom’, which “began rumbling in the late 1970s 
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and reached its peak in the 1990s”.48 Broks identifies the same “cultural shift beginning around 
the late 1970s and early 1980s” and cites the bookshop Waterstone’s own Guide to Popular Science 
Books (2000) which noted that “the world of science literature has seen an astonishing sea change 
over the last fifteen or so years”. 49  
 
 
2.2  Theoretical Approaches to Popular Science – Towards a Definition 
 
The outline above of some of the historiographical studies of the popular science genre reveals 
significant disagreements about when popularization can be deemed to have ‘begun’; however, 
these differences are really variations in the authors’ conceptions of popularization itself. It is 
clear, reading, say,  Burnham and Rousseau that they have dissimilar ideas as to what ‘popular 
science’ or ‘popularization’ really is, or what the process entails, but neither of them dedicate any 
space to elucidating their own definition. Bruce Lewenstein, in a brief overview of the 
historiography of popularization, identifies two categories of works that have considered 
popularization, and gives Burnham’s book as a prime example of the first of these. This first 
strand “emerging mainly from attempts by single authors to survey broad periods of time, takes 
the notion of ‘popularization’ to be unproblematic – as the means by which the knowledge 
produced by scientists is distributed to audiences beyond the limits of professional research”.50 
Rousseau, it would be fair to say, falls into this category also. On the other hand the second 
groups of works, mainly from the 1980s and 1990s, took “popularization not as a product, but as 
a process” and challenged “the sharp line between doing science and popularizing it”.51 Studies in 
this ‘strand’ ask vital questions about the definitions of popular science. Their interrogation of the 
assumptions about popular science, and some of their conclusions, will inform my own definition 
of popular science, and it is therefore to such studies that I wish to turn now. 
 
I have had cause to mention, in the course of the previous historical contextualisation of popular 
science, the concept of the ‘dominant view’ of popular science, and the studies that have sought 
to overturn this view. It has now become compulsory in studies of popular science such as this 
one to include a similar rejection, drawing on Hilgartner, Whitley, and Cloître and Shinn,52 of the 
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traditional conception of popular science – to the extent that one wonders whether the dominant 
view is not now one that supports the realignment.53 However, this overturning of an inflexible 
and often derogatory view of popularization is to be appreciated, even if the phrase ‘dominant 
view’ may well now be outdated (I will use the phrase ‘traditional model’ instead). Briefly, the 
traditional model of popular science involves two communities – the scientists and scientific 
institutions, and the public. Popular science is seen as a translation of the knowledge produced by 
the former community and absorbed by the latter, in a one-way passage of information. 
Furthermore, the process of popularization is seen as “at best, ‘appropriate simplification’ [...a]t 
worst popularization is ‘pollution’”, and yet is not seen as having any impact on the elite scientific 
community.54 Hilgartner sees the conception of popular science as ‘contaminated’ as being a 
crucial corollary for the maintenance of the ideal of pure scientific knowledge, shoring “up an 
idealised view of genuine, objective, scientifically-certified knowledge” and also placing the 
judgement of which popularizations are “‘appropriate’ [...] and which are ‘distortions’” in the 
hands of the scientific community.55  
 
The primary criticism of the traditional model is the reductiveness of the process and of the 
formulation of the two communities: there is a far greater heterogeneity than is conceived in the 
traditional model. Firstly, the audience, the ‘knowledge acquirers’ in Whitley’s phrase, are 
traditionally seen as “large, diffuse, undifferentiated and passive”, but Whitley shows that parts of 
the audience exert an influence back upon scientific research and that (even excluding “the 
important set of audiences constituted by other scientists”) they vary in levels of scientific 
knowledge.56 In short “there are a number of readily identifiable audiences for scientific 
knowledge which pursue a variety of goals and which are important for scientific research in a 
number of ways”.57 Similarly, the scientific community is not a single monolithic entity, but a 
diverse conglomeration of groups, each with varying epistemological assumptions and 
experimental practices. The traditional idea of popular science translating between the scientists 
and the public has been eroded partly by the fact that “the expansion and specialisation of 
scientific research in the past 200 or so years has resulted in many scientists popularising their 
work to other groups of scientists as well as to non-scientists”: specialisation has “increasingly 
necessitated intrascientific popularisation”.58 There is, to use Cloître and Shinn’s phrase, “a sort 
                                                                                                                                                        
and Richard Whitley, Sociology of  the Sciences Yearbook 9 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985), 31-60. 
53 For example, see Greg Myers, ‘Discourse Studies of  Scientific Popularization: Questioning the 
Boundaries’, Discourse Studies, 5 (2003), 265-79; or Leane, pp. 9-10. 
54 Hilgartner, p. 519. 
55  Hilgartner, p. 520. 
56  Whitley, p. 4, p. 5. 
57  Whitley, p. 5. 
58 Whitley, p. 4, p. 10. 
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of expository continuum” of science writing, ranging through “specialist, inter-specialist, 
pedagogical and popular articles”.59  
 
Moreover, popular science covers not merely recognised scientific ‘facts’ but a full spectrum of 
knowledge from rarely disputed, long-held assumptions, through widely believed, but unproved, 
theories, to wild speculation and conjecture. Popular science often represents an expository space 
for ideas which are precisely not established; popular science’s role as a forum for speculative 
theorisation, in a way impossible in a professional journal, can, and perhaps should, be seen as a 
vital one – especially for the cross-fertilisation of ideas within the scientific community. A. 
Truman Schwarz has asserted that “Popularization is [...] a way of going public with controversial 
opinions” and W. Daniel Hillis notes that popular science books often involve ideas “that have 
absolutely no way of getting published within the scientific community”.60 Dawkins recognises 
the importance of the genre when he reveals that his own books contain both “popularizations of 
material already familiar to scientists and original contributions to the field that have changed the 
way scientists think, albeit they haven’t appeared in scientific journals”.61 Popular science writing, 
then, plays a role even in the construction of scientific knowledge. Jan Golinski, for example, 
argues that: 
As facts are translated from the language in which they are represented among 
specialists to language appropriate for a lay audience, they become 
consolidated as knowledge. As experts describe their findings to nonexperts, 
facts are simplified and rendered more dramatic, and the sureness with which 
they are held is strengthened, even among the experts themselves.62 
 
 
2.3  Defining Popular Science 
 
It has been necessary to use phrases such as ‘popular science’ and ‘popularization’ without 
defining them in order to conduct the preceding discussion, precisely because the definition of 
such terms requires a knowledge of some of the arguments and critiques, such as that of the 
‘dominant view’, expounded above. I will briefly present distinctions between the terms that I 
intend to use in this thesis, for the avoidance of confusion. Therefore I take ‘popular science’ to 
                                                 
59 Cloître and Shinn, p. 31, p. 32. 
60 Quoted in Leane, p. 20; quoted in John Brockman, The Third Culture (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1995), p. 26. 
61 Quoted in Brockman, p. 23. 
62 Jan Golinski, Making Natural Knowledge: Constructivism and the History of  Science (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), p. 34.  
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mean science written primarily in an expository mode for a general, as opposed to specialist, 
readership. Bensaude-Vincent makes a distinction between ‘popular science’ and ‘popularized 
science’, seeing the former as, in the nineteenth century “a science distinct from that of 
professional science” and in the twentieth century as “the image of science as reflected by 
vehicles of pop culture such as commercial advertisements, best-seller fictions or television 
serials”.63 I, on the other hand, will use ‘popularized science’ and ‘popularization’ synonymously 
with ‘popular science’, but will make a distinction, following Sheets-Pyenson and George 
Basalla’s definitions respectively, between the two representations of science conflated by 
Bensaude-Vincent.64 Thus, I will use ‘low science’ to refer to non-professional science and 
scientific discourse; and I will refer to images of science in popular culture as ‘pop science’. 
Clearly, as Sheets-Pyenson has said of the relationship between low science and popular science, 
the latter is generally contained within the former in the context of early- to mid-nineteenth-
century popular science periodicals, popular science being simply the mode of communication of 
low science. By the late nineteenth century, and certainly in the twentieth century, as popular 
science publications sought to disseminate and explicate ‘high’ science, this relationship between 
popular science and low science had broken down. Whilst current popular science writing is not 
contained within high scientific discourse, nor is it necessarily part of low science either.65 There 
is sometimes overlap too between pop science and popular science: some popular science books, 
the obvious example is A Brief History of Time, have become so well-known as to enter into 
popular culture.  
 
A final phrase that needs clarification is ‘public science’. Here I follow the succinct definition of 
Frank Turner who describes it as “the body of rhetoric, argument and polemic” employed by 
scientists to “justify their activities to the political powers and other social institutions upon 
whose good will, patronage, and cooperation they depend”.66 Here too, there is overlap with 
popular science, in that popular science books can often be deemed to be directly or indirectly 
involved with the justification of their particular field, or indeed the sciences in general. However, 
I will attempt to distinguish between publications whose primary role is expository (popular 
science) and those which are justificatory (public science).  
 
                                                 
63 Bensaude-Vincent, p. 322. 
64 Sheets-Pyenson; George Basalla, ‘Pop Science: The Depiction of  Science in Popular Culture’, Science 
and its Public: The Changing Relationship, ed. by Gerald Holton and William A. Blanpied, Boston Studies in 
the Philosophy of  Science, 33 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1976), 260-78.  
65 However, Danette Paul has shown how popular science works can indeed feed back into high 
scientific discourse. Danette Paul, ‘Spreading Chaos: The Role of  Popularizations in the Diffusion of  
Scientific Ideas’, Written Communication, 21 (2004), 32-68. 
66 Frank M. Turner, ‘Public Science in Britain 1880-1919’, Isis, 71 (1980), 589-601 (p. 589). 
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Almost any means of distinguishing popular science as a genre seems to fall at one hurdle or 
another. In terms of its historical construction as a genre, its inception seems to be based in the 
creation of something that is professional, or specialised, science; at the point at which scientists 
see the audience for their writings as predominantly other specialised scientists, rather than 
interested amateurs or the wider public, a genre of science writing that aimed to disseminate high 
science to a general readership could emerge. Finally, however, one has to conclude that there is 
an essential problem in creating a definition of a genre from an analysis of the members of that 
genre: there is a circularity of argument in trying to isolate the criteria that define a group, the 
members of which one has already chosen, based on a set of implicit criteria. In the end, the best 
one can do is accept that logically, definitions are atomic, or are shorthand for some defining 
properties or characteristics of previously defined objects. I have attempted to establish a 
collection of criteria that tend to define popular science, but with the caveat that many examples 
of the genre will display some but not all of these characteristics.  
 
Popular science can take many forms, and find outlets in almost any media. Books and 
newspaper articles are only the most obvious of an array of means of dissemination: television 
documentaries, radio talks or programmes, public lectures, specialist popular science magazines, 
blogs, youtube videos. To address such a range is well beyond the scope of any single study; I will 
content myself with discussing published book-length works. The justification for this is fairly 
straightforward: since I will be comparing popular science with contemporary fiction it is book-
length published works that, generically, most closely resemble modern novels, with their soft 
covers, back-cover blurbs and critics’ reviews, chapters and epigraphs.67 This superficial similarity 
is borne out by the use of metaphors, characterization and narrative; turning in the next chapter 
to popular science writing on the new physics I will show how several distinct sets of metaphors 
serve to support an account of the new physics that places considerable emphasis on the 
indeterministic implications of this set of related scientific theories. 
                                                 
67  Baudouin Jurdant prefers to see popular science books as most closely related to autobiography, as 
opposed to fiction, since autobiography makes claims to truth in a way that fiction does not. Baudouin 
Jurdant, ‘Popularization of Science as the Autobiography of Science’, Public Understanding of Science, 2 
(1993), 365-73. I agree that this may be an important distinction, but in other ways popular science 
books diverge from autobiography: they may range widely over time and between many different 
characters in a way less likely or common in autobiography, for example. The complex issue of 
fiction’s relationship to truth will be raised in the conclusion to this thesis. 
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3 Representations of Determinism in Popular Science  
 Writing on the New Physics 
 
 
Gary Zukav’s The Dancing Wu Li Masters, a seminal piece of popular science writing on the new 
physics that achieved a cult status in the 1970s, is composed of twelve ‘Chapter 1’s. The rationale, 
presumably, is to remind the reader of an exchange early in the book between Zukav and the T’ai 
Chi Master Al Huang on the structuring of the latter’s classes: 
 ‘Every lesson is the first lesson,’ he told me. ‘Every time we dance we do 
it for the first time.’ 
 ‘But surely you cannot be starting new each lesson,’ I said. ‘Lesson 
number two must be built on what you taught in lesson number one [...] and so 
on.’ 
 ‘When I say that every lesson is the first lesson’, he replied, ‘it does not 
mean that we forget what we already know’.1 
The exchange explains the conceit of the repeated Chapter 1s; but it is also analogous to the way 
in which Zukav wishes to present his subject, the new physics. The paradox of ‘starting anew’, 
but ‘not forgetting what we already know’ is similar to the problems that Zukav faces as he 
attempts to present the new physics (broadly, this means relativity and quantum mechanics) as a 
revolutionary overturning of classical, Newtonian, science. Zukav begins with the relatively 
equivocal position that “quantum mechanics does not replace Newtonian physics, it includes it” 
(Wu Li, 45), equivalent to ‘not forgetting what we already know’; but already by the end of the 
first Chapter 1 he sums up, “The physics of Newton was a thing of the past.” (Wu Li, 90) It is to 
this latter position – that of starting anew – that Zukav defaults in the remainder of the book as 
he characterises the new physics not as a continuation of classical physics, but a rejection of it. 
 
The exchange also epitomises the paradoxical form of thinking that Zukav will emphasise is 
required to come to terms with the conclusions with which quantum mechanics presents us. 
More specifically, the duality of starting anew but not forgetting the previous lessons can be 
compared to the conceptual problem of accepting complementarity – that a photon or electron 
can behave like a particle in one experimental situation and like a wave in another.  
 
                                                 
1 Gary Zukav, The Dancing Wu Li Masters (London: Fontana, 1979), p. 36. All subsequent references are 
to this edition, hereafter Wu Li, and will be made in the text. 
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In his rejection of Newtonian mechanics Zukav is not alone. Fritjof Capra, Stephen Hawking, 
John Gribbin, Brian Greene, and others all identify modern physics’ theories of relativity and 
quantum mechanics as a fundamental break with Newtonian science.2 Popular science figures the 
shift from classical mechanics to the new physics as a revolution in science: Greene describes first 
how “the constancy of light’s speed spelled the downfall of Newtonian physics” and then how 
the development of quantum mechanics  “spell[ed] the downfall of what has come to be known 
as classical physics”;3 Zukav speaks of “the end of the line for classical causality” (Wu Li, 88) as a 
result of the wave-particle duality, and sees “the whole idea of a causal universe [as] undermined 
by the uncertainty principle” (Wu Li, 135); Capra puts it in no uncertain terms – “Quantum 
theory has thus demolished the classical concepts of solid objects and of strictly deterministic 
laws of nature”.4 
 
What is conspicuous in the above quotations is the uncritical yoking of distinct concepts.  
Zukav’s pairing of “classical” and “causality” silently equates the two ideas; a similar slippage is 
evident in Capra’s implication that “deterministic laws of nature” are a classical concept, 
irrelevant to modern physics. Greene is initially more cautious: he describes how the constancy of 
light’s speed “ultimately spells doom for another venerable and cherished theory – Newton’s 
universal theory of gravity” (Elegant Universe, 52), but resists the temptation to extrapolate to 
implications for more general ideas of determinism or causality. But finally he too succumbs to 
patronising a distinctly Laplacian sounding determinism, one that, he implies, has been 
superseded: “By 1927, therefore, classical innocence had been lost. Gone were the days of the 
clockwork universe whose individual constituents were set in motion at some moment in the past 
and obediently fulfilled their inescapable uniquely determined destiny” (Elegant Universe, 107). 
 
These conflations are an important part of the representation of a revolutionary overturning of 
classical physics: Newtonian mechanics comes to stand, metonymically, for determinism and 
even causality. Newtonian physics and determinism, together or separately, are established as 
representatives of the now obsolete. The process of the scientific revolution of relativity and 
quantum mechanics may be represented as the exposure of the limits of Newtonian mechanics, 
but it is a deterministic world-view that is figured as the principle casualty. And yet it is unclear 
                                                 
2 Although the new fields of  chaos and complexity are often presented by popularizers in a similar way, 
I will concentrate on popularizations of  the new physics, with only occasional references to chaos, 
though many of  the arguments also apply to popularizations of  these fields.  
3 Brian Greene, The Elegant Universe: Superstrings, Hidden Dimensions, and the Quest for the Ultimate Theory 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1999), p. 33, p. 90. All subsequent references are to this edition, hereafter 
Elegant Universe, and will be made in the text. 
4 Fritjof  Capra, The Tao of  Physics (London: Fontana, 1981) p. 71. All subsequent references are to this 
edition, hereafter Tao, and will be made in the text. 
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quite what this ‘determinism’ so resoundingly “demolished” (Tao, 71) by the new physics is: none 
of these authors establish an explicit definition of ‘determinism’, apparently presuming the term 
to be unproblematic; but an established definition is essential since, as Bricmont notes, 
“Determinism is one of those words over which many people get involved in disputes, partly 
because it is rarely defined”.5  
 
It is important at this stage to clarify quickly what this critique will not be doing: I will not 
attempt to show that a non-deterministic argument based on the theories of relativity and 
quantum mechanics is wrong by asserting that a deterministic world view is compatible with 
quantum mechanics. This thesis does not seek to make such a critical intervention into 
philosophy of science, or quantum theory. Rather I will interrogate the representations of scientific 
theories and practice in popular science writing. As such, my contention is that, even while the 
theories of the new physics may have consequences for determinism (however we understand the 
term), the emphasis placed by popular science writing on the new physics upon the demise of 
determinism and the resultant implications is striking. This focus is achieved both through 
explicit arguments and statements and, I will argue, through a range of literary devices. 
 
To this end, the slippery use of the word ‘determinism’ is significant for two reasons. Firstly, 
because as noted above, the claim that determinism has been overthrown by the new physics is 
weakened when the precise meaning of determinism is left unclear. Secondly, and more 
significantly, because if the reader is unclear what is connoted by ‘determinism’ then the 
opposition established between the supposedly very different relationships that classical physics 
and the new physics have with determinism may collapse. In other words, if classical physics is 
presented as supporting one form of determinism, and the new physics apparently rejects a 
different form of determinism, then assertions that the new physics has overthrown the classical 
world view are severely undermined. A related issue concerns the misinterpretation of historical 
understandings of determinism – just as an ill-defined idea of determinism may erode the 
opposition created between classical physics and the new physics, so may a misunderstanding of 
the way in which determinism was conceived by classical physicists. This is especially true of 
Laplace’s famous lines on universal determinism, routinely misinterpreted by writers establishing 
a gulf between classical and modern attitudes to determinism.  
 
In this chapter I will examine the strategies in the rejection of determinism in popular science 
writing on the new physics, concentrating in particular on that essential element in the pedagogy 
                                                 
5 Jean Bricmont, ‘Determinism, Chaos and Quantum Mechanics’, 
  <http://www.freeinfosociety.com/pdfs/mathematics/determinism.pdf> [accessed May 23 2007]. 
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of popularisations – metaphor. I will argue that the presentation of the new physics as a 
departure from deterministic laws involves three supporting arguments, and that each of these is 
in turn buttressed by the systematic use of a particular metaphor or range of related metaphors. 
The first emphasises the role of human consciousness in the new physics. This foregrounding of 
consciousness is, I will show, implicit in the repeated use of anthropomorphic metaphors. The 
second establishes an opposition between the old and the new physics, presenting non-
determinism as a consequence of scientific revolutions and progress. This image of scientific 
progress is reinforced by the numerous forms of metaphors involving exploration and maps. The 
third and final element of the anti-determinism of these popular science books consists of the 
assertion of the inherent indeterminism in quantum mechanics. This third argument for 
indeterminism is supported, in the popular science books I will examine, by metaphors which 
draw on the cultural history of the image of the shadow.  
 
 
3.1  Anthropomorphic Particles 
 
The reactions to Laplace’s famous lines on the theoretical possibility of universal determinism 
give us an insight into the motivation behind figuring the new physics as a break with Newtonian 
mechanics. Capra, Greene, Gleick, and Stewart all quote the lines describing how “an intelligence 
which could comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated” and “submit these data to 
analysis [...]; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past, would be present to its 
eyes”.6 As with Greene’s description of a clockwork universe quoted above, there is a patronising 
attitude evident in responses to Laplace – Stewart talks about the “intellectual sleight-of-hand” 
involved, but also allows for “the atmosphere of excitement that prevailed in the science of the 
time”;7 Gleick goes further, describing how Laplace “caught Newtonian fever like no one else” 
and proposing that now “Laplace seems almost buffoon-like in his optimism”.8 But it is perhaps 
Zukav’s response that is most revealing – not specifically to Laplace, but to the laws of motion of 
the old physics on which Laplace rested his apparent assertion of universal determinism:  
[they] carry within them a very dispiriting logic. If  the laws of  nature 
determine the future of  an event, then, given enough information, we could 
have predicted our present at some time in the past. (Wu Li, 51) 
                                                 
6 Laplace, p. 4. 
7 Ian Stewart, Does God Play Dice?: The New Mathematics of  Chaos, 2nd Ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1997), p. 6. 
8 Gleick, Chaos, p. 14. 
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There is a deep reluctance to accept the complete determinism supposedly implied by the old 
laws and this is, I believe, a key impetus behind the opposition created between the old and the 
new physics: as Hoefer observes, “what is at stake in determinism [is...] our fears about our own 
status as free agents in the world”.9 Bricmont has noted that “[m]any people simply cannot 
swallow mechanical and reductionist explanations”; the philosophy of determinism seems to 
disagree with our intuitive sense that we have a conscious choice whether we do X or Y.10 
Popular science writing on the new physics utilises this opposition between determinism on the 
one hand, and conscious choice on the other; Newtonian mechanics is equated with the former, 
whilst a link is made between the new physics and consciousness. How this latter connection 
between the new physics and consciousness is created will be the subject of this section.  
 
Summarising the supposed implications of classical physics, Zukav claims that if we  
accept the mechanistic determination of  Newtonian physics – if  the universe 
really is a great machine – then from the moment that the universe was created 
and set into motion, everything that was to happen in it already was 
determined. (Wu Li, 51) 
The first part of this interpretation of Newtonian physics directly equates mechanistic 
determinism and Newtonian physics; in the immediately following sentence, imagining this 
deterministic world, Zukav simultaneously introduces the counter-argument of the presence of 
free will: 
we may seem to have a will of  our own and the ability to alter the course of  
events in our lives, but we do not. Everything, from the beginning of  time, has 
been predetermined, including our illusion of  having a free will. (Wu Li, 51-52) 
The debate ostensibly concerns scientific determinism, but the focus is subtly shifted through the 
proliferation of first-person pronouns in this second passage (five in two sentences), a 
proliferation all the more evident when contrasted with their absence from the immediately 
preceding lines quoted above. This new focus opposes scientific determinism to free will and the 
importance of human consciousness. Zukav has laid a logical foundation such that if he can show 
that we do have the “ability to alter the course of events”, and more generally emphasise the role 
that consciousness plays, then Newton’s supposed mechanistic determinism appears to be 
undermined.  
 
                                                 
9  Hoefer, (Section 1, Introduction). 
10 Jean Bricmont, ‘Science of  Chaos of  Chaos in Science?’, Physicalia Magazine, 17 (1995) 
 <http://www.chronos.msu.ru/EREPORTS/bricmont.htm> [accessed 24 May 2007], 159-208.  
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Initially, however, Zukav’s refutation of determinism seems to rely upon showing that “quantum 
mechanics does not and cannot predict specific events” (Wu Li, 53). Following the discussion of 
the Great Machine quoted above Zukav goes on to examine the problem of prediction: 
The Great Machine runs blindly on, and all things in it are but cogs. 
 According to quantum mechanics, however, it is not possible, even in 
principle, to know enough about the present to make a complete prediction 
about the future. (Wu Li, 52) 
The almost paratactical juxtaposition of the dismal prospect of our merely illusory free will 
implied by Newtonian mechanics, and the impossibility of prediction asserted by quantum 
mechanics, implies that the former is called into question, or even refuted, by the latter, an 
implication especially evident in that “however”. This refutation rests upon a slippage between 
determinism and prediction criticised by both Jean Bricmont and John Earman. The problem, 
Bricmont claims, is that “nobody who has ever defended universal determinism (in particular 
Laplace [...]) ever meant it to be true in that sense of the word. Everybody agrees that not 
everything in the world is predictable, and it is somewhat surprising to see how many people 
present that truism as if it were a recent discovery”.11 Earman disagrees with Bricmont in that he 
sees Laplace as outlining a definition of determinism which “starts with a causal flavor but ends 
by equating determinism with predictability”.12 But he agrees that we must resist stirring 
“ontology and epistemology [...] into a confused and confusing brew”. For Earman, prediction 
can never form the basis of a definition of determinism: “[Determinism] is an ontological vision; 
whether it is fulfilled or not depends only on the structure of the world, independently of what 
we do or could know of it”.13 As Carl Hoefer concludes: 
‘Predictability’ is therefore a façon de parler that at best makes vivid what is at 
stake in determinism; in rigorous discussions it should be eschewed. The world 
could be highly predictable, in some senses, and yet not deterministic; and it 
could be deterministic yet highly unpredictable, as many studies of  chaos 
(sensitive dependence on initial conditions) show.14 
In the end, however, Zukav does not make prediction the focus of his assertions that 
determinism has been undermined. Instead his refutation focuses on the connection between the 
new physics and consciousness, and I will identify three ways in which this connection is made 
and reinforced. The first, and most explicit, is the emphasis on the role played by the observer in 
                                                 
11 Bricmont, ‘Determinism, Chaos and Quantum Mechanics’. 
12 John Earman, A Primer on Determinism (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1986), p. 7.  
13 Ibid. 
14  Hoefer, (Section 1, Introduction).  
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quantum mechanics. Universal determinism, at least as it is defined by Zukav, Capra, and others, 
is supposedly disproved by the conscious choices made by human observers: 
the two data that must be included in a Newtonian calculation, position and 
momentum, cannot both be known with precision. We must choose, by the 
selection of  our experiment, which one we want to measure most accurately[.] 
(Wu Li, 53) 
and on the very next page, “we must choose which of these two properties we want to determine” 
(Wu Li, 54). The italics clearly emphasise the importance of the observer’s choice. Zukav goes 
further, claiming that “Not only do we influence our reality, but, in some degree, we actually create 
it [...] Metaphysically, this [choosing which property to measure] is very close to saying that we 
create certain properties because we choose to measure these properties.” (Wu Li, 53-4) Likewise, 
Capra scatters the word “consciousness” throughout his discussion of the role of the observer:  
In Eastern mysticism, this universal interwovenness always includes the human 
observer and his or her consciousness, and this is also true in atomic physics 
[...] The end of  this chain of  processes [of  preparation and measurement] lies 
always in the consciousness of  the human observer. Measurements are 
interactions which create ‘sensations’ in our consciousness[.] (Tao, 144) 
These explicit references to the association between consciousness and, for example, the 
uncertainty principle, are supported, as Elizabeth Leane has comprehensively shown, by “a 
network of interlocking metaphors, all of which identify quantum theory with the human 
mind”.15 This is the second strategy for linking the new physics with conscious choice, and thus 
placing it in opposition to the determinism of classical physics. Leane concentrates on the 
pervasive metaphor of the “dance”, showing that “[t]he dance metaphor establishes an implicit 
connection between quantum phenomena and consciousness”.16 But equally, the frequent 
anthropomorphic metaphors describing quantum processes in terms of human consciousness 
also reinforce the explicit connection that is made. When John Gribbin explains that “electrons 
not only know whether or not both holes are open, they know whether or not we are watching 
them”,17 or when Bill Bryson describes how “certain pairs of subatomic particles [...] can each 
‘know’ what the other is doing”,18 or when Richard Feynman asks “How does a photon “make 
up its mind” whether it should go to A or B?”19 – in all these cases there is clearly a level of 
anthropomorphism equal to or greater than in describing, for example, genes as ‘selfish’ (see 
                                                 
15 Leane, p. 162. 
16 Ibid. 
17 John Gribbin, In Search of  Schrödinger’s Cat (London: Corgi Books, 1985), p. 171. 
18 Bryson, p. 191. 
19 Richard P. Feynman, QED: The Strange Theory of  Light and Matter (London: Penguin Books, 1990), p. 
18. 
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below, chapter 5.1). However, following Gillian Beer’s argument that it is context that determines 
whether metaphors “overturn the bounds of meaning assigned to them”,20 I contend, as Leane 
does, that the anthropomorphic metaphors used by Capra and Zukav are more problematic than 
those of Gribbin, Feynman or Bryson. Because Zukav makes explicit connections between 
consciousness and quantum physics, when he tells his reader that “photons in the double-slit 
experiment somehow “know” whether or not both slits are open” (Wu Li, 88) there is greater 
potential for his anthropomorphic metaphor to assume a meaning beyond the metaphorical. 
‘Scare quotes’ do little to counteract this, and indeed sometimes he drops them altogether: “How 
did the photon in the first experiment know that the second slit was not open?” (Wu Li, 87).21 The same 
problem arises in Capra’s The Tao of Physics. When he describes how fast moving particles “live 
about 1.7 times as long as their slow ‘twin brothers’” (Tao, 178) or when he writes about the 
“particle’s point of view” (Ibid.) the subject of the new physics’ study is endowed with human 
characteristics, shoring up the link between the new physics and conscious choice.  
 
I have deliberately ignored possibly the most obvious link between the new physics and 
consciousness established in these two texts, by Zukav and Capra – the extended parallel 
between Eastern mysticism and the new physics. Sal Restivo’s articles conduct an extensive 
analysis of “the thesis that there are parallels between modern physics and Eastern mysticism” 
with particular attention paid to Capra, and I will not rehearse the arguments here.22 Whilst 
acknowledging the role that this parallelism plays in the connection between the new physics and 
consciousness, I will concentrate here instead on the importance of metaphor, in order that this 
analysis retains applicability to a wider range of popular science books addressing the new 
physics, beyond those that make a connection with Eastern Mysticism.  
 
The argument, that such a system of anthropomorphic metaphor works in implicit support of 
explicit connections made between the new physics and consciousness, and thus plays an 
important role in presenting the new physics as a revolutionary rejection of determinism, involves 
an assumption about the role of metaphor in these books. This is representative of a set of wider 
assumptions on which the readings in this thesis rest. It is tempting to see many metaphors as 
simply an inevitable consequence of the expository mode of popular science writing – 
pedagogical metaphors that, albeit maybe imperfectly, convey a difficult technical idea or theory 
                                                 
20 Gillian Beer, Open Fields: Science in Cultural Encounter (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), p. 156. 
21 This same ‘dropping’ of  scare quotes occurs elsewhere too. Cf. Gribbin, p. 171. 
22 Sal Restivo, ‘Parallels and Paradoxes in Modern Physics and Eastern Mysticism: I – A Critical 
Reconnaissance’, Social Studies of  Science, 8 (1978), 143-81; Sal Restivo, ‘Parallels and Paradoxes in 
Modern Physics and Eastern Mysticism: II – A Sociological Perspective on Parallelism’, Social Studies of  
Science, 12 (1982), 37-71. 
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without recourse to the language and mathematics in which the ideas are expressed in their 
technical form. These pedagogical metaphors constitute the first of three categories into which 
we could divide the metaphors in popular science books, which I will outline here. Readers and 
critics should, I believe, remain healthily sceptical of metaphors in popular science, not dismissing 
them too quickly into this first category. Leane identifies as “naive” a similar temptation “to 
dismiss the narrative structure of science popularizations as mere pedagogical scaffolding”.23 
More broadly, I believe that popular science writing can and should be subjected to the same 
analysis as other textual discourse. A choice is made by the author when a photon is said to 
“know” whether both slits are open: to recall to Whitley’s pithy conclusion, “[e]xpository 
practices are not epistemologically neutral”.24 
 
A second category of metaphors, overlapping with the first, is composed of metaphors drawn 
consciously or unconsciously from elsewhere.  Clearly, these can be pedagogical as in the first 
category; the significant difference is that they also invoke, explicitly or implicitly, the tradition 
from which they are drawn. An example will demonstrate this most efficiently. Einstein’s famous 
lines from his letter to Max Born (12th December 1926) engendered a lasting metaphor: 
Quantum mechanics [...] is not yet the real thing. The theory says a lot, [...] but 
[it] does not really bring us any closer to the secret of  the Old One. I, at any 
rate, am convinced that He does not throw dice.25 
Einstein’s iconic status (and the fact that he used the image repeatedly)26 has ensured that this 
metaphor has been ubiquitous in popular science books on the new physics.27  
 
Clearly, as he used it, Einstein’s metaphor is not motivated by pedagogy; after all, his letters were 
addressed to fellow physicists. Nor is it pedagogical when used second-hand by popular science 
writers, for the image of ‘God playing dice with the universe’ (as it is often rendered) is far from 
the most obvious way to explain the random element of quantum mechanics. Indeed, this image 
was already a strategic misrepresentation of quantum mechanics when used by Einstein. Einstein 
was unhappy about the “limitation on the physicist’s degree of certainty” as a result of 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle; but in his image of God playing dice “Einstein is cheating [...]; 
he metaphorizes the implication of quantum theory in a limiting way”.28 Its use by popularizers is 
                                                 
23 Leane, p. 182. 
24 Whitley, p. 11. 
25 Quoted thus in Ronald W. Clark, Einstein: The Life and Times (New York: HarperCollins, 1971), p. 340. 
26 Cf. Clark, p. 345, p. 346. 
27 See, for example, Stewart, Does God Play Dice?; L.I. Ponomarev, The Quantum Dice, trans. by A.P. Repiev 
(Bristol, Philadelphia: Institute of  Physics, 1993); Wu Li, p. 92. 
28 Arlen J. Hansen, ‘The Dice of  God: Einstein, Heisenberg, and Robert Coover’, NOVEL: A Forum on 
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motivated, then, by the fact that it is a metaphor with a rich cultural pedigree, invoking Einstein’s 
disagreement with the chance element in quantum mechanics.  
 
In line with my own argument, I would suggest also that the use of this memorable image of 
‘God playing dice’ supports the non-deterministic representation of the new physics advanced by 
these popular science books. Of course, Einstein originally used the metaphor in the negative – 
that God ‘does not throw dice’ – but the enduring element of the metaphor is the chance and 
randomness evoked by the dice themselves.  
 
Isolating these ‘adopted’ metaphors in a separate category in no way removes them from the 
literary critical approach proposed for expository metaphor. Just as a literary critic should not 
assume that metaphors are merely pedagogical, so it should not be presumed that metaphors in 
this second category are adopted neutrally – on the contrary, the adoption of a particular tradition 
of metaphor can be extremely revealing. I have discussed elsewhere, for example, how popular 
science writers’ use of Rutherford’s image of “a fly in a cathedral” as a model for the atom 
appropriates the cultural status of religion.29 Similarly Knusden has explored in detail the passage 
of the metaphor of the genetic ‘code’ from scientific texts to popular science writing.30 I will 
perform a more detailed analysis of this form of metaphor later to show how the use of 
metaphors involving shadows invoke the long cultural history associated with this image, and 
how this is utilised by popular science writers.  
 
The third type of metaphor, and the most interesting for my purposes, is that characterised by 
Gillian Beer as strategic, one that can be shown to be working towards and within an agenda that 
becomes evident through literary analysis of the metaphor, and from the context in which it is 
placed.31 Obviously, metaphors from the previous categories may also inhabit this one: 
explanatory metaphors may also advance, say, a particular view of scientific progress, or the 
scientific method; similarly, adopted metaphors may carry significant resonances which support 
the advocated position. It is into this final category that I place many of the anthropomorphic 
metaphors that attribute human consciousness to non-conscious sub-atomic particles, implicitly 
supporting, as they do, the link established between the new physics and consciousness as part of 
the broader aim to undermine the perceived universal determinism of classical physics. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Fiction, 10 (1976), 49-58 (p. 50). 
29 My own unpublished M.Phil. thesis. ‘The Literature of  Evolution: Narrative, Metaphor and Teleology 
in Richard Dawkins and Stephen Jay Gould’, University of  Cambridge, 2005. 
30 Susanne Knudsen, ‘Scientific Metaphors Going Public’, Journal of  Pragmatics, 35 (2003), 1247-63. 
31 Gillian Beer, Darwin’s Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot, and Nineteenth-Century Fiction 
(London: Routledge, 1983), p. 57. All subsequent references are to this edition, hereafter DP, and will 
be made in the text. 
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* * * * 
 
I claimed, above, that there are three ways in which popular science writers connect the new 
physics to consciousness. Firstly, I identified explicit statements of this connection, concentrating 
primarily on the role of the consciousness of the observer. Secondly, I claimed that the strategic 
use of metaphors implying the consciousness of sub-atomic particles supports this connection. 
The third strand in the argument looks at the connection from the other direction: not the impact 
of consciousness on our understanding of physics, but the supposed impact of the new physics’ 
revolutions on our understanding of consciousness.  
 
There is an elision between the claims that consciousness plays a crucial role in the new physics, 
that the new physics takes consciousness as part of the object of its study and finally that the new 
physics’ theories have implications for our understanding of consciousness. The first stage of this 
elision is accomplished by passages such as the following: 
 Now, after three centuries, the Scientists have returned with their 
discoveries. They are as perplexed as we are [….] 
 “We are not sure,” they tell us, “but we have accumulated evidence 
which indicates that the key to understanding the universe is you.” 
 
  (Wu Li, 115) 
The hyperbolic phrase “key to understanding the universe”, coupled with the suggestion that this 
conclusion is the result of (three centuries of) experimentation implies that consciousness is more 
than simply important in our understanding of physics, but that the study of consciousness is part 
of physics. This is stated more explicitly later: 
The Cogs in the Machine have become the Creators of  the Universe. 
 If  the new physics has led us anywhere, it is back to ourselves, which, of  
course, is the only place we could go. (Wu Li, 136) 
The declaration here is that, following the revolutions brought about by relativity and quantum 
mechanics, physics does take “ourselves” as a subject of study, or at least contemplation – ‘we’ 
are incorporated into its world-view.  
 
The second shift, from the study of consciousness within physics, to physics’ implications for 
consciousness, is facilitated by the speculation that the traditional objects of physics’ study are 
themselves conscious. The curious logical leap-of-faith required in Zukav’s remarkable claim that 
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“there is a possibility that by studying photons [...] we may learn something about us” (Wu Li, 88) 
is at least partly achieved through the cumulative effect of the anthropomorphic description of 
photons: the metaphorical identification of photons as entities that “know” and “act accordingly” 
prepares the reader for the jump to the claim that “Some physicists, like E.H. Walker, speculate 
that photons may be conscious!” (Ibid.). Zukav does at least mark the sensationalism with an 
exclamation mark here, but his ostensible retreat to a more conservative position – “Whether 
Walker is correct or not” – is actually nothing of the sort: 
We have little choice but to acknowledge that photons, which are energy, do 
appear to process information and to act accordingly, and that therefore, 
strange as it may sound, they seem to be organic. (Wu Li, 88) 
Having ‘shown’ that photons are organic (in this very dubious sense) Zukav is able to conclude 
that “since we are also organic” the study of photons could lead to revelations about ourselves.  
 
The close association of the new physics and consciousness plays an important role in the 
representation of the new physics as non-deterministic. Determinism is seen to preclude the 
possibility of conscious choice affecting a deterministic universe, and therefore the inclusion of 
consciousness within the framework of modern physics undermines the supposed determinism 
of Newtonian mechanics. However the connection also has the secondary consequence of 
‘proving’ that physics has an impact on our understanding of ourselves, an important factor in 
the success of popular science books. To this end, the numerous ways in which determinism is 
questioned and rejected that I identify in this chapter are a means of supporting the “claims that 
quantum mechanics has heralded a return to an anthropocentric world-view” by prioritising the 
role of human consciousness, and thus form part of the representation of the new physics as 
having “restore[d] humanity to centre stage after four hundred years of post-Copernican exile”.32 
 
 
3.2  Exploring Progress 
 
In the previous section the anti-deterministic argument was seen, in the opposition created 
between determinism on the one hand and consciousness on the other, to also inevitably involve 
a parallel opposition between classical physics and the new physics. In this section I will focus in 
more detail on this latter opposition, and on the metaphors of exploration that support the 
argument that the new physics represents a critical moment in scientific progress, and supersedes 
the determinism of classical physics.  
                                                 
32 Leane, p. 135, p. 159. 
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Put simply, scientific progress in popular science books on the new physics is often figured 
spatially – or more precisely, territorially. New and revolutionary science is analogous to 
exploring or discovering new territory, as when Einstein is described as stepping “boldly into the 
unknown, in fact, into the unimaginable. Already on new territory, he proceeded to explore 
where no person had ever been before” (Wu Li, 159) or when Brian Greene describes how 
“Physicists focused their initial pathbreaking efforts to merge special relativity with quantum 
concepts” (Elegant Universe, 121).33 Other examples abound: Zukav describes the most innovative 
physicists as “those who best have slipped the bonds of the known to venture far into the 
unexplored territory which lies beyond the barrier of the obvious” (Wu Li, p140); Martin 
Gardner, referring to the Mandelbrot set, but scientific discoveries more generally, claims that it 
is “as much ‘out there’ as Mount Everest is, subject to exploration in the way a jungle is 
explored”;34 Einstein, in a comparison also quoted in The Dancing Wu Li Masters, likens “creating a 
new theory [...to] climbing a mountain” and imagines the “mastery of the obstacles on our 
adventurous way up”.35 
 
Thus known territory is equated with established scientific theory and exploration stands for 
pushing back the boundaries of existing knowledge.36 On the simplest level, metaphors of 
territory, exploration, maps and so on, established as representative of the process of scientific 
advancement and used in conjunction with the scientific discoveries of the new physics, support 
the argument that the new physics, as a scientifically more ‘advanced’ theory, supersedes classical 
physics. But there are a number of secondary implications that result from this system of 
metaphor that have consequences for the representation of scientific progress in general and the 
new physics in particular. The first is a ramification of the very nature of metaphors, whereby 
attributes of the ‘vehicle’ of the metaphor transfer themselves across to the ‘tenor’, to borrow 
I.A. Richards’s terminology.37 In the case of exploration the primary attribute transferred across 
to scientific progress is that of expansion: the expansion of territory implies the expansion of 
                                                 
33 The subtitle to Greene’s book on string theory is “Superstrings, Hidden Dimensions and the Quest for 
the Ultimate Theory” (italics mine). 
34 Foreword to Roger Penrose, The Emperor’s New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds and the Laws of  Physics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. xv. 
35 Albert Einstein and Leopold Infeld, The Evolution of  Physics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1971) p. 31, and also quoted in Zukav, p. 45. 
36 Feynman provides an interesting counter-example, using a spatial metaphor of  “retreat” to describe 
the ‘advances’ of  new physics: “Does this mean that physics [...] has been reduced to calculating only 
the probability of  an event, and not predicting exactly what will happen? Yes. That’s a retreat, but that’s 
the way it is” (Feynman, QED, p. 19). 
37 In I.A. Richards’s terminology the ‘tenor’ of  a metaphor is the subject to be described, the ‘vehicle’ is 
that to which the subject is compared. E.g. ‘The setting sun [tenor] was a red ball [vehicle] in the sky’. 
See I.A. Richards, The Philosophy of  Rhetoric, ed. John Constable (London: Routledge, 2001; first 
published 1936), p. 64. 
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knowledge. But the vehicle of a metaphor may, and almost always does, evoke more than one 
association, and there are secondary associations that also affect the representation of scientific 
progress through these metaphors of exploration and territory. 
 
The most interesting of these is probably the relationship between the act of exploration and the 
act of ‘discovering’ a new scientific theory. In describing scientific progress in terms of 
exploration, some of the ideas commonly evoked by the image of exploration, from the “system of 
associated commonplaces” as Max Black refers to it, are transferred to scientific progress.38 Let us look 
at an example: 
such reasoning has inspired a prodigious and distinguished group of  physicists 
to follow this path vigorously, but the terrain has proven to be fraught with 
danger, and no one has succeeded in traversing it completely. (Elegant Universe, 
126) 
Here, the exploration metaphor does not just imply the expansion of scientific knowledge but 
also the manner of this expansion: scientific research and practice are presented as arduous – 
despite their vigorous attempts the dangerous terrain is still not traversed. To read this carefully is 
to realise that the “vigorous” efforts of the scientists may be just as metaphorical as the idea that 
their attempt to develop a scientific theory is literally the crossing of dangerous terrain, but 
something of the vehicle (the effort involved) transfers to the tenor (scientific practice). It is easy 
to unpick this example, to reveal the transferred commonplaces, because they are made explicit; 
the dangers, the vigorous efforts – these are the associations we have with exploration, built up 
from cultural representations over centuries. But, I argue, these associations are implicit and 
transferred to the representation of scientific practice even when they are not made explicit by the 
writer. Taking the initial examples quoted above in turn, the implied dangers, difficulties and 
effort involved in scientific work are implicit in the following words or phrases: “boldly”, 
“unknown”, “new territory” and “where no person had ever been before”; “venture far”, 
“unexplored territory” and “lies beyond”; in Gardner’s image the arduousness of ‘discovering’ is 
simply contained in the choice of places he uses analogously – Mount Everest and a jungle; in 
Einstein’s image a mountain is again chosen, and the difficulties are also present in the words 
“obstacles” and “adventurous”. This implication of the arduousness of exploration is paralleled 
in explicit declarations of the similar effort involved in scientific endeavour, as when Greene 
describes how “a few dedicated researchers kept at it” and produced the “landmark paper 
culminating more than a dozen years of intense research” (Elegant Universe, 137, 138); even the 
                                                 
38 Max Black, Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1962), p. 40. 
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graduate students “worked deep into the night to try to master the vast areas of theoretical 
physics and abstract mathematics” (Elegant Universe, 139). 
 
There is another ‘commonplace’ associated with exploration, I believe; one perhaps less obvious 
at first, but borne out by examples from these popular science texts. This other feature of 
exploration is the possibility of moments of almost mystical wonder, like that experienced by 
“stout Cortez” in Keats’s sonnet On First Looking into Chapman’s Homer “when with eagle eyes / 
He star’d at the Pacific”, a moment that renders him silent. These, no doubt mythic, but 
identifiable, moments of discovery – bursting through the jungle to see a hidden temple, attaining 
a summit and seeing the vista laid out ahead – equate to that other mythic moment in scientific 
practice, the ‘eureka moment’. The connection between these moments in exploration and 
moments of discovery in science is, like the associations of arduousness, only sometimes explicit 
– as in Einstein’s comparison quoted above in which as we climb (create a new theory) we gain 
“new and wider views, discovering unexpected connections” – but is always partially present. The 
importance of this eureka moment in popular science representations of scientific practice is 
beyond question. Capra asserts that “Scientists are familiar with direct intuitive insights from 
their research, because every new discovery originates in such a sudden non-verbal flash” (Tao, 
40) and Greene describes how “In 1900 Planck made an inspired guess” (Elegant Universe, 91). 
The essential element in these moments of insight is that they are precisely that – moments. The 
gradual realisations that are part of scientific practice are dramatically compressed: Greene 
imagines “the key insight that Einstein had one happy day in the Bern patent office” (Elegant 
Universe, 60); similarly, Zukav, telling “the story” of Young’s double-slit experiment, pronounces, 
“When both slits were uncovered, however, Young made history” (Wu Li, 85). 
 
Taken together, these two shared representations of, on the one hand, exploration and, on the 
other, the practice of science and the history of science, constitute the narrative model of 
scientific discovery that I will explore further in chapter 5. This model involves initially long and 
arduous work or research (often of a mechanical or repetitive nature), culminating in a ‘eureka 
moment’. Whilst science writers sometimes explicitly deny the veracity of this model, the 
temptation to utilise it in narratives of scientific discovery is strong.39 Popular science books tend 
to opt for this ‘hard-graft and eureka’ model over the standard normative history of 
“development-by-accumulation” that Thomas Kuhn identifies in science textbooks.40 Of course, 
                                                 
39 Stephen Jay Gould might show such self-awareness in claiming that “Key moments are kid stuff. [...] I 
have laboured to master all the details and to arrange them in proper order. How can I now blow all 
this effort on the myth of  eureka?”, but there is no mistaking his adherence to this exact narrative 
model at other times. Gould, Wonderful Life, pp. 129-30.  
40 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of  Scientific Revolutions, 2nd Ed. (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 
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Kuhn expresses “profound doubts about the cumulative process through which these individual 
contributions to science were thought to have been compounded” and concludes that it is 
“difficult to see scientific development as a process of accretion”41 – but the eureka structure is 
even more misleading.  
 
Another form that territorial metaphors may take, besides exploration, is that of maps. If, in 
metaphors of exploration, territory represents existing knowledge and exploration the pushing 
back of the boundaries of knowledge, map metaphors tend to take terrain as representing nature, 
the world or the universe and maps as our knowledge of nature. As with metaphors of 
exploration, it is important to establish the particular elements of the “system of associated 
commonplaces” that are being utilised when this vehicle is pressed into service. Maps, I contend, 
are used as a metaphor for scientific knowledge because they themselves are a representation that 
is simultaneously useful and limited or imperfect; this latter quality is emphasised by Capra (who 
is fond of this metaphor), as part, I argue, of the demonstration that the new physics has shown 
the impossibility of science’s complete knowledge of the world and is thus non-deterministic.  
 
The first map analogy in The Tao of Physics makes it clear that this imperfection of representation 
is at the heart of the metaphor: 
In thinking about the world we are faced with the same kind of  problem as the 
cartographer who tries to cover the curved face of  the Earth with a sequence 
of  plane maps. We can only expect an approximate representation of  reality 
from such a procedure[.] (Tao, 28) 
Capra goes on to compare this approximation to the field of science, saying, “The limitations of 
any knowledge obtained by these [scientific] methods have become increasingly apparent in 
modern science, and in particular in modern physics” (Ibid.). On this level the metaphor is fairly 
self-explanatory; however, having established maps as repositories of scientific knowledge, their 
connection with the wider theme of consciousness is brought to the fore. After all, maps are 
human constructs; or, as Capra puts it, “Modern physics has confirmed [that…] the concepts we 
use to describe nature are limited, that they are not features of reality, as we tend to believe, but 
creations of the mind; parts of the map, not of the territory.” (Tao, 167. Italics mine). Capra 
frequently uses Alfred Korzybski’s distinction between ‘the map and the territory’ to argue that 
science’s knowledge of the world is imperfect and incomplete. Often this is done explicitly, as in 
the example above, or when asserting that “mathematics […] must be seen as part of our 
                                                                                                                                                        
1970), p. 2. 
41
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conceptual map and not as a feature of reality itself.” (Tao, 33). But increasingly this idea is 
implicit in the map metaphor: when Capra notes that “Our notions of space and time figure 
prominently on our map of reality” (Tao, 167) only the word “notions” and the metaphor of the 
map (now thoroughly integrated) indicate that these are, according to Capra, not properties of 
nature, but creations of our consciousness.  
 
Capra’s use of the map metaphor may be usefully compared to Borges’s wonderful short story 
describing “a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided point 
for point with it”, eventually deemed “Useless” by succeeding generations and “delivered up to 
the Inclemencies of Sun and Winters” until only “Tattered Ruins of that Map” remain.42 The 
target of the pathetic allegory of this pointless map might be more open to speculation, were it 
not for Borges’s title – ‘On Exactitude in Science’ (or ‘On Rigour in Science’ – the Spanish title is 
‘Del rigor en la ciencia’). Like Capra’s analogies, Borges’s story may be read as revealing the 
essential absurdity in trying to ‘map’ our epistemological systems onto the real world in a way that 
does not recognise their representational nature – to attempt too close a fit is to render them 
useless.  
 
* * * * 
 
This section has thus far argued that the representation of scientific progress through metaphors 
of exploration strengthens the opposition between the new physics and classical physics, and that 
map metaphors reinforce the suggestion that the new physics asserts the impossibility of a 
complete knowledge of the world. Both are seen as part of the anti-deterministic argument. I 
would like to end this section by moving away from metaphors of exploration and examining a 
further way in which representations of scientific progress in the popular science books under 
scrutiny support their non-deterministic arguments. 
 
I noted earlier that representations of revolutionary moments in science are often characterised 
by an emphasis on eureka moments, or moments of spontaneous insight. They are often also 
coupled with a strong sense of the role of contingency, of accident or chance, in the events that 
bring about a scientific revolution. Zukav, for example, stresses that “Planck did not intend to 
undermine the foundations of Newtonian physics [...] he inadvertently fathered the revolution of 
quantum mechanics” (Wu Li, 73). Greene concurs that “Planck had no justification for his 
pivotal introduction of lumpy energy” (Elegant Universe, 94) and that he just “made an inspired 
                                                 
42 Jorge Luis Borges, ‘On Exactitude in Science’ in Collected Fictions, trans. by Andrew Hurley (London: 
Penguin, 1999), p. 325. 
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guess” (Elegant Universe, 91), and I have already mentioned Einstein’s “happy day in the Bern 
patent office” (Elegant Universe, 60). This element of chance in representations of scientific 
practice is particularly prevalent, it will be noticed, in those moments in the history of science that 
are portrayed as critical, or revolutionary. This same contingency is emphasised not only in 
theoretical conjecture but also in scientific practice. Introducing Davisson and Germer’s 
experiment that verified de Broglie’s hypothesis of matter waves Zukav gives us scant 
information: what we are told is that “Both Davisson and de Broglie got Nobel Prizes”, 
emphasising the importance of the work, and that “The famous Davisson-Germer experiment 
[...] was done by accident” (Wu Li, 119). Zukav does not elaborate on what chance element 
played such an important role.  
 
This contingent narrative of scientific progress has been superbly parodied by Douglas Adams in 
his account of the development of an “Infinite Improbability Drive”, which scientists had 
“grumpily announced [...] was virtually impossible” 
Then, one day, a student who had been left to sweep up the lab [...] 
found himself  reasoning this way:  
If, he thought to himself, such a machine is a virtual impossibility, then it 
must logically be a finite improbability. So all I have to do in order to make one 
is to work out exactly how improbable it is, feed that figure into the finite 
improbability generator, give it a fresh cup of  really hot tea [a Brownian 
Motion producer]... and turn it on!  
He did this, and was rather startled to discover that he had managed to 
create the long sought after golden Infinite Improbability generator out of  thin 
air.43 
This description is surprisingly closely paralleled by one from Gleick’s Chaos, of Lorenz’s 
experiments with weather simulation. Lorenz had been feeding weather patterns into a computer 
model, when  
One day in the winter of  1961 [...] Lorenz took a shortcut. Instead of  starting 
the whole run over, he started midway through [...] Then he walked down the 
hall to get away from the noise and drink a cup of  coffee. When he returned 
an hour later he saw something unexpected, something that planted the seed 
for a new science.44 
Chance and intuition continue to play a part as the story unfolds. Gleick tells us how Lorenz 
“suddenly [...] realised the truth”, and that he “could have assumed something was wrong with 
his particular machine – probably should have assumed [...] But for reasons of mathematical 
                                                 
43 Douglas Adams, The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy (London: Gollancz, 2002), p. 68. 
44 Gleick, p. 16. 
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intuition [...] Lorenz felt a jolt: something was philosophically out of joint”.45 Gleick sums up, 
rather dramatically, 
Lorenz’s discovery was an accident, one more in a line stretching back to 
Archimedes and his bathtub. Lorenz never was the type to shout Eureka. 
Serendipity merely led him to a place he had been all along.46 
Besides reasserting the importance of accident, the comparison with Archimedes does several 
things. Firstly, it places Lorenz’s discovery into a pantheon of science; secondly, it suggests that 
contingency plays a role in discoveries in all the sciences; finally, the comparison either suggests 
the authenticity of the story of the bathtub, or, more likely, suggest that Gleick’s version of 
Lorenz’s day in 1961 may verge on the apocryphal.  
 
The significance to my argument of the role of contingency should be immediately apparent. In 
chance occurrences within experimental science, accidents suggest the importance of the 
undetermined, of those elements that cannot be predicted, controlled or even fully understood by 
the experimenters and thus loosely mimic on a macroscopic scale the supposedly non-
deterministic events taking place on a quantum scale. In this sense, chance is strongly associated 
with the level of irreducible uncertainty in quantum mechanics, with that element of “pure 
chance” (Wu Li, 92) that determines certain outcomes on a quantum level. The same is true of 
those theoretical speculations presented as part of the contingency of scientific progress; but 
there is the additional suggestion of the non-determinism of consciousness, since it is this 
inexplicable insight that, it is suggested, gives rise to these new, revolutionary theories.  
 
 
3.3  Uncertain Shadows 
 
Attempting to describe James Terrell’s rotation effect, Zukav wastes no time in calling upon the 
analogy of Plato’s cave. In order for the ensuing discussion to make sense, I digress for a 
moment to attempt an explanation of Terrell rotation that is non-mathematical but, whilst 
certainly drier, hopefully more precise than that of Zukav. Terrell’s mathematical demonstration 
of the effect on the projected image of objects moving at near-light velocities shows that the 
object appears to rotate, rather than contract. In other words, although Lorentz contractions are 
measurable, we could never photograph them because at velocities approaching light speed the 
finite speed of the light travelling to the camera (or indeed our eyes) becomes significant. Imagine 
                                                 
45 Gleick, p. 16, p. 17. 
46 Gleick, p. 21. 
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a cube travelling across our line of vision from right to left at near-light speed. Because of the 
finite speed of light, light takes longer to reach us from the furthest corner than from the nearest 
corner. Thus light from this furthest corner that reaches us at the same time as light from a 
nearer edge must have left the object earlier, which consequently also means further to the right 
(a point earlier in time means a point earlier in the trajectory of the object). We therefore see both 
the furthest corner and the nearest corner of this edge perpendicular to the line of motion (and 
the same effect extrapolated to all points along this edge) – thus this edge is flattened towards us. 
When applied to all the light leaving the object the object appears rotated. Penrose showed that 
the rotation is in proportion to the Lorentz flattening and that therefore a sphere, for example, 
will always appear a sphere no matter which frame of reference it is viewed from.  
 
I hope to show that the comparison between Terrell rotation and Plato’s cave is a flawed analogy. 
But this is not simply an idle criticism – after all, flaws are relatively easy to uncover when enough 
pressure is applied to almost any analogy. Rather, my analysis shows that the introduction of 
Plato’s cave is part of a wider use of shadow metaphors that serves to reinforce the argument for 
non-determinism of these popular science books.  
 
There is a simple sense in which Plato’s cave is not an accurate analogy: Lorentz contractions are 
a measurable phenomenon, and in this sense are a “real” effect of near light speed motion; but 
the implication of the comparison with Plato’s cave is that they are simply a visual illusion, and 
this implication is supported by a number of phrases: “a moving object appears to contract in the 
direction of motion”; “this phenomenon is something like a visual illusion”; “it is the projection 
that contracts”. But Lorentz contractions are not an illusion – in fact, the opposite is true, they 
cannot be seen, but they can be measured. So what then, is the significance of Plato’s cave, and 
why is it introduced? Zukav, having described Terrell rotation, sums up: “The equations in the 
special theory of relativity (the Lorentz transformations) which show a contraction due to motion 
describe these projections. (Is this beginning to sound like Plato’s cave?)” However, the 
contractions are not projections, but real effects that occur because of relative frames of 
reference – from our frame of reference an object really does flatten, even though from its frame 
of reference it is we that are in motion, and therefore it is we that contract. For this reason, the 
analogy with Plato’s cave seems to hang on the use of the word ‘projection’. 
 
In fact, the most accurate part of the analogy with Plato’s cave is that which Zukav does not 
mention. Plato’s idea that the forms (the real objects in the cave) can be comprehended with our 
mind alone, and not empirically observed, does map quite revealingly onto the fact that Lorentz 
contractions may be understood rationally, but not perceived (what we ‘see’ would be Terrell 
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rotation). In Zukav’s version of the allegory he emphasises the philosopher who escapes and sees 
the real world; but, of course, Plato’s parable is already an analogy, and the real objects represent 
forms “which can only be seen with the eye of the mind”.47 
 
Although I am wary of attributing to Zukav deliberate obfuscation in this passage, there does 
appear to be compelling evidence. Instead of emphasising this element of the comparison which 
does hold between relativistic effects and Plato’s cave, the idea that is stressed is that Lorentz 
contractions “describe projections”, which as I have shown, is not really the case. Terrell’s paper, in 
which he describes the rotation that we would see in place of relativistic contraction is entitled 
‘The Invisibility of Lorentz Contraction’, a title that would seem to challenge Zukav’s description 
of Lorentz contraction as a projection, and thus also the relevance of the introduction of Plato’s 
cave. It is therefore conspicuous that the endnote with which Zukav references Terrell’s paper 
cites the journal in which the article first appeared, but does not give the title of the paper: “J. 
Terrell, Physical Review, 116, 1959, 1041.” (Wu Li, p.336 n.6). Revealingly, endnotes citing other 
journal articles (including those from the same journal) do include titles: “David Finkelstein, 
“Past-Future Asymmetry of the Gravitational Field of a Point Particle,” Physical Review, 110, 1958, 
965.” (Wu Li, p.336 n.4)48 
 
What, then, is the purpose of Zukav’s introduction of the allegory of the cave? It is, I believe, an 
example of the use of the shadow metaphor as part of the non-deterministic argument that I 
identify in these popular science books. In employing shadow metaphors in this way Zukav 
draws on a long cultural history in which “[f]rom Plato on, projected shadow has intermittently 
also had to appear in the role of bearer of imperfect knowledge of the object that projects it”.49 
‘Imperfect’ is precisely the way in which both writers wish to characterise our knowledge of a 
supposedly non-deterministic world as seen through the new physics.  
 
When Capra notes that “it makes no sense to ask which is the ‘real’ length of an object, just as it 
makes no sense in our everyday life to ask for the real length of somebody’s shadow” (Tao, 177) 
he utilises the image of the shadow ostensibly because the length of a shadow is variable. But this 
is probably a secondary feature of shadows compared with the more primary association that is 
their projected nature, an association clear in the sentence which follows: “The shadow is a 
                                                 
47 Plato, The Republic, trans. by Benjamin Jowett (New York: Cosimo, 2008; this translation first published 
1894), p. 175. This quotation actually comes the book preceding the allegory of  the cave, but as 
Socrates says having finished his description of  the cave, “This entire allegory [...] you may now 
append, dear Glaucon, to the previous argument [i.e. that of  the Divided Line in Book VI]” (p. 179). 
48 For further examples cf. p. 334 n. 2, p. 337 n. 2, p. 338 n. 21 and many others. 
49 Michael Baxandall, Shadows and Enlightenment (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995) p. 144. 
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projection of points in three-dimensional space on to a two-dimensional plane” (Ibid.). The 
essence of the projected nature of a shadow means that it gives us only a limited representation 
of the “real” object that is casting it, and the analogy implies that we likewise only have a limited 
understanding of the fluctuating lengths of objects due to relativistic effects. In the above 
example of Zukav’s use of the allegory of the cave, the analogy does not hold – the Lorentz 
contractions are measurable, and because of the special theory of relativity, also calculable. But at 
first sight Capra’s slightly more careful comparison between a shadow, whose length varies, and a 
(moving) object whose length (along its line of motion) also varies, appears a better one. A 
shadow, as Capra says, is a projection of a 3D object on to a 2D plane; likewise a moving object 
is “the projection of points in four-dimensional space-time on to three-dimensional space” 
(Ibid.). In both cases the addition of missing information appears to ‘complete’ the projection – if 
we know the relative positions of the projection, object and light source we can calculate the real 
length of an object from its shadow; similarly if we know its velocity we can calculate a moving 
object’s real length (from our frame of reference), including Lorentz contraction. So far, so good. 
 
However, under closer scrutiny the essence of shadows reveals itself: they do contain an inherent 
lack of information – an irreducible uncertainty. Even with the angle of the light source, and 
distance from the object, one dimension of the object is still unknowable from its shadow – its 
depth – and other details, such as its colour, also remain obscured. A shadow can give us no 
information concerning one of the dimensions of the original three-dimensional casting object, 
but Lorentz transformations allow us to ascertain precisely the contraction that is undergone by 
an object at velocities close to light-speed. In other words part of the connotative field of the 
image of the shadow is the lack of information that they contain about the original; a shadow can 
convey only “imperfect knowledge of the object that projects it”.50 
 
The paradigmatic example of “imperfect knowledge” as represented in the new physics is 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, and it is therefore unsurprising that it is in this context that 
Zukav again invokes the image of the shadow.  
Since electrons are so small, [...] the wavelength of  ordinary light is much too 
long to “see” electrons, in the same way that long sea waves barely are 
influenced by a thin pole sticking out of  the water. 
 If  we hold a strand of  hair between a bright light and the wall, the hair 
casts no distinct shadow [...] To see something, we have to obstruct the light 
waves we are looking with [...] An electron is large enough, compared to the 
tiny wavelength of  gamma rays to obstruct some of  them: to make a shadow 
on the wall, as it were. (Wu Li, 133-4) 
                                                 
50 Ibid. 
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Zukav’s description is an explanation of the uncertainty principle: we cannot get a clear ‘shadow’ 
of an electron with light with as long a wavelength as visible light – in other words we cannot 
‘see’ it, or ascertain its position. But using light with a shorter wavelength – say, gamma rays – 
gives a different problem: gamma rays have far greater energy, and therefore, although they 
accurately establish the position of the electron, they affect its momentum in an unpredictable 
way. This is a version of one of Heisenberg’s explications of his principle, an attempt to describe 
how uncertainty is manifested even in empirical attempts to ascertain measurements of 
canonically conjugate variables.51 However, the shadow in Zukav’s description complicates 
matters, because even were we able to resolve a distinct “shadow on the wall, as it were” of an 
electron, this shadow, as we have already seen, implies imperfect knowledge of the object itself. 
By using the shadow metaphor, Zukav suggests a secondary layer of uncertainty to the 
uncertainty principle.  
 
It could be objected that these passages, by using shadow metaphors in conjunction with 
descriptions of relativistic and quantum phenomena in a way that activates the connotations of 
imperfect knowledge or representation, simply reflect the inherent uncertainties involved with the 
new physics. But the implications of relativity, though counter-intuitive, are not of indeterminism 
or even uncertainty: the effects of relative motion on both space and time are precisely quantified 
by Einstein’s theories. It is true that quantum mechanics does describe the irreducible 
imperfection in our knowledge of the universe: we can never know both the position and 
momentum of a single electron. However, the philosophical implications of quantum mechanics 
are far from resolved.  
 
The idea of the new physics that is presented in many of these popular science books is of 
undermining determinism and necessitating an indeterministic interpretation of the world. I have 
shown how anthropomorphic metaphors form part of the strategy for asserting a connection 
between consciousness and the new physics, a connection that is presumed to undermine 
determinism. I have also revealed how metaphors of exploration and maps present a normative 
history of scientific discovery as well as a distorted image of scientific practice. The presentation 
of scientific progress implies the obsolescence of classical physics and its supposed determinism; 
moreover, scientific theory and practice, through the emphasis on the role of contingency, is 
presented as itself characterised by indeterminism. Finally, I have explained how metaphors of 
shadows draw on the cultural history of the shadow as an imperfect representation, suggesting 
the new physics’ inherent uncertainty about the world as part of the argument that determinism 
has been undermined.  
                                                 
51  This is often called Heisenberg’s microscope.  
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But this representation overstates the connection between the new physics and indeterminism. It 
is by no means certain that quantum mechanics requires us to jettison determinism: different 
interpretations of quantum mechanics give different conclusions.52 Simplifying greatly, 
Schrödinger’s wave function equation is, if we ignore the quantum measurement problem, 
generally considered deterministic; the Copenhagen interpretation, with its collapse of the wave 
function, is, by contrast, indeterministic; and David Bohm’s alternative interpretation, proposed 
in 1952 – a hidden variables interpretation which utilises a ‘guiding equation’ – restores determinism 
to quantum mechanics. Carl Hoefer sums it up this way: 
QM [quantum mechanics] is widely thought to be a strongly non-deterministic 
theory. Popular belief  (even among most physicists) holds that phenomena 
such as radioactive decay, photon emission and absorption, and many others 
are such that only a probabilistic description of  them can be given. [...] At the 
microscopic level the world is ultimately mysterious and chancy. 
So goes the story; but like much popular wisdom, it is partly mistaken 
and/or misleading. Ironically, quantum mechanics is one of  the best prospects 
for a genuinely deterministic theory in modern times! [...E]verything hinges on 
what interpretational and philosophical decisions one adopts.53 
The popular wisdom may be mistaken but it is a representation of the new physics that has been, 
as I have shown, propagated by many of the popular science accounts. Turning in the next 
chapter to contemporary fiction, we will see that it is also a conception of physics that has 
exerted influence over contemporary fiction writers who have sought to incorporate the ideas of 
the new physics into their writing.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                 
52  Interestingly, nor is it really the case that determinism is a constant in Newtonian mechanical systems. 
See J.D. Norton, ‘Causation as Folk Science’ for an example of a system “fully in accord with 
Newtonian mechanics” which “harbour[s] uncaused events and ones for which the theory cannot 
even supply probabilities” (pp. 8-12). 
53  Hoefer, (section 4.4 Quantum Mechanics). 
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4 The New Physics and Determinism in 
 Contemporary British Fiction 
 
 
As I have shown in the previous chapter, popular science writing on the new physics, and 
particularly that which deals with quantum mechanics, has chosen to depict the new physics as a 
fundamental rejection of Newtonian mechanics. As such, the new physics is seen as a radical new 
science which denies the total determinism famously articulated by Laplace. Regardless of 
whether this representation is accurate, it is clear that this has been an important part of the 
cultural reception and public perception of the new physics.1 It is also a feature of the new 
physics that contemporary writers have embraced: contemporary fiction which reveals an 
awareness of the ideas of twentieth-century physics also frequently shows an interest in the way 
in which the use of metaphors and ideas from the new physics can be brought to bear on ideas 
about determinism.  
 
I will begin by showing how, just as in the popular science writing, the changes in twentieth-
century physics are used to undermine the idea of universal determinism. I will then look at the 
problems and opportunities that this anti-determinist stance poses for narrative and examine 
briefly one particular narrative that is often encountered in these fictions – that is, historical 
narrative. I will argue that these contemporary authors do far more than simply incorporate and 
utilise the ideas of twentieth-century physics that have received widespread popularization. Many 
of the novels and plays examined in this chapter can also be seen to be engaged in an 
epistemological critique. If, my argument posits, the popular science writing on the new physics 
adopts and strategically deploys particular metaphors in order to emphasise a particular 
ontological argument – that determinism is fatally undermined by the new physics – then 
contemporary fiction may be adopting this ontological position as a metaphor as part of its own 
epistemological argument: that science does not hold all the epistemic cards. 
 
 
                                                 
1  This is true from the outset. Reporting on Einstein’s theory of  relativity in 1919 The Times led with 
“Revolution in Science – New Theory of  the Universe – Newton’s Ideas Overthrown”. Quoted in 
Gregory and Miller, p. 28.  
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4.1  Resistance to Determinism: Character and Plotting 
 
Before going on to show how some contemporary authors use references to the new physics to 
conduct an epistemological critique of a monistic scientific epistemology, I will begin by showing 
how they have used references to the new physics as part of a broader resistance to determinism 
in their novels and plays. Just as we have seen with popular science on the new physics, the 
immediate interpretation of the implications of the new physics (normally broadened to include 
statistical mechanics and thermodynamics, as well as relativity and quantum mechanics) is that 
several developments have called into question the idea of a ‘clockwork’ determined universe. 
Perhaps it is no surprise that this interpretation should appeal to fiction writers, since narrative, 
which is a fully determined world, is often attempting to feign its own indeterminacy. The reader 
is invited to believe that the events in the novel are subject to choice, to accident, to chance – 
whereas in fact they are predetermined by the author.  
 
One of the common, and in some ways simplest, interpretations of the developments in physics 
is the problematising of cause-and-effect in these narratives. In Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s 
Rainbow (1973) the opposition between determinism and indeterminacy is played out partly 
through the opposition of two sets of characters. On the one hand are those in thrall to the idea 
of a deterministic universe, those like Pointsman, the behaviourist who with Pavlov believes that 
“the ideal [...] in science, is the true mechanical explanation [...] No effect without cause, and a 
clear chain of linkages”; on the other hand there are those like Roger Mexico, who realises that 
“there is a feeling about that cause and effect may have been taken as far as it can go [...] the next 
breakthrough may come when we have the courage to junk cause-and-effect entirely”.2 Slothrop, 
the novel’s principal character, lurches along the spectrum between these two camps. According 
to Pynchon’s definition, paranoia is the “onset, the leading edge of the discovery that everything is 
connected” (GR, 703/834; italics in original); Slothrop, then, begins the novel as a paranoiac – he is 
conscious of a proliferation of causality, and feels the control of determinism: “all in his life of 
what has looked free or random, is discovered to’ve been under some Control, all the time, the 
same as a fixed roulette wheel – where only destinations are important, attention is to long-term 
statistics, not individuals: and where the House always does, of course, keep turning a profit...” 
(GR, 209/249).   
 
                                                 
2 Thomas Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow, p. 89/104 (hereafter GR). Page numbers will be given in the text 
for two different editions: the first refers to the 1987 Penguin edition (the 1978 Viking paperback uses 
the same pagination), the second to the 2000 Vintage paperback.  
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The determinism that Slothrop feels here is analogous to the first challenge to the clockwork 
universe – the practical impossibility of computing the movement of an individual atom. What 
Slothrop feels is the probabilities of statistical mechanics. Not, in other words, total determinism, 
but a very close approximation. Statistical mechanics can compute, say, the pressure of a gas 
inside a cylinder, through a calculation of the average movement of molecules within that 
cylinder, but cannot predict or describe the movement of any individual molecule; this idea is 
ingeniously imagined in a scene from The Crying of Lot 49 (1966) in which a can of shaving foam, 
propelled by the compressed gas inside it, bounces unpredictably and dangerously around a small 
enclosed bathroom.3 This clever image scales up the processes that are taking place inside the 
can, making them observable, and turns the can itself into an analogue for the unpredictable 
molecule of gas inside the can. We can see this same pattern, of unpredictability on one scale, and 
apparent determinism on another, played out in the scheme of the novella’s plot: on the one 
hand Oedipa’s life is constantly affected by chance events, as she bounces around the USA trying 
to unravel the mysteries of the Trystero; on the other, the string of chance encounters can be 
seen in the end to lead towards a point – the ‘crying’ of the lot of stamps at the auction – the 
predetermined nature of which is signalled, before the book is even opened, in the title.  
 
In Gravity’s Rainbow, in the passage quoted above, Pynchon draws the parallel with a casino, which 
cannot prevent an individual from winning, but over the long run the odds are set such that ‘the 
house always wins’. Slothrop feels that his life, apparently free, has actually been under the same 
probabilistic control – his individual actions may be free, but the long term destination is 
determined, is a statistical (if not quite a literal) certainty. In this regard he is much like Oedipa. 
Slothrop begins to resist this feeling of control, and the form of Gravity’s Rainbow itself also enacts 
a resistance to deterministic causality. In Gravity’s Rainbow, the reader, and even more so the critic, 
is presented with a profusion of connection, an abundance of information. But Pynchon sets the 
signal-to-noise ratio deliberately high. This has led critics to look for connections where there are 
none to find, as Robert Nadeau has observed: “Critics in growing numbers have driven 
themselves to distraction looking for logical connections which would allow for a rational 
explanation for this ‘ambiguity’ in the novel [...] The clues are everywhere, but there is again that 
gap in logical, linear connections which precludes closure”; this is also one of the reasons that 
Nadeau warns that “any critic who chooses to tackle all Gravity’s Rainbow in one chapter is either 
terribly ambitious or very foolish or both”.4 But many critics have missed the broader point, that 
Pynchon does not merely turn the critic into a paranoid who sees connections everywhere, but 
                                                 
3  Thomas Pynchon, The Crying of Lot 49 (London: Vintage, 2000), pp. 23-24. 
4 Nadeau, p. 146, p. 137. 
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that the abundance of connection undermines the very basis of narrative – it threatens our 
understanding of cause and effect.  
 
Initially, though, the proliferation of connections simply bemuses the characters within the novel. 
To take the most obvious example, the number of explanations offered for the co-incidence 
between Slothrop’s map of sexual conquests and the map of the rocket strikes is implausibly 
high: psychokinesis, telepathy, precognition, conditioning to auditory or possibly visual signals, or 
to some material (perhaps Impolex G) in the rocket itself. The unknown nature of Jamf’s 
“stimulus x” allows for more speculation. The connections between Slothrop and the rocket are 
so strong that everyone in the novel, Slothrop included, is searching for an explanation, one that 
they presume is there to be discovered. But there is no solution to the coincidence – none of the 
characters find one, nor is there one buried in the plethora of clues Pynchon teasingly includes 
for the reader or critic to uncover. When the possibility is introduced that not all of the stars on 
Slothrop’s map are genuine – that he might have fantasised some of them – even the validity of 
the evidence for a connection is undermined. To use a phrase that has resonance for many of the 
works examined in the chapter, “Some questions have no answers to find”.5 
 
The proliferation is intended precisely to undermine linear causal explanation: the chaos of life, 
encyclopaedically represented in this novel, precludes this sort of linear analysis, and every 
attempt to explain the world this way fails. Brigadier Pudding’s study of the European balance of 
power, Things that Can Happen in European Politics, is an example in little. Pudding was “brought up 
to believe in a literal Chain of Command”, in fact “newer geometries confuse him” – he is, in 
other words, a linear thinker. His historical study takes this same linear form: “‘First [...] Ramsay 
MacDonald can die’. By the time he went through resulting [...] permutations [...] Ramsay 
MacDonald had died. ‘Never make it [...] it’s changing out from under me’” [GR, 77/90-91]. This 
strictly linear, causal form of analysis simply cannot account for the proliferation of information 
in the world.  
 
It should be noted that Pynchon quite explicitly implicates the reader and critic in the same 
unreasonable desire for comforting causality as many of the characters exhibit. Critics have 
commented on one of the novel’s direct narratorial interventions in which, addressing the reader 
directly, the narrator grudgingly concedes – “You will want cause and effect. All right.” (GR, 
663/786). But the significance is in the context: these words begin a new ‘chapter’, but they also 
immediately follow on from the phrase “there are things to hold on to...”.  These two phrases are 
                                                 
5 Michael Frayn, Copenhagen (London: Methuen, 2000), p. 3. All subsequent references are to this edition 
and will be made in the text. 
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separated by the row of seven boxes (in lieu of asterisks) that signal a chapter break, but the 
ellipsis also implies their connection: cause-and-effect is one of the cornerstones of our 
perception of reality and also of our understanding of narrative – it is one of the ‘things we hold 
on to’. In Pynchon’s worlds and narratives, however, we are rarely permitted such comfort – and 
we are denied it at this moment in the narrative too. Promised cause-and-effect, we get very little 
– “Thanetz was washed overboard [...] he was rescued by a Polish undertaker in a rowboat”, 
immediately followed by the explanation that this Pole was “out in the storm tonight to see if he 
can get struck by lightning” (Ibid.). And then there follow tangents on Benjamin Franklin, 
calculus, masonic groups and headgear – so it is with Pynchon.  
 
Elsewhere, another brief glimpse of the narrator’s own voice again comments on the opacity of 
narrative causality. Amidst Pirate Prentice’s “second thoughts” about bringing Katje back to 
England, we can discern the subtle intrusion of the narrator’s own, metafictive, voice:  “Indeed, 
why did she [Katje] leave Schussstelle 3? We are never told why.” (GR, 107/126) Although this 
could be Pirate’s thoughts, that ‘we’ implies not just that Pirate does not know Katje’s 
motivations, but that the reader does not either – and, as importantly, that Pynchon is not going 
to tell us. The reader is left in the dark.  
 
 
4.2  “This is not science, this is story telling”: Resistance to Determinism in Narrative 
Form 
 
In addition to these explicit statements of the demise of cause-and-effect, resistance to 
determinism in these novels can also involve a resistance to, or a reworking of, traditional 
narrative form. After all, as H. Porter Abbott notes “narrative itself, simply by the way that it 
distributes events in an orderly consecutive fashion, very often gives the impression of a 
sequence of cause and effect”.6 For even if Roger Mexico and Leni Pökler may perceive causality 
to be uncertain, the narrative in which they exist remains a closed determinate system, with the 
author deciding the course of all events. But Pynchon does his best to construct narratives which, 
in the reading, feel causally underdetermined. The narratives are wildly unpredictable: sequences 
which are tending towards more traditional linear narrative are often disrupted by contingent 
interventions that take the narrative swerving away. The disruption that is caused by, say, the little 
figure who steals Slothrop’s clothes while he lies with Katje, is not only felt by Slothrop but also 
                                                 
6 H. Porter Abbott, The Cambridge Introduction to Narrative, 2nd Ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), p. 41. 
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by the reader, as the narrative that has begun with Katje is interrupted and we follow Slothrop 
down a completely different narrative path (GR, 198, 236). 
 
Beyond these disruptions to our sense of normal narrative causality, various formal conceits, and 
forms of narrative experimentation, also attempt to reduce the determinism of the narrative 
system, or at least to de-emphasise it or hide it. One of the ways in which this may be done is by 
removing or altering the inherent teleological structure of narrative. In Martin Amis’s Time’s 
Arrow, in which time flows backwards, the formal conceit undermines the dependability of cause-
and-effect, to the constant confusion of the narrator. The reader quickly learns to reorder events 
so that causality is restored, but for the narrator cause-and-effect remain problematic. He 
eventually learns that “things are created in the violence of fire”, that we all have to “take it in the 
ass each morning” and so on, but even towards the end the narrator admits that “the world has 
stopped making sense again”.7 For the narrator, almost anything can appear to cause anything 
else: “High romance brings with it, or seems to bring with it (I’m getting more and more tentative 
about cause-and-effect) an expansion of my role here at AMS [the hospital]”. There is humour in 
the resulting situations, opportunities that Amis does not pass up, but there are also important 
ramifications of the reversal. Firstly, the narrator is a passive observer of events, without any 
control over the body that he inhabits – Tod’s body “won’t take orders from this will of mine”.8 
This exempts the narrator from the immorality of the body he inhabits, and thus exempts Amis 
from the problem of the immorality of his narrator. Secondly, it removes the need for moral 
comment on the central episode of the novel – the events in Auschwitz. By inverting causality – 
and also, crucially, by keeping his narrator out of the loop – the actions of the protagonist take on 
an altogether different appearance: the reader can comprehend and make their own moral 
judgements, but the narrator, unable to see the true order of events and consequences of Tod’s 
actions, cannot come to the same conclusions. Amis’s narrator is far from reticent in making 
moral judgements – later in the novel he is outraged that Tod always takes the largest bill from 
the collection bowl in church – but his judgements are in the wrong place, at the wrong time. 
 
 
4.3  Resistance to Determinism: Indeterminate History 
 
We have already seen how a rejection of determinism is enacted in the problematising of the link 
between cause-and-effect, both for characters within the narrative (what causes the connection 
                                                 
7 Martin Amis, Time’s Arrow: or The Nature of  the Offence (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992), p. 51, p. 52, p. 
157. 
8  Amis, p. 13. 
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between Slothrop’s map and that of the rocket strikes?), and for readers of the narrative (where is 
this narrative about to go next?). However, if in a non-deterministic world it is difficult to 
extrapolate from cause to effect, then the corollary is that we cannot confidently move back from 
the effect to the cause. For this reason, representations of the demise of scientific determinacy 
are often also linked to an uncertainty of history, or the difficulty in establishing historical events.  
 
Tom Stoppard’s play Arcadia enacts the difficulty in reconstructing the events of the past through 
the enthusiastic, but in the end erroneous, researches of the Byron scholar Bernard Nightingale. 
The action of the play takes place in a single room – a school room in fact, a fitting location for a 
play not just “of ideas” but also “about ideas [...and]  the processes that generate them”, as 
Burkhard Niederhoff remarks.9 While the location is, at least on the face of it, stable, the play is 
set across two broad time periods, with the division between the two destabilized in the climax of 
the play.10 Many of the themes of the play – sexual attraction, the Enlightenment and 
Romanticism, epistemology and the pursuit of knowledge, loss and grief – are doubled up in the 
discussions of classical mechanics, thermodynamics and chaos theory. Although many of the 
themes in the play also connect with each other (Stoppard loves to layer the connections) the 
images and ideas drawn from science form a central core of the play.  
 
It is in the conversations in the nineteenth-century scenes between Thomasina – the 
“uncomplicated” thirteen year old girl, who is also, however, much “cleverer than her elders” – 
and Septimus Hodge, her tutor, that classical mechanics is introduced into the play.11 In an early 
scene set in 1809 we hear the words of Laplace unknowingly paraphrased and prophesied by 
Thomasina (Laplace’s formulation comes in 1814 in the introduction to his Essai philosophique sur 
les probabilités):  
Thomasina: If  you could stop every atom in its position and direction, and if  
your mind could comprehend all the actions thus suspended, then 
if  you were really, really good at algebra you could write the 
formula for all the future; and although nobody can be so clever as 
to do it, the formula must exist just as if  one could.  
   
  (Arcadia, 5) 
While Thomasina objects to the determinism of Newton’s system, and finally exposes its flaws, 
Septimus is a confident Newtonian, believing that “time needs must run backwards” (Ibid.): 
                                                 
9 Burkhard Niederhoff, ‘“Fortuitous Wit”: Dialogue and Epistemology in Tom Stoppard’s Arcadia’, 
Connotations, 11 (2001-2), 42-59 (p. 42).  
10 Technically the play is set in three discrete periods: 1809, 1812, and unspecified present. 
11 Tom Stoppard, Arcadia (London: Faber, 1993), p. 14. All subsequent references are to this edition and 
will be made in the text. 
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when asked by Thomasina “Do we believe nature is written in numbers?”, Septimus replies “We 
do” (Arcadia, 37). Thomasina, on the other hand, instinctively realises the limitations of 
Newtonian mechanics: “why do your equations only describe the shapes of manufacture? [...] 
Armed thus God could only make a cabinet” (Ibid.). She also appears to understand the flaw in 
Newton’s system, that time is not reversible as Septimus imagines, and that the reason is the 
dissipation of heat. Towards the end of the play, Septimus examines Thomasina’s diagram and 
begins to understand; Valentine, simultaneously on stage as the separation of the two periods 
dissolves, explains that what she realised ahead of her time was   
that you can’t run the film backwards. Heat was the first thing which didn’t 
work that way. Not like Newton. A film of  a pendulum, or a ball falling 
through the air – backwards, it looks the same [...] But with heat – friction – a 
ball breaking a window [...] You can put back the bits of  glass but you can’t 
collect up the heat of  the smash. It’s gone. (Arcadia, 93)  
  
It is a conclusion, a realisation, that questions Newtonian mechanics as the complete description 
of the world, and Septimus’s confidence in the clockwork universe. As Thomasina puts it: 
Thomasina:  Well! Just as I said! Newton’s machine which would knock our 
atoms from cradle to grave by the laws of  motion is incomplete! 
Determinism leaves the road at every corner, as I knew all along, 
and the cause is very likely hidden in this gentleman’s 
observation.12 
Lady Croom: Of  what? 
Thomasina:  The action of  bodies in heat. 
  (Arcadia, 83-4) 
Here, in a characteristic Stoppard double entendre, is revealed the connection between the themes of 
sexual attraction and science – “the attraction Newton left out” (74) as Valentine puts it. This 
type of pun, one that causes the conversation to become misleading for the interlocutors – a style 
of conversation perhaps best described by Stoppard’s stage direction from an earlier instance, 
“(answering the wrong question)” (11) – plays a part in creating what Heinz Antor has described as the 
“semantic entropy” of the dialogue.13 I will return to look at the disagreements regarding the 
epistemological effect of misunderstandings in the dialogue in more detail later.  
 
                                                 
12 The gentleman that she is referring to is Jean Baptiste Joseph Fourier (1768-1830) whose essay 
describing the propagation of  heat in a solid body won the Grand Prize in Mathematics of  the Institut 
de France in 1812. 
13  Heinz Antor, ‘The Arts, the Sciences, and the Making of  Meaning: Tom Stoppard’s Arcadia as a Post-
Structuralist Play’, Anglia, 116 (1998), 326-54 (p. 350). 
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Thomasina is able to describe fully her insight only after reading an essay by Joseph Fourier from 
1812, and she pre-dates Clausius’s first formulation of the Second Law of Thermodynamics by 
nearly forty years. Fourier’s essay does not constitute a “natural contradiction of Sir Isaac 
Newton” or show that “the atoms do not go according to Newton” (Arcadia, 81), as Stoppard 
has Septimus claim, but it is part of the work on heat that led to the concept of entropy.14 
Thomasina, though, has instinctively appreciated the entropic nature of the world from the very 
beginning of the play: 
Thomasina:  When you stir your rice pudding, Septimus, the spoonful of  jam 
spreads itself  round [...] But if  you stir backwards, the jam will not 
come together again. Do you think this is odd? 
Septimus:  No. 
Thomasina:  Well, I do. You cannot stir things apart.  
    
  (Arcadia, 4) 
In an important parallel, the demise of classical mechanics is also echoed in the play by the 
demise of the previously classical garden at Sidley Park, torn up by Capability Brown, and now 
being redesigned by the “landskip architect” (3) Richard Noakes. Noakes’s Improved Newcomen 
steam pump also links the two themes: it is partly responsible for Thomasina’s insight regarding 
heat loss, and also responsible for draining the lake as part of the new picturesque style garden. 
Hannah Jarvis, the garden historian working on the Sidley gardens in the present, tells us that: 
There’s an engraving of  Sidley Park in 1730 that makes you want to weep [...] 
By 1760 everything had gone – the topiary, pools and terraces, fountains, an 
avenue of  limes – the whole sublime geometry was ploughed under by 
Capability Brown [...] so that the fools could pretend they were living in God’s 
countryside. And then Richard Noakes came in to bring God up to date. 
(Arcadia, 27) 
Comparing the changes in the garden to the broader shift from Enlightenment to Romanticism, 
Hannah notes that the “history of the garden says it all, beautifully” (27); but the analogy with 
classical science is even more explicit in the play. The ‘sublime geometry’ Hannah refers to 
reminds us of Thomasina’s objections: both gardens and science are seeing the demise of classical 
geometry. Thomasina complains that Newton’s equations can only draw “commonplace 
geometry, as if the world of forms were nothing but arcs and angles [...] if there is an equation for 
a curve like a bell, there must be an equation for one like a bluebell, and if a bluebell, why not a 
                                                 
14 Prapassaree and Jeffrey Kramer make a similar observation: “the laws of  thermodynamics do not 
deny the absolute nature of  time and space, or the deterministic behaviour of  particles in motion, or 
even the possibility of  a Laplacian observer[; ...] Septimus’ declaration [...] is a bit hyperbolic”. Jeffrey 
Kramer and Prapassaree Kramer, ‘Stoppard’s Arcadia: Research, Time, Loss’ in Modern Drama, 40 
(1997), 1-10 (p. 4). 
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rose?” (37). Later she objects that “Mountains are not pyramids and trees are not cones. God 
must love gunnery and architecture if Euclid is his only geometry” (84). Noakes’s plans for the 
garden “is all irregular” (12), as Brice puts it, and elsewhere Thomasina describes Noakes as the 
“Emperor of Irregularity” (85); in parallel Thomasina’s own “truly wonderful new [mathematical] 
method”, which anticipates chaos mathematics and rejects classical geometry, she calls the “New 
Geometry of Irregular Forms” (43). These ideas look forward to chaos theory, looking for order 
in the apparent disorder of nature, and the sort of analysis that Valentine is doing one hundred 
and eighty years later, but it also represents another part of the growing pressure on classical 
mechanics. 
 
In the play, history turns out to be as difficult to comprehend as Valentine’s grouse populations: 
“Too much noise. There’s just too much bloody noise!” (Arcadia, 62). Noise, in the case of 
history, comes in the form of lost data, like the covers to letters, one of which Septimus “tosses 
[...] negligently aside” (4); or destroyed evidence, like the letters Septimus burns; or confusing 
additions to the data, like Thomasina’s drawing of the hermit; or ambiguities, like the fact that the 
botanist Chater in the West Indies is also the poet Chater in England, or the ambiguity of 
Chater’s inscription of Septimus’s edition of The Couch of Eros. The result of this ‘noise’ is that 
Bernard is convinced that he can show that Byron killed Chater in a duel before leaving England, 
and wrote two savage reviews of Chater’s poetry, while neither is in fact the case.  
 
In Stoppard’s meticulously plotted play, much of the comedy (aside from his customary witty 
linguistic play) comes from the disparity between the events depicted in the nineteenth-century 
scenes, and the attempts at reconstruction by Hannah and Bernard in the present. The audience 
is allowed to see not only that Hannah and Bernard are getting things wrong, but also why they 
are doing so. Even though, in the light of new evidence, Bernard does finally concede that Byron 
did not kill Ezra Chater in a duel, there are many details about which they remain mistaken, and 
Stoppard highlights wherever possible the ambiguity, indeed the treacherousness, of the 
documentary evidence that Hannah and Bernard rely on: the “only known likeness of the Sidley 
hermit [...] Drawn in by a later hand, of course” (Arcadia, 25), in Noakes’s sketchbook, was 
actually an absent-minded doodle by Thomasina; similarly, the Fuseli study that Hannah 
supposes is of Byron, but is ‘analysed’ and shown not to be, turns out to indeed be of Byron; the 
game book notes that Byron shot a hare, evidence that Bernard takes as gospel – “as sure as he 
shot that hare” (89) – but Augustus says that Byron “claimed my hare, although my shot was the 
earlier” (79), to which evidence we could add Septimus’s earlier observation that Byron “was 
never a sportsman” (13).  
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Bernard and Hannah rely on documents (like the game book and letters), but actually it is their 
guesses that are more accurate – including Bernard sarcastic “platonic letter” from Byron to 
Septimus ending “p.s. Burn this” (Arcadia, 57): such a letter (or at least similar) did exist, and is 
burned by Septimus before he has read it, noting “Now there’s a thing – a letter from Lord 
Byron never to be read by a living soul” (71). This fictional letter might even have revealed the 
solution to a real historical puzzle – why Byron left England.  
 
The problems that Bernard and Hannah face in recreating the events of the past are central to an 
interesting trend in the critical responses to Arcadia, and one I would like to spend some time 
examining: that is, the debate over the epistemological scepticism of the play especially but not 
exclusively in those studies that pay particular attention to the play’s scientific themes. Heinz 
Antor reads the play, notwithstanding a number of hopeful passages, as broadly sceptical about 
the possibility of knowing: “No matter where we look in the play, we time and again come across 
a scepticism with regard to our attempts at understanding the world and an awareness of the 
precarious status of the patterns we create in order to explain what we perceive”.15 He sees the 
play as showing that we have entered an age in which “it has become much more difficult to map 
the world and in which any pattern or structure may at best only claim a temporary truth status, 
since in a decentred universe ultimate meaning has become ungraspable and has to be pursued 
anew all the time, without there being a realistic hope of arrival”.16 Antor also argues that this 
difficulty in grasping meaning has been transferred into the language of the play, such that “there 
is a noise in the sense of communication being hampered by such factors as polysemy or varying 
frames of reference that lead to a kind of semantic entropy”.17 The language of the play embodies 
the “vicissitudes of the creation and communication of meaning”.18 Anja Müller-Muth similarly 
argues that “knowledge and insight are unevenly distributed in the play”, that any knowledge 
gained in the play is “in the external communicative system, i.e. among the audience, who has 
access to the different frames of reference”, and finally that “several uncertainties still remain 
unresolved at the end of the play for both characters and audience”.19 On the basis of these facts, 
she too reads the play as sceptical.  
 
Other critics have interpreted the epistemological position differently, seeing the play as affirming 
the possibility of knowledge. Although even the sceptics mentioned above acknowledge the 
                                                 
15 Antor, p. 348. 
16 Antor, p. 349. 
17 Antor, p. 350. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Anja Müller-Muth, ‘“It’s wanting to know that makes us matter”: Scepticism or Affirmation in Tom 
Stoppard’s Arcadia’, Connotations, 12:2-3 (2002/2003), 281-91 (p. 286). 
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positive representation of the process of seeking knowledge – or as Hannah puts it in the play, 
that even though “It’s all trivial [...] It’s wanting to know that makes us matter” (Arcadia, 75) – 
critics such as Daniel Jernigan and Burkhard Niederhoff have gone further and seen the play as, 
in John Fleming’s words, “an affirmation that [...] people can use their intellect and intuition to 
gain knowledge”.20 Niederhoff’s pair of essays contend that “the epistemology of the play is not 
sceptical” – not “a fashionable claim”, he notes.21 His argument is that:  
the outcome of  the research or detective plot [...] precludes scepticism. The 
researchers may be plunged in comparative uncertainty, lagging behind the 
audience, but eventually they succeed in catching up, in falsifying or verifying 
their theories. This plot contrasts Bernard’s theory, which is wrong, with 
Hannah’s theory, which is right, and both are proved to be so in the course of  
the play.22 
A sceptical play, he claims, would also end on a sceptical note – but Arcadia ends with Hannah 
receiving the piece of proof that she thinks she needs to prove her theory. 
 
Daniel Jernigan, in an essay that examines the role of science in both Hapgood and Arcadia, 
supposes that we might expect Stoppard to “create a work that is quantum mechanically dubious 
about the possibility of narrative explicability”.23 In fact, Jernigan claims, this assumption “proves 
to be incorrect, as much of Stoppard’s investigation into these theories [quantum mechanics and 
chaos theory] seeks to normalize them according to a classical interpretation rather than to revel 
in their anti-epistemological implications”.24 Jernigan defines the Enlightenment epistemology as 
a commitment to “rationality as the means by which truth is discovered” and sees this attitude as 
portrayed “whenever it [the play] suggests that rationality might be able to assist Bernard and 
Hannah in their recovery of the past. In fact, such instances are numerous”.25 
 
The debate between those who see the play as epistemologically sceptical and those who see it as 
epistemologically affirming seems to me to fall into the trap of “an either/or model”.26 Just as 
Fleming shows that Hannah “embodies Stoppard’s notion that classical and romantic 
                                                 
20 John Fleming, Stoppard’s Theatre: Finding Order Amid Chaos (Austin: University of  Texas Press, 2001), p. 
200. 
21 Burkhard Niederhoff, ‘Who Shot the Hare in Stoppard’s Arcadia? A reply to Anja Müller-Muth’, 
Connotations, 13:1-2 (2003/2004) 170-78 (p. 170). 
22 Niederhoff, ‘Fortuitous Wit’, p. 55. 
23 Daniel Jernigan, ‘Tom Stoppard and “Postmodern Science”: Normalizing radical Epistemologies in 
Hapgood and Arcadia’ in Comparative Drama, 37 (2003), 3-35 (p. 3). 
24 Jernigan, p. 4. 
25 Jernigan, p. 23. 
26 Fleming, p. 201. 
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temperaments are not mutually exclusive, but rather co-exist in people” sceptical and affirmative 
epistemological positions can coexist within the play: we need to use a “both/and paradigm”.27  
 
It is relatively easy to marshal evidence on both sides of this debate, and I do not want to come 
down too heavily on either side, precisely because I think that the play also deliberately avoids 
doing so. Arcadia is not so much interested in the possibility of establishing ‘ultimate meaning’, as 
in the means by which we go about searching for it – even, perhaps, while “knowing that failure 
is final” (Arcadia, 75 – the phrase concludes Hannah’s ‘It’s all trivial’ speech). But nor is this to 
say that Hannah simply speaks for the play when she argues that all knowledge is in itself ‘trivial’, 
but that “It’s wanting to know that makes us matter” – or as Antor and others have put “it is the 
journey that matters, not the arrival”.28 I don’t think that Stoppard’s intended conclusion is so 
pat, indeed so trivial, as that. I will argue that the play’s epistemology is sceptical in certain ways, 
but not in the way that Antor and Müller-Muth have claimed, and not in the way that a sceptical 
reading of the play is characterised by Jernigan or Niederhoff. 
 
The interpretation of the play as being non-sceptical, as epistemologically affirming, seems to me 
to isolate details of the plotting and dialogue in a way that, while supporting the argument, is at 
odds with the general thrust of the play. It is possible to argue that the refinement of the theories 
of Hannah and Bernard over the course of the play suggests that the play is not sceptical about 
the possibility of knowledge and a broadly scientific methodology more particularly. Perhaps it is 
true too that some of the resolutions are not entirely sceptical. But to read the play this way 
seems to me to be a case of not seeing the wood for the trees. It is a problem that Richard 
Corballis diagnoses more broadly in audiences of Stoppard’s plays, though he is remarking on the 
failure to appreciate the “essential substance of a play”: “Like Donne surveying his mistress for 
the first time in the flesh in ‘Air and Angels’, they get dazzled by the surface effects [...] The 
surface brilliance inhibits appreciation of the underlying design”.29 
 
An analogy for such a reading – allowing a few details to overwhelm a broader emphasis, 
notwithstanding the truthfulness of those details – can be found in Noakes’s garden. Noakes’s 
plan for the garden “is all irregular” (12), as Brice puts it, and elsewhere Thomasina describes 
Noakes as the “Emperor of Irregularity” (85); but as Heinz Antor points out, “Noakes’s garden, 
of course, is not chaotic at all, but well planned”.30 To emphasise, however, this planning at the 
expense of the manifest irregularity, would be ridiculous, even though true; and Antor does not 
                                                 
27 Ibid.  
28 Antor, p. 352, and quoted by Niederhoff, ‘Fortuitous Wit’, p. 56. 
29 Richard Corballis, Stoppard: The Mystery and the Clockwork (Oxford: Amber Lane Press, 1984), p. 1. 
30 Antor, p. 333. 
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do so, instead going on to note that the garden “nevertheless stresses discontinuities and 
nonlinearity rather than symmetry and cohesion”.31 In other words, the meticulously planned 
garden may still represent the chaotic. Likewise, a play with some narrative resolutions (e.g. that 
Hannah finds the proof that Septimus was the hermit), with some progress made in Hannah and 
Bernard’s reconstruction of events, and with Thomasina and Septimus’s development of a radical 
new mathematics, such a play can still emphasise the contingency and instability of knowledge. 
 
The same may be said of the disagreement between Antor and Niederhoff over the ‘semantic 
entropy’ of the play’s dialogue. Antor suggests that the movement towards increased disorder and 
entropy is also represented in the dialogue of the play, particularly in the misunderstandings 
created through puns or “varying frames of reference”, as I noted earlier.32 Niederhoff, on the 
other hand believes that it is “misleading to describe the misunderstandings of the play as 
‘semantic entropy’. Instead of disrupting or dissolving meaning, they create it”.33 Niederhoff rests 
his argument on three assertions: firstly, that the “sheer fun and ingenuity of the two passages 
quoted should preclude a description in terms of ‘semantic entropy’”; secondly, that 
misunderstandings create connections between, say, sexuality and the garden, that are “crucial to 
the thematic structure of the play”; and finally, that misunderstandings in the first scene “lead to 
crucial discoveries on Thomasina’s part [...] The interruptions to Thomasina’s lesson do not cause 
pedagogical or cognitive entropy. They result in worthwhile lessons and insights”.34  I perceive 
flaws in all three contentions. 
 
The first two assertions reveal an important distinction. The witty ingenuity and thematic 
connections evident in the word-play of Arcadia are a species of meaning created only for the 
audience of the play, not for the characters within the play. This is important for two reasons: 
firstly, that discussion of the epistemological attitude of the play must revolve around knowledge 
as it is sought and achieved within the diagesis – for the characters, not for the audience. This, of 
course, is sensible; an epistemological argument regarding the play that was based on an 
assessment of the ability of the audience to achieve knowledge would really be a measure of how 
comprehensible the play was. An incomprehensible play is, perhaps, one way in which a 
playwright could undermine or question the stability of knowledge and our pursuit of it, but it is 
not the method that is evidently chosen by Stoppard. The second reason is that the creation of 
meaning for the audience through disordered dialogue is synecdochic of the argument that I have 
been advancing: that the confusion that the play depicts is more indicative of the play’s 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Antor, p. 350. 
33 Niederhoff, ‘Fortuitous Wit’, p. 44. 
34 Niederhoff, ‘Fortuitous Wit’, p. 46, p. 47. 
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epistemology than the entertainingly ordered play that the audience watches. Both the dialogue 
and the events of Arcadia are comprehensible to the audience even at the same time as they are 
confusing for the characters (this is perhaps the very essence of farce): it is from this that much 
of the play’s humour is derived, but the audience’s understanding does not preclude the 
possibility of the play’s taking an epistemologically sceptical position. 
 
Niederhoff’s final piece of evidence for the meaning creation of the misunderstandings in the 
dialogue (and, indeed, interruptions, slips of the tongue, and overhead phrases) is that Thomasina 
learns from them. This is true. (Müller-Muth’s objection that Thomasina’s “reactions to 
Septimus’s evasive answers to her questions about carnal embrace very clearly indicate that she 
already knows what this expression means”, and therefore does not learn this in this scene, is not, 
I think, convincing.)35 Certainly Thomasina may well be seen as one of the only characters who 
does achieve knowledge in a way that could be epistemologically affirming. But she does not, I 
think, achieve this knowledge predominantly from the confusions and misunderstandings in the 
conversations between characters. It is revealing to consider what exactly Thomasina learns from 
the confusions of the opening scene – Niederhoff provides a list: “She learns what carnal 
embrace is, that it addles the brain, that Septimus shared it with Mrs Chater, and that Septimus is 
in love with her mother; [...] she also has a first inkling of the second law of thermodynamics or 
the principle of entropy”.36 Once we realise that the last in this list is inadmissible as evidence 
(Thomasina simply has her idea about rice pudding because that is what is for dinner, not 
because of any semantic confusion) the pattern emerges easily: Thomasina learns about sex and 
sexual attraction. Given the connection that the play establishes between sexual attraction and the 
non-rational, the Romantic, the disorderly, and the non-deterministic, it should come as no 
surprise that Thomasina’s knowledge of it comes about through the semantic confusion in this 
scene.  
 
In a footnote to her essay Anja Müller-Muth notes that the use of the phrase ‘semantic entropy’ 
is itself “rather inappropriate for this context” since it denotes words that are drained of meaning 
due to repetition or, to use a fitting word, reiteration, rather than due to multiple meanings. She 
does not note that this in some ways supports the argument that she is trying to refute, that the 
dialogue contains not a lack of meaning, but a superfluousness of meaning.37 Of course, to inject 
the play with genuine semantic entropy in the dialogue would be to write a play deliberately 
populated with banalities and clichés (certain scenes from Beckett spring to mind), not a very 
                                                 
35 Müller-Muth, p. 283. 
36 Niederhoff, ‘Fortuitous Wit’, p. 48.  
37 Müller-Muth, p. 288. 
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Stoppardian approach. In attempting to represent disorder, Stoppard does not allow the play 
itself to descend into confusion. Stoppard is content to work within the constraints of a kind of 
realism or at least orderliness, while trying to also reveal the disorderliness of reality. As Stoppard 
himself notes, he wants to retain a sense of narrative: “I want to [...] organize this impossible 
Rubik’s Cube, so that it still has the architecture of a – what is the word? – not conventional, not 
traditional, but somehow atavistic archetypal architecture of narrative”.38 Lucy Melbourne makes 
the comparison with a phrase from Thomasina: “Stoppard might well declare his intent for a new 
‘drama of irregular forms’”.39  
 
Stoppard, then, creates dialogue that is representative of entropy without being itself devoid of 
meaning – in fact, it often bristles with many meanings – but it does represent the difficulties in 
establishing meaning, it represents the noise inherent in communication, and as such the 
difficulties in transmitting knowledge. There is one passage in particular that I think strongly 
supports an anti-epistemological interpretation of the dialogue of the play, one that has received 
scant attention, and yet which seems to speak to many of the play’s themes. 
 
When Septimus deviously sets Thomasina a passage from Antony and Cleopatra translated into 
Latin as a translation task to be translated back into English, we are presented with a genuine 
example of ‘semantic entropy’ – indeed the phrase derives precisely from translation theory. 
Here, the impoverishment of Thomasina’s version of the speech, the draining of its meaning, is 
due to the reiteration: the new ‘Latin’ text is used as the starting point for the subsequent 
transformation. This is a ‘rabbit’ translation to go with Thomasina’s ‘rabbit’ equation: “it eats its 
own progeny” (Arcadia, 77). As a consequence the instability of language is clear – the 
permutations of language are too vast to return to the original by simply performing the same 
action in reverse. Instantaneously this idea recalls not only the sensitive dependence on initial 
conditions of an iterated algorithm that is familiar to us from chaos theory, but also the 
irreversibility of certain processes, as the Second Law of Thermodynamics reveals about time. It 
is surely no coincidence that the speech that Stoppard has Septimus have Thomasina translate is 
one which itself embodies the paradox of representation through language.  In Septimus’s own 
“free translation” (Arcadia, 37) he ends with the crucial phrase: “For her own person, it beggared 
all description – she did lie in her pavilion – “ but the speech continues 
  For her own person, 
It beggared all description. She did lie 
                                                 
38  Quoted in Lucy Melbourne, ‘“Plotting the Apple of  Knowledge”: Tom Stoppard’s Arcadia as Iterated 
Theatrical Algorithm’, Modern Drama, 41 (1998) 557-72 (p.  563). 
39 Melbourne, p. 563. 
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In her pavilion—cloth of  gold, of  tissue— 
O’er-picturing that Venus where we see 
The fancy outwork nature.40 
Language is too impoverished to describe Cleopatra, and yet Enobarbus continues to attempt to 
utilise it. 
 
This episode also foreshadows Hannah’s later observation about the purpose of pursuing 
knowledge: she does not want the answers to be “in the back of the book” because the joy of 
knowledge is in the discovery. For Thomasina, the frustration of Septimus’s trick is that the 
answer is in a book – and that there is a right answer, there is a true translation. The process 
becomes, in her eyes, frustrating and pointless because the translation has already been done; but, 
ironically, the scene also confirms that the point of ‘work’, of seeking knowledge, is the process. 
Thomasina doesn’t do the translation in order to produce a translation, but for the benefits of 
going through the process. 
 
I claimed above that isolating certain details to argue for the epistemologically affirmative nature 
of the play was to not see the woods for the trees. The same kind of reading could also be used 
to assert the scepticism of the play, and would be equally flawed. There is some argument over 
the degree to which, say, Hannah’s theory that Septimus is the hermit can be said to be ‘proved’ 
correct at the close of the play, but two mysteries do remain unquestionably unsolved at the 
play’s end: the reason for Byron’s departure from England and the proof for Fermat’s theorem. 
The fact that the play does not solve these puzzles is not evidence that the play takes an anti-
epistemological stance, since these are real-world problems that remain unsolved (or remained 
unsolved at the time of the play’s composition in the case of Fermat’s theorem). Readings of the 
play that take this sort of approach are guilty of precisely the scholarly approach of which 
Hannah accuses Bernard: “You’ve left out everything that doesn’t fit” (Arcadia, 59).  
 
However, the play does draw considerable attention to these remaining uncertainties: the fact that 
a solution to Fermat’s theorem “has kept people busy for a hundred and fifty years” (Arcadia, 2) 
is amplified by the knowledge that the audience already has (or will learn during the course of the 
play), that it continued to do so for a further two hundred years; and just as with Fermat, the fact 
that no one knows why Byron leaves England is equally apparent in both time periods, and the 
only possible source for a solution (aside from Byron, who remains off-stage) is a letter that 
Septimus conspicuously burns on stage, musing “Now there’s a thing – a letter from Lord Byron 
                                                 
40  William Shakespeare, Anthony and Cleopatra, Act 2, Sc. 2, ll. 204-208 in The Complete Works, Compact 
Edition, ed. by Stanley Well and Gary Taylor (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 1010. 
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never to be read by a living soul” (Arcadia, 71). It is the fact that the play so deliberately brings 
these unsolved mysteries to our attention, rather than the fact that it leaves them unsolved, that 
does support the play’s own particular epistemology. And this is the point – the play is not simply 
sceptical, or not: it doesn’t just depict the possibility of reaching knowledge via rational means, 
nor does it simply reject this; it doesn’t normalize the supposedly radical epistemology of chaos 
theory into a classical rational epistemology (à la Jernigan), nor does it put forward a genuinely 
anti-epistemological argument “reveling in the fact that knowability is an impossibility”.41 Rather, 
it presents its own epistemology. 
 
When Thomasina says that Fermat’s last theorem is a problem without a solution, that it is just 
there to drive us mad, she recalls a similar observation by Niels Bohr in Michael Frayn’s play 
Copenhagen that “Some questions have no answers to find” (Copenhagen, 3). Just as we cannot be 
“really really good at algebra” (the one fictional interpolation into Thomasina’s speech – it is 
otherwise near-verbatim Laplace), so we cannot solve all problems. This points to the play’s 
emphasis on the limits of a scientific epistemology, not of its complete invalidity. The same 
limitation, though, is placed on the humanities too – and Stoppard has noted that Bernard’s rant 
against science is not his own position. If these traditional forms of knowledge are shown to be 
limited, then at the same time an importance is attached to alternative forms, such as intuition, in 
the form of Gus’s inexplicable interventions, or interpersonal and sexual dynamics – these too 
are suggestive of a limit on the completeness of rationalism as an epistemological system. The 
play, then, enacts the insufficiency of any single monocular epistemology. 
 
Just as in Arcadia, Michael Frayn’s Copenhagen dramatizes the difficulties in attaining knowledge, 
asking, indeed, the “further question, whether under any conditions penetration to a single truth 
embedded in a determinate reality can be achieved”, and just as in Arcadia, this is linked to the 
impossibility of reconstructing history.42 Like Arcadia too, this coincides with an elaboration of a 
post-Newtonian non-deterministic science, in this case the Copenhagen Interpretation of 
quantum mechanics, and Heisenberg’s uncertainty (more properly, indeterminacy) principle in 
particular. The play focuses on a visit that Werner Heisenberg made in 1941 to his former 
colleague and close friend and mentor Niels Bohr in Nazi-occupied Copenhagen. The reasons for 
Heisenberg’s visit, and exactly what was said between the two men, have been the subject of 
speculation and controversy ever since. In Frayn’s play, first performed in 1998, these 
uncertainties are discussed by the ghosts of Heisenberg, Bohr and Bohr’s wife Margrethe as they 
                                                 
41 Jernigan, p. 32, n. 4. 
42 Martin Meisel, How Plays Work: Reading and Performance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 145. 
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make “one more attempt” to understand the conversation that led to “the end of the famous 
friendship between Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg” (Copenhagen, 4). 
 
The play is in two acts but, in imitation of the multiple drafts of a physics paper, is structurally 
divided into three ‘drafts’, three attempts to establish precisely what took place during 
Heisenberg’s visit, what was said by both men, and what Heisenberg’s motivations for coming to 
Copenhagen were.43 A number of concepts from the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum 
mechanics make appearances in the play, but it is Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle that is most 
conspicuous. All critical interpretations of the play have identified the unmissable connection that 
Frayn makes between Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and the uncertainty that is attached to 
reconstructing the events and motivations of Heisenberg’s visit. The uncertainty principle shows 
that there is a necessary limit to our possible knowledge of the subatomic realm: we cannot ever 
know precisely both the position and the momentum of a subatomic particle, and the 
relationship between our knowledge of the two variables is inversely related – in other words, the 
more precisely we know the position of the particle, the less we know about its momentum, and 
vice versa.44 The principle is often wrongly described as an ‘observer effect’ – that we cannot 
observe something without affecting it – but this is a simplification. In fact there is a precise ratio 
of precision between our measurement of canonically conjugate variables such as position and 
momentum. 
 
In the aftermath of Copenhagen’s premiere in London in May 1998, and even more so after its 
United States premiere in New York in April 2000, the play was subject to considerable criticism. 
The initial criticisms, following the London premiere, focussed on inaccuracies in what Frayn has 
called his “shaky science”, and Frayn made a “number of modifications” before the play opened 
in New York.45 In the wake of the US premiere, however, the play was criticised far more 
broadly, and particularly for perceived historical inaccuracies, and for its apparently overly 
sympathetic depiction of Werner Heisenberg. Michael Frayn responded to many of these 
criticisms in his post-postscript written for the third edition published by Methuen in 2003, but 
subsequent commentary has continued to focus on the historical accuracy of the play. Such a 
focus is justified, according to Gerald Holten, one of the more vocal critics of the play, because 
Frayn’s own post-scripts have shown that “he is not satisfied to have Copenhagen be and remain a 
                                                 
43 Bohr in particular was renowned for his almost obsessive redrafting of  papers.  
44 In fact, to be precise, the same effect is true of  our observations of  particles and bodies on all scales, 
only that the margin of  error in our measurements of  momentum and position for bodies larger than 
the microscopic scale is so disproportionally small as to be unnoticeable. On a subatomic scale, 
however, the uncertainty is significant.  
45 Michael Frayn, ‘Friends and Mortal Enemies’, Guardian, 23 March 2002, Saturday Review 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4379725,00.html> [accessed 3 April 2009]. 
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work of fiction”.46 Steven Barfield likewise suggests that the reaction to the historical arguments 
in the play were precipitated not by the play itself, but by Frayn’s own desire to separate the 
fictional from the historical. “In this Postscript,” Barfield claims, “Frayn has suggested that the 
play is some kind of historical account”.47 
 
Regardless of whether it is valid to level these criticisms at the play, one of the inevitable 
consequences is that many critics have lost sight of the mechanics of the play as a play; more 
significant than whether their historically focussed criticisms are invalidated by the fictional 
nature of the piece per se is that their failure to read the play as fiction leads them into specific 
criticisms which are misreadings. Frequently, the problem is simply conflating the words of the 
on-stage Heisenberg with the opinions and intentions of the playwright.48 
 
At its most extreme this can lead to some strange accusations. Commenting on the scene in 
which Heisenberg notes the irony – the “something almost mathematically elegant” – about the 
fact that the diffusion calculation was done by Jewish exiles from Germany, Paul Lawrence Rose 
identifies an “implicit anti-Semitism”.49 However, he shies away from attributing this to Michael 
Frayn: “not of Mr. Frayn himself, of course, but of Heisenberg and others”.50 But what exactly is 
Rose proposing here? That the fictitious character Heisenberg on stage is anti-Semitic, or that 
because of this comment in this play, the historical Heisenberg was anti-Semitic? In the context 
of his argument (a historical, not a literary one) the first conclusion seems banal, the second 
absurd. If not to Frayn, then to whom is Rose really referring? And who are the “others” that he 
also accuses? Regardless of whether or not this exchange implies any anti-Semitism at all (rather, 
I think it obviously alludes to the ironic problem that Nazi anti-Semitism has created for itself by 
forcing such scientists into exile), the problem Rose faces is deciding who he thinks is speaking 
here: a character, a historical figure, or a playwright.  
 
We can take this issue further. In writing the play, Frayn was heavily influenced by Thomas 
Powers’s book Heisenberg’s War. Powers argues that Heisenberg had done the diffusion equation 
but misled Nazi authorities – especially Speers – about the amount of fissionable material that 
                                                 
46 Gerald Holten, Jonathan Logan, Michael Frayn and Thomas Powers, ‘Copenhagen: An Exchange’, New 
York Review of  Books, 11 April 2002 <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15264> [accessed 23 March 
2009]. 
47 Barfield, Steven. ‘Dark matter: The controversy surrounding Michael Frayn’s Copenhagen’, Archipelago, 
8.3 (2004), 80-103 (p. 84). 
48 Similarly simplistic, if  tempting, conflations have also led to misinterpretation of  the role of  scientific 
rationalism in the novels of  Ian McEwan, as I will show in chapter 6.  
49 Paul Lawrence Rose and Thomas Powers (reply), ‘Copenhagen Cont’d.’, The New York Review of  Books, 
9 May 2002 <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15373> [accessed 23 March 2009]. 
50 Ibid. 
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would be required, in order to discourage significant investment in the bomb development 
programme. One of the accusations that has been levelled at Frayn is that while Copenhagen seems 
to adopt this argument (what might be described as the ‘strong’ Powers thesis), in subsequent 
post-scripts and interviews Frayn retreated from this position to the ‘weaker’ thesis, namely that 
Heisenberg and the other German scientists lacked the total commitment that would have been 
required to make the project successful.51 Holten, for example, has followed this line of criticism, 
and has wondered as a result how this retreat affects the play, asking:  
what to do about such lines in his play as “Heisenberg’s” dramatic remarks: “I 
understood very clearly. I simply didn’t tell the others”? And later: “I wasn’t 
trying to build a bomb. Thank you.” Perhaps should the actor now deliver the 
lines with heavy irony?52 
Regardless of whether the initial accusation itself is justified,53 this comment, which at least 
focuses on the play and shows an awareness of the presence of an actor and of delivery, misses a 
crucial point – the character Heisenberg does not express Frayn’s thesis (if such a thing exists) in 
the same way that Powers’s book can be said to express his. Barfield cites the example of Gerald 
Logan, who misreads the ‘strange new quantum ethics’ episode that I shall examine later, noting 
that “Logan’s criticism is therefore problematic, because he does not recognise the critical 
strategies necessary for reading the words of a character in a play, but assumes the whole piece 
should be read, as if it possessed the coherency of a thesis”.54 Once we appreciate this it is hardly 
surprising that this fictitious Heisenberg should defend some of his actions, and that as a 
playwright Frayn should also try to “make explicit the ideas and feelings that never quite get 
expressed in the confusing onrush of life”.55 In his post-post-script Frayn records his belief that 
“everyone [in a play] should be allowed the freedom and eloquence to make the most convincing 
case that he can for himself”.56 The conclusion that we should draw from this is that 
Heisenberg’s words are not Frayn’s message; if we are determined to isolate a ‘message’ for the 
play, then it must come from a more holistic (this is not a great deal to ask) appreciation of the 
dialogue of all the characters in combination with all the dramaturgical apparatus. 
                                                 
51 Duncan Wu, ‘Michael Frayn, Copenhagen (1998)’, in Making Plays: Interviews with Contemporary British 
Dramatists and Directors, ed. by Duncan Wu (Basingstoke: Macmillan 2000), pp. 209-230 (p. 224). 
52 Holten, Logan, Frayn and Powers <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15264> [accessed 23 March 
2009]. 
53 I personally do not believe it is. Firstly for the reasons stated below, that the character Heisenberg may 
present a version of  the strong Powers thesis in defence of  himself, but this does not necessarily mean 
that Frayn does so; but more simply, Frayn quite clearly puts forward his belief  in the weaker version 
in his interview with Duncan Wu in March 1999, long before the criticisms that followed the US 
premiere. (Wu, p. 219) 
54 Barfield, p. 90. 
55 Michael Frayn, Stage Directions: Writing on Theatre 1970-2008 (London: Faber, 2008), p. 78. 
56 Ibid. 
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One of the realisations resultant from such a conclusion is the almost complete lack of attention 
that has been paid to the vital role of Margrethe in the play. Discussion has tended to circle 
around the dialogue between Bohr and Heisenberg, and the subsequent non-dramatic writings of 
Frayn; but Margrethe’s character acts as an important corrective to Heisenberg’s claims and to 
both Bohr and Heisenberg’s romantisization of their relationship, and as such is a crucial part of 
the play’s representation. Barfield, one of the exceptions, observes that: 
The character of  Margrethe [...] is sceptical throughout Copenhagen of  
Heisenberg’s claims, and her attitude is closest to that of  historians such as 
Rose and Holton. She undermines exactly the kind of  arguments on behalf  of  
Heisenberg that someone like Thomas Powers makes. The fictitious 
‘Heisenberg’ that Frayn creates, lies closer to Power’s account, because that 
book is much more favourable to the way that the real Heisenberg presented 
himself  and his actions, in his own comments. Copenhagen’s Heisenberg couldn’t 
represent himself  in the same way that Rose’s interpretation of  Heisenberg 
does, because people are seldom so hostile to themselves.57 
The following exchange, an excellent example of Margrethe’s function and also of the way in 
which the play distances itself from Heisenberg’s claims, reveals the dangers of removing 
Heisenberg’s statements from the context of the play: 
H:  I understood very clearly [how to build the bomb]. I just didn’t tell 
the others.  
M:  Ah. 
H:  I understood, though.  
M:  But secretly. 
 
  (Copenhagen, 80) 
Margrethe’s responses here make it quite clear that she is mocking Heisenberg and is deeply 
sceptical of his claims. Margrethe’s role as an observer also highlights the similarities between the 
problems of scientific and historical observations. Without the effect of observers, the play 
implies, we might be able to ascertain what actually happened: 
B:  Very well. Let’s start all over again from the beginning. No 
Gestapo in the shadows this time. No British intelligence office. 
No one watching us at all.  
M:  Only me. 
B:  Only Margrethe. 
 
  (Copenhagen, 38) 
                                                 
57 Barfield, pp. 86-7. 
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Margrethe’s presence reminds us that an observer-less system cannot exist: that even if there is a 
determinate truth in order to describe what happened there needs to be someone to explain it to. 
There is also a comic irony on a metadramatic level, in Bohr’s claim that they can start again, with 
“No one watching”, because it reminds us of our own observation of the process: the audience is 
made complicit in the impossibility of reconstructing the meeting. This complicity was 
emphasised by the design of the original production. The play was set in the round, and the  
now-famous set was a circular playing area surrounded on one side by three 
rows of  curved seating arranged like a lecture theatre or a jury bank. This led 
Harry Lustig and Kirsten Shepherd-Barr to view the actors as particles within 
an atom and the setup of  the audience as a way of  emphasizing the theme of  
observation, with spectators watching other spectators watching the 
performers.58 
The play’s metadramatic awareness indicates that we should also follow Barnett in recalling (as 
few have) that the mechanics of the play’s setting and construction are overtly anti-realistic – this 
is not a realist representation of the events, but an after-death recollection of them. It is perfectly 
possible to imagine a version of the play that still included the three ‘drafts’, but re-enacted them 
as alternate realities. But this is not the play with which we are presented. Rather, the characters 
discuss the events that took place from the perspective of an unspecified afterlife. This, Barnett 
has argued, “emphasizes the artifice of the situation” and alerts the audience to the fact that: 
the play is not dealing in anything but imagined encounters [...] This position 
helps to expose the apparently naturalistic dialogues for what they are: 
constructions born of  those involved and not an objective history, as if  such a 
thing were ever possible.59 
Although, as we will see, the play utilises an at times fluid temporal perspective, the predominant 
mode is a retrospective examination of the events of 1941, opening with a series of questions 
which characterises the play’s uncertainty: “But why? [...] You’re still thinking about it? [...] Why 
did he come to Copenhagen? [...] Does it matter, my love, now we’re all three of us dead and 
gone?”. But also made clear here, in the “still [...] now [...] dead and gone”, is the temporal 
location of the characters. The play soon shifts, however, back to the ‘present’ of 1941: 
H:  September, 1941, Copenhagen... And at once – here I am, getting 
off  the night train from Berlin with my colleague Carl von 
Weizsäcker.   
  (Copenhagen, 6) 
                                                 
58  David Barnett, ‘Reading and Performing Uncertainty: Michael Frayn’s Copenhagen and the 
Postdramatic Theatre’, Theatre Research International, 30 (2005), 139-49 (p. 146). 
59 Barnett, p. 142. 
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Here, in the play’s first change of temporal location, the shift is amply signalled – firstly, by 
Margrethe, who comments that “The past become present inside your head”, and also by the 
reminder of the date and location, which acts a little like an on screen caption in a film. The shift 
is also facilitated by the unspecified tense leading in to Heisenberg’s ‘arrival’ in 1941. Elsewhere, 
however, the shifts in tense are more rapid: 
M: Niels! They’ve occupied our country 
B:  He is not they.  
M:  He’s one of  them. 
H:  First of  all there’s an official visit to Bohr’s workplace [...] At the 
head of  the table is that Bohr? [...] A difficult occasion, though – I 
remember that clearly enough. 
B:  It was a disaster. He made a very bad impression. Occupation of  
Denmark unfortunate. Occupation of  Poland, however, perfectly 
acceptable. Germany now certain to win the war.  
H:  Our tanks are almost at Moscow. What can stop us? Well, one 
thing, perhaps. One thing.  
 
  (Copenhagen, 7-8) 
Here the perspective shifts, very briefly, from the present of 1941 to the later perspective, 
reminding both the audience, and Heisenberg, of the dramatic irony of his confidence in 
Germany’s victory. It also reminds Heisenberg of the ‘one thing’ that could prevent a victorious 
Germany.  
 
These dramatic ironical gaps that the shifting temporal perspective can open up are even more 
conspicuous elsewhere. So it is that Bohr can, rather patronisingly, tell Margrethe that 
“Heisenberg is a theoretical physicist. I don’t think anyone has yet discovered a way you can use 
theoretical physics to kill people”, and that “no one is going to develop a weapon based on 
nuclear fission” (Copenhagen, 10, 11).  Beyond the customary (and here, blackly) comic effect of 
dramatic irony, there is an important implication in these naive assumptions, and even more 
markedly so in Bohr’s later assertion that 
mercifully [...] to produce even one gram of  U-235 would take 26,000 years. By 
which time, surely this war will be over. So he’s wrong, you see, he’s wrong! 
(Copenhagen, 34) 
Bohr’s certainty that enough U-235 cannot be separated is heightened by the contrast with his 
darkly comic uncertainty over the duration of the war. In both cases, what comes across most 
strongly is the fragility of our previous certainties, and scientific certainty in particular. Barnett 
points out this same disparity and sees that “[t]he obvious contrast between what was considered 
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scientific fact in 1939 and the reality of Hiroshima and Nagasaki a mere six years later opens up a 
line of critique that aims at interrogating the nature of scientific fact”.60  
 
At times, then, Bohr and Heisenberg inhabit the present of 1941, without the benefit of the 
knowledge of events later in the war and afterwards.  At other times Bohr and Heisenberg inhabit 
the unspecified afterlife, and look back at events after 1941. When they discuss the development 
of the Allied bomb, they describe, with hindsight, how Frisch and Peierls did the diffusion 
equation for Uranium 235 and “discovered just how fast the chain reaction would go” 
(Copenhagen, 83), making the idea of a U-235 fission bomb imaginable. But from this position, 
with the benefit of hindsight, they no longer have access to the knowledge of their own 
behaviour and motivations that they might have had in the present. Most conspicuously, this is 
the case with the central uncertainty in the play – why Heisenberg went to Copenhagen. This is 
clear from the very start of the play: Margrethe reveals that Heisenberg “explained over and over 
again. Each time he explained it became more obscure” (Copenhagen, 3), and Heisenberg agrees 
that the “more [he] explained the deeper the uncertainty has become” (Copenhagen, 4).  
 
This uncertainty that the distance brings is true of other actions, or inactions. When Bohr asks 
Heisenberg “why didn’t you do the [diffusion] calculation?”, Heisenberg can only reply: 
H: I don’t know! I don’t know why I didn’t do it! Because I never 
thought of  it! Because it didn’t occur to me! Because I assumed it 
wasn’t worth doing! 
  (Copenhagen, 85) 
Just as with Heisenberg’s motivations for going to Copenhagen, he can no longer isolate the 
reason. 
 
If we wish to, we can make the comparison with Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle: the 
relationship between Heisenberg’s knowledge of events and his knowledge of his motivations is a 
little like a pair of canonically conjugate variables (though the analogy is not a strict one). From 
their vantage of their afterlife, Bohr and Heisenberg can perhaps see relationships between events 
unclear at the time – they can see that Germany’s victory was not certain, that the development 
of fission bombs was not impossible. But from this position they no longer have contact with the 
thoughts and motivations that they had at the time: memory is “a curious sort of diary” 
(Copenhagen, 6). The greater their hindsight, the further removed they are from their feelings at 
that time.  
                                                 
60 Ibid. 
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Karen Barad, in a long and detailed criticism of Frayn’s play, takes issue with the use of the 
uncertainty principle in this way – as an analogy for the impossibility of knowing a person’s 
motivations; the analogy I have just described is actually closer to the more rigorous version of 
the analogy that Karen Barad proposes, which would state something more like ‘there is a ratio of 
uncertainty between our knowledge of a person’s actions and of their motivations’.61 However, 
Barad has a more general concern – that this sort of analogical use of uncertainty in the play does 
not say anything more than what would as easily be understood without the analogy. She 
proposes that a comparison with a quantum mechanical theory is not necessary to argue 
something as accepted as the fact that “we can [in theory] never know everything about human 
thinking”.62 Or, in this instance, we could agree that it is hardly a novel contention that, say, 
‘memory is imperfect’, or that ‘things look different depending on where and when they are 
observed from’ – and the comparison with quantum mechanics may be seen as window dressing, 
or worse. As she puts it: 
ultimately it seems that such [analogical] methods (intentionally or otherwise) 
are only out to garner the authority of  science for some theory or proposition 
that someone wanted to advance anyway and could have advanced without 
understanding anything at all about quantum mechanics.63 
This is a fair point, and if the play was only using the scientific content and context to make the 
above observations, then I think the criticism would be valid. But, in my reading of the play, 
these contentions are part of a broader analogical aim, one that shows the problems with a 
scientific monopoly on knowledge. The play does not simply propose that ‘memory is a little like 
quantum uncertainty’. Rather, the uncertainty of our knowledge of events and motivations 
mirrors the inherent uncertainties involved in quantum mechanics, and in so doing the play 
begins to extrapolate this to all knowledge, and specifically, the apparent certainty of scientific 
knowledge. 
 
As they begin the final ‘draft’, and the temporal perspective once more jumps back to 1941, via 
the now established trigger of the image of Heisenberg crunching “over the gravel to the Bohrs’ 
front door” (Copenhagen, 86), Heisenberg again asks: 
                                                 
61 Barad, pp. 3-25. 
62 Barad, p. 4. The editorial brackets, and their contents, are Barad’s. This would appear to be an 
adaptation of  comments made by Frayn in a newspaper interview: “The Uncertainty Principle says 
that there is no way, however much we improve our instruments, that we can ever know everything 
about the behavior of  a physical object. And I think it’s also true about human thinking.” Paul 
Denison, ‘Morality Play: Brilliant Minds or Mad Bombers?’ The Register-Guard, 3 April 2005, section 
G5. 
63 Barad, p. 18. 
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H:  [...] Why have I come? I know perfectly well. Know so well that 
I’ve no need to ask myself. Until once again the heavy front door 
opens. 
B: He stands on the doorstep blinking in the sudden flood of  light 
from the house. Until this instant his thoughts have been 
everywhere and nowhere, like unobserved particles, through all the 
slits in the diffraction grating simultaneously. Now they have to be 
observed and specified. 
H: And at once the clear purposes inside my head lose all definite 
shape. The light falls on them and they scatter.  
 
  (Ibid.) 
Here again it is conspicuous that, as he returns to the present of 1941, Heisenberg is in no doubt 
as to his motivations – it is only later that they become, to use Margrethe’s apposite word, 
“obscure”. There is a subtlety in this exchange that is not immediately evident. For both Bohr 
and Heisenberg, the “flood of light” that comes from the house – photons fired at the particle 
that is Heisenberg’s motivations, his thoughts – is responsible, ironically, for obscuring the nature 
of those thoughts. But careful reading of their two responses reveals an important distinction: for 
Bohr, in the moment before the light hits them, in the moment before observation, Heisenberg’s 
thoughts have been “everywhere and nowhere” – they have no determinate position at all; for 
Heisenberg, on the other hand, his purposes were “clear”, they had a “definite shape”, but the 
impact of the light causes them to scatter. This is a brilliantly economical description of the 
distinction between their interpretations of quantum mechanics: for Bohr, a particle cannot be 
said to have a position before we make a decision about how we are going to interpret the light 
that we shine on a particle (as a particle, or as a wave?); Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle sees 
the particle as having a position, but that the act of firing the photon at it alters it in the process 
of observing it.  
 
All attempts at certainty in the play are confounded. In particular, as I have shown, the 
uncertainty associated with science actually plays out on two levels: the first, on the subatomic 
level, in the impossibility of observational certainty that is the result of the uncertainty principle 
and complementarity, but also on a historical level, in which scientific ‘certainties’ are seen to be 
temporary. On all levels – historical, personal, scientific – “the unreliability of the available 
evidence is built into the play’s dramaturgy”.64  
 
                                                 
64 Barnett, p. 142. 
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4.4  Ian McEwan: Determinism and Contingency 
 
The texts that I have looked at up to this point present critiques of science’s epistemic self-
confidence by drawing, in ways I have shown, on anti-deterministic implications apparently 
inherent in theoretical advances in the physical sciences. Both the plays I have examined – 
Arcadia and Copenhagen – undermine the possibility of determinism, partly by revealing the 
difficulties in reconstructing cause-and-effect. As they do so, both texts move a small distance 
away from realism. To adopt a term coined by Susan Strehle in her study Fiction in the Quantum 
Universe, these plays could be classified, along with Pynchon’s novels, as ‘actualistic’. Strehle sees 
the binary division of fiction into realist and anti-realist as unhelpful, especially its consequence of 
uncritically categorizing all postmodern fiction as anti-realist. Strehle derives the term from “a 
distinction Werner Heisenberg makes between the actual and the real”, and sees actualism as a 
direct consequence of the attempt to express the uncertainties implied by the new physics:  
Actualistic fiction expresses, then, a literary version of  the reality constituted 
by fundamentally new physical theories in the first half  of  the twentieth 
century. Departing from the stable material reality underpinning Newtonian 
science and realistic fiction, actualism abandons and even subverts the narrative 
conventions of  realism.65  
Other novels that I have discussed, such as Time’s Arrow, subvert traditional linear narrative form 
in order to resist over-determination. In this case, the events described are realistic, but their 
narrative formulation is quite clearly not. 
 
Turning to the novels of Ian McEwan – I will concentrate on Enduring Love and Saturday, but also 
refer to his newest novel, Solar – we find neither of these strategies: his later novels are often 
praised for their realism and, in Saturday and Enduring Love in particular, the narrative is 
conspicuously chronological and broadly continuous. Nonetheless, I will argue that there is a 
resistance to determinism in these novels, but one not immediately obvious because it is masked 
by protagonists who themselves implicitly and explicitly support deterministic interpretations of 
events. Moreover, in these two novels the relevance of these arguments concerning determinism 
is explicitly linked to questions of the relative status of scientific epistemology and alternative 
systems of knowledge, perhaps even more so than in the texts already discussed.  
 
McEwan’s 2005 novel Saturday is an account of a single eventful day in the life of a neurosurgeon 
Henry Perowne, beginning “Some hours before dawn” and ending as he slips into sleep, thinking, 
                                                 
65  Susan Strehle, Fiction in the Quantum Universe (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), p. 
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finally, “this day’s over”.66 The two central episodes in the novel involve two encounters with a 
man named Baxter: the first when they are involved in a minor car accident that leads to a violent 
confrontation; and later when Baxter forces his way into Perowne’s house and threatens his wife 
and daughter. During the first encounter Perowne diagnoses that Baxter is suffering from some 
pathology, probably Huntington’s disease, and uses the information to “escape a beating” (S, 
211) but also to, partly unintentionally, humiliate Baxter in front of his two sidekicks; in the 
second episode, the violence and danger of the situation is defused when Perowne’s daughter, 
Daisy, recites Matthew Arnold’s ‘Dover Beach’.  
 
There are striking similarities between Saturday and McEwan’s earlier novel Enduring Love. It has 
been observed that McEwan’s novels frequently enact the disruption to a (generally middle-class) 
life that a traumatic event can bring about, and, often, the ensuing pressure on relationships. 
James Wood, for example, has described McEwan as “the great contemporary stager of traumatic 
contingency as it strikes ordinary lives”.67 In Enduring Love this is a balloon accident, in Saturday a 
car accident – the dual meaning of ‘accident’ is significant here. In his novels relationships are 
often broken or disrupted because two characters react to a chance traumatic event in different 
ways, as is the case in, say, The Child in Time or Enduring Love or even On Chesil Beach.  In Enduring 
Love the traumatic event that opens the novel is a balloon accident in which, due to a “fatal lack 
of cooperation”, and due to a struggle between altruism and selfishness in which the latter wins, 
one man falls to his death.68 In the aftermath of the tragedy the novel’s protagonist and narrator 
Joe Rose encounters Jed Parry, who becomes obsessed with him and begins to stalk him, the 
stress of which results in the disintegration of Joe’s relationship with his partner Clarissa. 
 
Enduring Love and Saturday are similar to each other in the way that they fit into, but also vary 
from, the model that Wood observes. In both novels the ‘event’ (the balloon accident, the car 
accident) is similar in that it is a traumatic experience but one which in itself has only a limited 
direct effect on the events of the rest of the novel. In both cases, this event also brings the 
protagonist into contact with another character – an antagonist – who is more disruptive than the 
original catastrophe (Jed Parry, Baxter). These antagonists are also similar: in both cases their 
behaviour is affected by a pathological tendency towards extremes of emotion that culminates in 
violence – strikingly, both novels culminate with the protagonist’s wife held at knife point.69 In 
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other words, Baxter does not come to exact revenge on Perowne for his humiliation because of 
the car accident, but because he is Baxter, and is not in control of his mood swings. Similarly, Jed 
Parry does not start harassing Joe because of the balloon accident, but because of an irrational 
belief that Joe is in love with him.70 The initial trauma in these novels – unlike in, say, The Child in 
Time – is only the catalyst for the true crisis that will face the novels’ protagonists. 
 
Baxter is, as James Wood puts it, “contingency personified, [...entering] Henry Perowne’s life in 
Saturday through that most random of urban events, the car accident”.71 In Saturday and Enduring 
Love there is an additional link in the chain of cause-and-effect, one that increases the contingency 
of these novels’ narratives: it is not even the chance traumatic event that sets in train the events 
of these novels, but the meeting with a character in combination with that character’s pathological 
predisposition to react to that chance meeting in a certain way. This is significant because the 
novels are themselves interested in interrogating causality and determinism: if on the one hand 
these highly contingent events might appear to reduce the narratological determinism, then, on 
the other, the protagonists at times seem to view the progression of events in an almost 
simplistically deterministic manner.  
 
The opening of Enduring Love is aware of the tension between an apparent determinism, and the 
contingency of the situation and the possibility of other sequences of events. Narrated 
retrospectively, the events clearly are pre-determined, and the opening chapter seems at first to 
confirm this. Joe’s narrative frequently glances forward, in more or less explicit ways, to the tragic 
outcome of the balloon accident and beyond: “Knowing what I know now, it’s odd to evoke the 
figure of Jed Parry” (EL, 2); “By the time it happened – the event I am about to describe, the 
fall” (Ibid.); “our fatal lack of cooperation” (Ibid.); “if I had been uncontested leader the tragedy 
would not have happened” (EL, 11); “at the inquest” (EL, 12), and so on. In so doing, this 
opening asserts the teleology of the narrative; or rather, it undermines the possibility of a 
conventional pretence that the narrative is not predetermined.  
 
By contrast, there is also a sense that, given the contingency of the balloon as it enters Joe and 
Clarissa’s life, there were other possibilities. Joe sees the balloon as responsible for setting events 
on their path: “The beginning,” the novel opens, “is easy to mark” (EL, 1) as the moment when 
Joe hears a man shout, but just a few pages later Joe pauses his narrative as the men run towards 
                                                 
70 Although McEwan’s ‘hoax’ appendix describing the apparently real source for Jed’s character does 
note that it is possible that the intense nature of  the balloon accident may have brought on the 
erotomania of  de Clérambault’s syndrome, the disintegration of  Joe’s normal life is due to Parry’s 
obsession, not directly the balloon accident.  
71 Wood, ‘The manipulations of  Ian McEwan’, p. 14. 
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the balloon “because it was a time when other outcomes were still possible” (EL, 2). Joe 
obviously makes a decision to run to help, but this fact is concealed in these opening pages in 
short sentences that resist causal connection: “We turned to look across the field and saw the 
danger. Next thing, I was running towards it. The transformation was absolute: I don’t recall 
dropping the corkscrew, or getting to my feet, or making a decision” (EL, 1). The elision 
contained in those full-stops is part of a broader pattern: although Joe is of course a rational 
scientist who sees his own actions as having important and, to an extent, predictable 
consequences, he also sometimes takes comfort from seeing events as determined, beyond the 
control of his own decisions.  
 
As Joe’s narration pauses after Logan’s fall to take stock – “Best to slow down” (EL, 17) – he 
notes that although he has “already marked my beginning, the explosion of consequences” in 
reality  
this pinprick is as notional as a point in Euclidian geometry, and though it 
seems right, I could have proposed the moment Clarissa and I planned to 
picnic [...] or when we decided on our route, or the field in which to have our 
lunch, and the time we chose to have it. There are always antecedent causes. A 
beginning is an artifice.  (Ibid.).  
‘Planned’, ‘decided’, ‘chose’: it is conspicuous that these alternative possible beginnings, these 
antecedent causes, are decisions that Joe and Clarissa make, as opposed to the contingent external 
intervention with which Joe chooses to open the story. Joe prefers to see the true cause of the 
subsequent events as the contingent trauma of the balloon accident as opposed to the decisions 
that they made.  
 
The tension between the inevitability of events and the possibility of alternatives outcomes is 
mirrored in the progress of Joe’s narrative, which concedes the ineluctable onward rush of 
events, but retains the possibility of interrupting and delaying them. One such example has 
already been mentioned, but is worth quoting in full: “I’m holding back, delaying the information. 
I’m lingering in the prior moment because it was a time when other outcomes were still possible” 
(EL, 2). Indeed, this is precisely what McEwan does, leaving the men “running towards a 
catastrophe” in order to step back – the beginning is not the beginning after all – and have Joe 
describe the hours leading up to that “pinprick on the time map” (Ibid.): buying a picnic, his 
thoughts at the airport, Clarissa’s arrival, driving out to the Chilterns, a conversation about Keats, 
and so on. For McEwan the point is not, as for Joe, to pause while other outcomes are possible, 
but is part of what James Wood has identified as McEwan’s “addict[ion] to the withholding of 
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narrative information, the hoarding of surprises, the deferral of revelations”.72 In this opening 
scene the balloon is initially described as “the colossus in the centre of the field” but it is three 
further paragraphs before McEwan reveals the nature of the danger. And at the point that the 
narrative pauses, we are aware that something traumatic is about to happen, but the momentum 
is resisted for five pages. Later, a moment before the gust hits the balloon that will lift the men 
off the ground, a pivotal moment in the events that lead to Logan’s death, Joe again breaks the 
progression of the narrative: “but before I let it [the gust] reach us, let me freeze the frame – 
there’s a security in stillness – to describe our circle” (EL, 12). Joe’s desire to control the course 
of events is palpable, but his ability to do so is limited to literally ‘delaying the inevitable’: the gust 
will hit, the events are predetermined, his control is only that of the storyteller. 
 
Many of the contradictions and complexities of the opening of the novel find expression in the 
first extended scientific metaphor.  
I’m holding back, delaying the information. I’m lingering in the prior moment 
because it was a time when other outcomes were still possible; the convergence 
of  six figures in a flat green space has a comforting geometry from the 
buzzard’s perspective, the knowable, limited plane of  the snooker table. The 
initial conditions, the force and the direction of  the force, define all the 
consequent pathways, all the angles of  collision and return, and the glow of  
the overhead light bathes the field, the baize and all its moving bodies, in 
reassuring clarity. I think that while we were converging, before we made 
contact, we were in a state of  mathematical grace. (EL, 2-3) 
This image of the field as a snooker table references the billiard balls of an archetypal description 
of Newtonian laws of motion, and its contention that the initial conditions define all the 
subsequent outcomes confirms the Newtonian ideal of determinism. And yet there is a clear 
contradiction in these lines: the initial conditions apparently define “all the consequent 
pathways”, but Joe also believes, or wants to believe, that this was a time “when other outcomes 
were still possible”. This passage synecdochically expresses the larger contradiction in Joe’s 
character already hinted at: he at once wants to believe in the possibility of determinism within a 
system, in so far as it confirms the logical and rational nature of the world – and one accurately 
described by science; and yet at the same time Joe asserts the possibility of free will and our 
power to affect events. 
 
McEwan compares the situation, the moments prior to the accident, to an experiment in 
Newtonian motion, deliberately blurring the boundaries between the two terms of the metaphor: 
“the overhead light” which should hang over the snooker table “bathes the field” in light, while 
                                                 
72 Wood, ‘The manipulations of  Ian McEwan’, p. 14. 
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the buzzard seems to hover over the snooker table; the “moving bodies” can of course refer 
either to the “six figures” converging on the balloon, or the bodies (as in, for example, planetary 
bodies) in a Newtonian system. But the predictability of the “consequent pathways” is restricted 
to the “knowable, limited plane” of the snooker table – such precision is lost in the confusion of 
real events. In Arcadia, Thomasina realised that Euclidian geometry and Newtonian mechanics 
cannot fully describe the real world: “Mountains are not pyramids and trees are not cones” 
(Arcadia, 84);73 similarly, in the moment of “grace” before the figures “made contact” (and also, 
of course, before ‘the fall’), when the situation still resembles an isolated laboratory experiment, 
the consequences may be predictable; once human complexity enters the picture the deterministic 
system breaks down. This additional complexity is imaged as a fatal third dimension: while events 
appear to be occurring on a “flat green space”, in the two-dimensions of the “limited plane of the 
snooker table”, there is a “comforting geometry” – tragedy comes in the form of the balloon, 
dramatically introducing the third dimension, and disrupting the predictable, deterministic course 
of events. 
 
Henry Perowne shares some of Joe Rose’s contradictory impulses. I will examine Perowne’s 
adherence to a biological or genetic determinism in chapter 6, but I would like to look here at a 
moment early in Saturday when, as he watches a plane coming down in flames over London, 
Perowne “remembers the famous thought experiment he learned about long ago on a physics 
course” (S, 18). The thought experiment is Schrödinger’s and I will quote the description of 
Perowne’s thoughts in full: 
A cat, Schrödinger’s Cat, hidden from view in a covered box, is either still alive, 
or has just been killed by a randomly activated hammer hitting a vial of  poison. 
Until the observer lifts the cover from the box, both possibilities, alive cat and 
dead cat, exist side by side, in parallel universes, equally real. At the point at 
which the lid is lifted from the box and the cat is examined, a quantum wave of  
probability collapses. None of  this ever made any sense to him [Perowne] at 
all. No human sense. Surely another example of  a problem of  reference. He’s 
heard that even the physicists are abandoning it. To Henry it seems beyond the 
requirements of  proof: a result, a consequence, exists separately in the world, 
independent of  himself, known to others, awaiting his discovery. What then 
collapses will be his own ignorance. Whatever the score, it is already chalked 
up. And whatever the passengers’ destination, whether they are frightened and 
safe, or dead, they will have arrived by now. (S, 18-19) 
                                                 
73 The full Mandelbrot quotation, the opening of  the introduction to The Fractal Geometry of  Nature, runs: 
“Why is geometry often described as ‘cold’ and ‘dry’? One reason lies in its inability to describe the 
shape of  a cloud, a mountain, a coastline, or a tree. Clouds are not spheres, mountains are not cones, 
coastlines are not circles, and bark is not smooth, nor does lightning travel in a straight line.” Benoit 
Mandelbrot, The Fractal Geometry of  Nature (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1982), p. 1. Stoppard probably 
found the quotation in James Gleick’s Chaos, p. 98. 
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Perowne’s rejection of the implications of the thought experiment indicate his strong belief in 
scientific realism – in the existence of fully determinate values ‘out there’ – but it also suggests his 
support for the deterministic view that “the initial conditions [...] define all the consequent 
pathways” (EL, 2), to return to Joe’s formulation – that, in other words, “Whatever the score, it’s 
already chalked up.” This is consistent – as we will see in chapter 6 – with Perowne’s repeatedly 
stated belief in a form of genetic determinism. But the reference to ‘the score’ might also invite us 
to compare this view with Perowne’s attitude during his squash game with Jay Strauss, in which 
he clearly does not believe that the result is predetermined – on the contrary, he sees his own 
actions and decisions as having a significant effect. When Perowne leaves the court to compose 
himself, for example, he tells himself that “[i]n this moment or two alone, he must think carefully 
about his game, cut to the fundamentals, decide what he’s doing wrong and fix it” (S,107). 
 
The reference to Schrödinger’s cat is complicated by the fact that it appears that Perowne has 
misinterpreted the purpose of the thought experiment. The idea, as originally proposed by 
Schrödinger in 1935, was a criticism of the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics; 
the idea of the cat was a sort of parody or critique – it was intended to illustrate the logical 
absurdity of the implications of quantum mechanics as it then stood. Schrödinger was unhappy 
with the idea of quantum superpositions that only undergo collapse into a definite state when 
they are observed, and the thought experiment constructs a situation in which such a 
superposition might have a more macroscopic consequence – one that more clearly shows the 
problem with superpositions. It is important to realise that Schrödinger was not proposing that 
dead-and-alive cats really exist, but rather that their existence in the thought experiment reveals a 
problem, or at least an incompleteness, in quantum mechanics. 
 
It therefore makes little sense to observe that the thought experiment does not make “any sense 
[...] at all. No human sense”, since this was precisely Schrödinger’s point. Nor is it clear what 
Perowne might mean when he says that “even the physicists are abandoning it”, unless he means 
abandoning the Copenhagen Interpretation that Schrödinger’s thought experiment criticises. 
Perowne’s comment that the idea of simultaneously alive and dead cats is “[s]urely another 
example of a problem of reference” connects his rejection of the idea back to objections he has 
already raised to superstition and religion: “The primitive thinking of the supernaturally inclined 
amounts to what his psychiatric colleagues call a problem, or an idea, of reference” (17). His 
objection is that religion is essentially anthropic, centring the world on one’s own experience, and 
involves “an inability to contemplate your own unimportance” (Ibid.). The notion that the cat’s 
fate may be dependent on our intervention seems to Perowne to involve the same inflated sense 
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of our own ability to control events. For Perowne the cat’s fate, as with the passengers on the 
plane, is already determined.  
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that Perowne, “the professional reductionist” (S, 272), the 
“unredeemable materialist” (S, 134), should find the counter-intuitive implications of quantum 
mechanics unfathomable. Near the end of the novel, Perowne sits in the ward with the 
unconscious Baxter and contemplates his thoughts: they have “assumed a sinuous, snaking 
quality [...] Feelings have become in this respect like light itself – wavelike, as they used to say in 
his physics class” (S, 262). McEwan initially appears to be using this reference to 
complementarity – light’s simultaneous and contradictory characteristics of both particle and 
wave – gratuitously, merely in its figurative “sinuous” sense. But Perowne also notes that “he’s 
alive to too many contradictory impulses” (Ibid.) – his thoughts have also taken on the duality of 
light. As Perowne sits there he wants to “break them [his thoughts] down into their components, 
the quanta, and find all the distal and proximal causes; only then will he know what to do, what’s 
right” (Ibid.). Perowne’s desire is explicitly reductionist, but the reference to quantum mechanics 
reveals the contradictions, the duality, of Perowne’s position: quantum mechanics legislates 
against the possibility of finding all the distal and proximal causes of events – there is a necessary 
epistemological limit to our knowledge of the causes of things.  
 
This may also illuminate the earlier example. Like Joe Rose, it seems that Perowne believes in 
causally determined systems, but only in so far as they do not impinge upon his ability to affect 
the course of his own life. It is perhaps really this that Perowne objects to in Schrödinger’s vision 
– the impossibility of knowing or affecting the outcome. This, and McEwan’s engagements with 
physics more generally, goes to the heart of the common reaction to determinism – we see the 
logic of causality, and want our decisions to have a causal impact on the future, but cannot quite 
reconcile our idea of free will with a deterministic view of the universe.  
 
It is notable that what Perowne is trying to understand as he sits with Baxter, through his process 
of rational reductionism, is “what to do, what’s right” (my emphasis). This idea, of an ethics based 
on a scientific method – observation and induction – is also one of the much-misunderstood 
aspects of Copenhagen. Karen Barad, in particular, is critical of Frayn for using the uncertainty 
principle as an analogy for moral uncertainty. She argues that Frayn forms his own uncertainty 
principle analogical to Heisenberg’s, which suggests that just as we cannot know the position and 
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momentum of a particle simultaneously, so we cannot understand the actions and motivations of 
a person. The result, Barad claims, is that “moral judgments [in the play] lose their foundation”.74 
 
It is necessary to quote Barad at length: 
[The question] that really interests him [Frayn] is the metaethical question of  
how it is possible to make moral judgements at all. Frayn puts it this way: “The 
moral issues always finally depend on the epistemological one, on the 
judgement of  other people’s motives, because if  you can’t have any knowledge 
of  other people’s motives, it’s very difficult to come to any objective moral 
judgment of  their behaviour.” But how does this dilemma arise? Why can’t we 
have any knowledge of  other people’s motives and intentions? According to 
Frayn, the root of  the dilemma derives from the analogy he wants to draw with 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle [...] But if  the goal is to set up an 
uncertainty principle for people in analogy with the famous one that 
Heisenberg proposes for particles, and one is committed to doing so with 
some care, then it does not follow that “we can’t have any knowledge of  other 
people’s motives”.75  
There are a number of slippages within this passage: careful reading reveals that the questions 
that Barad apparently draws out of the quotation from Michael Frayn (from a talk for the Niels 
Bohr Historical Archive’s History of Science Seminar, November 19, 1999) do not actually have 
any basis in it. Let us state clearly what Frayn actually says: that moral judgements require 
knowledge of motive; that if you can’t have any knowledge of motive, it is hard to make moral 
judgements; and that therefore moral judgements are also epistemological issues. It is unclear 
where the final quotation in the passage comes from but, with the emphasis placed as it is, it is 
not, I think, a conclusion with which Frayn would concur. Indeed, in an interview Frayn notes 
that although it is “extremely difficult [...] to know why people do what they do” he continues: 
“Not all the time, of course; there are simple cases – when someone’s very hungry you could be 
reasonably confident that’s why they’ve elected to eat something.”76 
  
Barad attributes to Frayn the idea that we can’t have any knowledge of a person’s motives; but 
Frayn says in the same interview that “[a]ll the time we make assessments of people’s motives”.77 
In an analogy with macroscopic physics he observes that “you can make good practical guesses”: 
For all practical purposes, you can tell where you are in the street, even where a 
fast car is [...] even where a planet is going to be in a year’s time [...] It’s the 
same with explanations of  why people do what they do: for a lot of  practical 
                                                 
74 Barad, p. 5. 
75 Barad, p. 7. 
76 Wu, pp. 214-5. 
77 Wu, p. 215. 
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reasons, you can disregard the problems, you can work on rough 
approximations, and we do all the time, we have to.78 
Barad’s argument continues by taking her reader through a reimagining of the play which uses 
Bohr’s principle of complementarity as its structuring analogy, in place of Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty. As Frayn accurately points out in the play, Heisenberg conceded to Bohr’s 
interpretation in a postscript to his paper on uncertainty (Copenhagen, 69). The distinction between 
the two interpretations is a subtle but important one, and can be summarised as the difference 
between an epistemological and an ontological interpretation: Heisenberg’s principle is that we 
cannot know both the position and momentum of a particle simultaneously; Bohr’s more counter-
intuitive principle of complementarity states instead that particles do not have determinate values 
of position and momentum simultaneously. Depending on the measuring apparatus used, 
different variables become determinate, but certain variables are complementary – the same 
apparatus cannot give definite values for all variables: “Complementary variables require different 
– mutually exclusive – apparatuses [...] for their definition, and therefore these variables are 
reciprocally determinable (when one is well defined, the other can’t be)”.79 Barad uses this shift 
from uncertainty to complementarity to create a complex argument that revolves around the 
complementary nature of “thinking about something and thinking about thinking about it”: “you 
need to make a choice between two complementary situations: either you think about something, 
in which case that something is the object of your thoughts, or you examine your process of 
thinking about something, in which case your thoughts about what you are thinking (about 
something) and not the something itself, are the objects of your thoughts”.80 The same logic, she 
argues, could be applied to our thoughts regarding intentions: the result of this argument is that 
instead of thinking, as she supposes Frayn does, that we cannot know everything (anything?) 
about intentional states of mind, we should rather acknowledge that the very notion of a 
determinate intentional state of mind needs rethinking. Rather than thinking of intentionality as 
something determinate that belongs to an individual, we need, following Bohr, to examine the 
material conditions (the analogue to the experimental apparatus) that would give intention a 
determinate existence. These would be “a complex network of human and nonhuman agents, 
including historically specific sets of material conditions that exceed the traditional notion of the 
individual”.81 
 
                                                 
78  Ibid. 
79 Barad, p. 20. 
80 Barad, p. 21. 
81 Barad, p. 23. 
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But the plays’ arguments regarding intention and ethics are more complex than Barad supposes. 
She sees Frayn’s implication of moral uncertainty as simply a means to “get history to back off 
from issuing any harsh judgements against Heisenberg”.82 However, having decided that this is 
Frayn’s agenda, she becomes blind to the uses to which Frayn can put his analogical comparison. 
Far from, as Barad puts it, “uncertainty sav[ing] Heisenberg’s tormented soul from the 
judgements of history” the fact that Heisenberg remains condemned for his (in)actions (witness 
the articles regarding the play), whilst Bohr (and indeed many of the physicists more influential in 
the allied bomb project at Los Alamos) are not, testifies to the fact that an ethics based upon 
external observables does not work. 83 This, far more than “Heisenberg’s lengthy homily on how 
if we made judgments only on the basis of actions, then the SS man who didn’t shoot him when 
he had his chance near the war’s end would go to heaven”, is the evidence that the “strange new 
quantum ethics” (Copenhagen, 92) that Heisenberg proposes is ironic.84 From this position, then, 
Frayn is able to go in a different direction to Barad, but ultimately end up in a similar place. Barad 
shows, through a reworking of Frayn’s concept, but using a more rigorously defined version of 
complementarity, that understanding intentionality would require attending to the complex of 
material conditions that “give it meaning and some sense of existence”, and that these would be 
“political, psychological, social, scientific, technological, and economic” and would also involve 
the issues of “race, religion, nationality, ethnicity, sexuality, political beliefs and mental and 
physical health” associated with Nazi thinking.85 The implication of the audience in the play, as I 
have shown, seems to me to suggest that the process of knowing intentionality, including one’s 
own intentions, is one that can be mimicked and examined by the literary process. After all, the 
lists above seem to be a roll call of issues habitually examined by literature. The material 
conditions that make intentionality determinate are more suited to an examination by literary 
means than by quantum mechanical ones. This is not to say that Frayn’s play, or any other, can 
‘solve’ the problem of Heisenberg’s motivation; but then, Barad does not propose a solution 
either. Instead, she argues, one of the implications of Bohr’s philosophy-physics is that “the very 
nature of intentionality needs to be rethought”; rethinking commonly held ideas is precisely what a piece 
of literature can attempt.  
 
An episode in Solar would appear to confirm that McEwan also sees the limitations to the 
analogy between Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and moral uncertainty. Michael Beard, the 
Nobel prize winning physicist at the centre of the novel, is listening to a “gangling novelist called 
Meredith” announce that “Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle [...] encapsulated for out time, the 
                                                 
82 Barad, p. 9. 
83 Barad, p. 5. 
84 Barad, p. 17. 
85 Barad, p. 22. 
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loss of ‘moral compass’, the difficulty of absolute judgements”. Beard responds that actually the 
principle is “not incompatible with knowing precisely the state of, say, a photon, so long as one 
could observe it repeatedly”, but more importantly that Heisenberg’s “principle had no 
application to the moral sphere” and would only have “application [to the moral sphere] if the 
sum of right plus wrong divided by the square root of two had any meaning”:  
Beard brought his fist down hard on the table. ‘So come on. Tell me. Let’s hear 
you apply Heisenberg to ethics. Right plus wrong over the square root of  two. 
What the hell does it mean? Nothing!’86  
The assertion of the inadequacy of an ethics based exclusively on science is part of what I 
perceive to be a broader critique of the prioritisation of science as an epistemology. Michael 
Beard silently ridicules the notion that his girlfriend Melissa is attracted to older men because she 
nursed her dying father: “this was the kind of nonsense that science was invented to protect him 
from [...] so many unexamined assumptions, so many unproven elements!” (Solar, 166). But 
McEwan gently undercuts him, finishing the section with a slight redressing of the balance: “He 
was further irked to hear that when she met her first serious love [...] he was the same age as her 
father when he died” (Solar, 167). Michael Frayn’s play also reveals the insufficiency of a simply 
scientific approach to understanding human actions and motivations. Despite all their revisiting, 
and redrafting of the events of that day in 1941, the three characters get no nearer to the truth. In 
fact, the only truth that they end up with is that perhaps sometimes it is best not to know 
everything. This may not represent the most historically accurate conclusion to the play – as 
Frayn admits, it is “very unlikely”87 that Heisenberg’s conversation with Bohr had a significant 
impact on the German bomb project – but this is “the wisdom of the play’s inconclusiveness”.88 
The final ‘draft’ confirms that the play is not about the impossibility of making moral judgements 
of people’s behaviour (as Barad seems to think that it is), but rather the insufficiency of certain 
systems for making moral judgements about behaviour – such as a system that only takes in to 
account observable quantities. Instead, a moral system needs to account for motivation and 
intention, a subjective judgement. This, I would argue, renders science epistemologically partial: 
other epistemological systems – such as the fictitious reconstruction of conversations taking place 
on stage – are required to make sense of moral issues. 
 
The incompleteness of scientific knowledge is seen, by these texts, as exemplified by the 
impossibility of the reconstruction of human action or explanation of human motivation. But 
                                                 
86 Ian McEwan, Solar (London: Jonathan Cape, 2010), p. 76, p. 77. All subsequent references are to this 
edition and will be made in the text. 
87 Wu, p. 221. 
88 Robert L. King, ‘The Play of  Uncertain Ideas’, The Massachusetts Review, 42 (2001), 165-75 (p. 175). 
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other branches of the natural sciences take exactly this as their aim: as we shall see in chapter 6, 
Perowne has little problem with explaining human behaviour in terms of the long reach of 
genetic determinism, although even then he is not without his moments of doubt. Perowne’s 
acceptance of genetic determinism does not amount to a belief that genes are the cause of all our 
actions and reactions, but nonetheless the idea that our genes have a significant impact not only 
on our physical appearance or pathologies but also on our behaviour has gained considerable 
traction. In the next chapter I will show how popular science writing on genetics and 
evolutionary biology – ‘the modern synthesis’ – has tended to foster the belief that our genetic 
make-up and our evolutionary development are critical determining factors: that it is genes or 
instincts, rather than environment  or our free will, that control us. 
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5 Biological Determinism in Popular Science Writing 
 
 
Most popular science writing on biology can be divided into one of two broad categories: 
evolution or genetics. That is to say, the development of species over evolutionary timescales on 
the one hand (phylogeny); and, on the other, the genetic causes of development of the individual 
organism (ontogeny). These processes are frequently presented in such a way as to suggest their 
determined or teleological nature. Whereas in my discussion of popular physics the metaphors 
that emphasised the indeterminism of physics supported those texts’ explicit arguments, 
suggestions of evolutionary inevitability or genetic determinism sit uneasily within the theoretical 
positions proposed by these texts. The implication of evolutionary or genetic determinism is not, 
then, to be found in direct statements, but is rather, to quote Gillian Beer, “concealed in [the] 
interstices” (DP, 56) of these texts.  
 
In the first section of this chapter, I will examine the representation of the role of genes in the 
development of the individual organism. Although the overarching arguments put forward by 
these texts are predominantly in line with the view that genes are responsible for an organism’s 
development only in conjunction with developmental processes on a molecular and cellular level, 
and with environmental conditions on molecular, cellular and organismal levels, I will show that 
the metaphors used in many popular science texts to describe DNA, genes, and the expression of 
genes in the phenotype, emphasise the role that genes play, and play down the importance of 
environmental factors. In short, the metaphors chosen tend to imply the simplicity and directness 
of the connection between genes and the phenotypic expression in the organism. In this section I 
will discuss some of the more pervasive metaphors: genes as language (especially writing); genes 
as a computer program; and genes as a blueprint for a building, or as a recipe for a cake. 
 
In the second section, I will show that a concealed determinism is also to be found in popular 
accounts of the processes involved in the evolutionary development of species, in the idea of 
evolution as a teleological process – as progressive rather than simply adaptive. The images used 
and the narratives constructed suggest that evolution has been inevitably directed towards the 
current point, with particular emphasis on our own species’ evolution as the telos – even while 
these same popular science texts may criticise precisely this (mis)representation. I will concentrate 
on one particular narrative often present in these popular science books – that of a normatized 
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account of scientific progress – and show how, as this is in turn conflated with a narrative of 
evolutionary progress, the idea of scientific self-knowledge, the ability to theorise our own 
evolutionary origins, becomes the implied end-point not only of evolutionary theory, but also of 
the process of evolution itself. 
 
 
5.1  Genetic Determinism  
 
Genetic determinism is an emotive issue. Unlike physical determinism whose debates rarely range 
beyond philosophical and scientific boundaries, the implications of genetic determinism impinge 
directly on human behaviour, and on issues such as society, racial and gender equality, parenting, 
politics and education. However, the debates are also complex and confusing; not least, again, 
because of the word ‘determinism’. As Steven Pinker points out, 
Attempts to explain behaviour in mechanistic terms are commonly denounced 
as “reductionist” or “determinist”. The denouncers rarely know exactly what 
they mean by those words, but everyone knows they refer to something bad.1 
Genetic determinism should be relatively easy to define as the determination of all physical and 
behavioural characteristics of an organism by its genetic material, or genes; but, as we shall see, 
this is not a useful definition for the forms of determinism that actually exist both within the 
scientific community, and in popular scientific representations of genetics. Versions of this 
definition can be found – for example in the first chapter of the collaborative book Not In Our 
Genes: 
biological determinists [argue] that human lives and actions are inevitable 
consequences of  the biochemical properties of  the cells that make up the 
individual; and these characteristics are in turn uniquely determined by the 
constituents of  the genes possessed by each individual.2 
But although Pinker stresses in The Blank Slate that “reductionism is not a straw man” – that 
some scientists do believe that complex social concerns, such as conflict resolution, can be 
explained by “the biophysics of neural membranes” – genetic determinism, in the extreme form 
quoted above, certainly is.3 The authors of Not In Our Genes openly admit that their agenda is a 
“critique of biological determinism and its claim to define ‘the nature of human nature’”.4 
                                                 
1 Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2002), p. 10. 
2 Steven Rose, R.C. Lewontin, Leon J. Kamin, Not In Our Genes: Biology, Ideology and Human Nature 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990). 
3 Pinker, p. 70. 
4 From the back cover blurb of  Rose et al., Not In Our Genes. 
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“Everybody,” Matt Ridley asserts in Nature via Nurture, “with an ounce of common sense knows 
that human beings are a product of a transaction between [nature and nurture]”.5 Susan Oyama 
notes, in her seminal work on developmental systems theory The Ontogeny of Information, that the 
“ease with which extreme nature and nurture positions are parodied ensures that no one will 
stand behind either straw man”.6 The debate between genetic-determinists and anti-genetic-
determinists (or nurturists) seems to be, then, a question of degree, and for this reason I will use 
the terms ‘gene-centric’ to refer to those writers who argue for an emphasis on the relative 
importance of genes in ontogeny, and ‘environment-centric’ for those who assert the relative 
importance of environment in the development of an organism. Although environment-centric 
nurturists – such as Lewontin et al. above – may choose to characterise the gene-centric 
geneticists as ‘hard’ determinists, the caricature is even more exaggerated than comparing modern 
physicists to a Laplacian ideal of physical determinism. 
 
Despite this fact, the link between genetics and determinism in the public consciousness is 
nonetheless strong, even if determinism in this instance is a weaker form than that under scrutiny 
in debates within physics. As we shall see, the physicist Erwin Schrödinger played an important 
role in the conceptualisation of genetics, and he was quick to see the connection between 
genetics and precisely the form of determinism discussed in chapter 3:  
In calling the structure of  the chromosome fibres a code-script, we mean that 
the all-penetrating mind, once conceived by Laplace, to which every causal 
connection lay immediately open, could tell from their structure whether the 
egg would develop, under suitable conditions, into [...] a mouse or a woman.7 
In this quotation can be perceived the modern debate concerning genetic determinism, 
encapsulated. In invoking the figurehead of determinism, Laplace, Schrödinger ascribes to 
genetics a ‘hard’ determinism; and yet, in that critical internal clause “under suitable conditions”, 
is contained the nurturist’s objection to genetic determinism: traits cannot be called genetically 
determined if they rely on environmental conditions. As far as Schrödinger’s genetic determinism 
goes, it is true determinism; but how far it goes, is hardly anywhere.  
 
If no one is an extreme genetic determinist, or a genetic ‘denialist’, then the broad answer put 
forward by almost all popular science writing on the subject is an interactionist approach. But 
                                                 
5 Matt Ridley, Nature via Nurture: Genes, Experience and What Makes Us Human (London: Harper Collins, 
2003), p. 3. 
6 Susan Oyama, The Ontogeny of  Information: Developmental Systems and Evolution, 2nd edn (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2000), p. 2. 
7 Erwin Schrödinger, What Is Life? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1944), p. 22. 
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what the quotation from Schrödinger shows is that within the interactionist argument the 
representation of the argument presented can still be determinist or anti-determinist, geneticist or 
empiricist, or (most likely) somewhere on the spectrum between the two. Those writers towards 
the geneticist end of the spectrum present an interactionism in which genes determine, within the 
constraints and alterations brought about by environment; at the other end, empiricists admit that 
environments cannot, on their own, ‘create’ an organism, but assert that it is the environmental 
conditions that control the expression of genes, and thus play a dominant role in development. 
The former stance is gene-centric; the latter environment-centric. 
 
Both gene- and environment-centric positions allow that ontogeny inevitably involves the 
interaction of both genes and environment, and indeed ‘interactionism’ may seem to present a 
compromise between the opposing groups. But, although “a generally interactionist vocabulary is 
rapidly becoming universal”, it is, according to Susan Oyama, a falling between two stools:  
[Another] problem that concerns me is interactionism itself. How does it 
manage to be virtually universally adopted and thus to lend itself  to such 
radically different approaches? The suspicion is that it has become 
conceptually vacuous while acquiring the symbolic value of  a membership 
badge, to be flashed upon entry into serious discussion: yes, I belong to the 
company of  reasonable people; now let’s talk about the real stuff.8 
The spreading of this vocabulary, has, in other words, glossed over significant disagreements. 
Oyama’s argument in The Ontogeny of Information is that we need to deconstruct the dichotomy of 
nature and nurture – that all of the variants of interactionism, as they are customarily used, merely 
“combine […] encoded nature with varying doses of contingent nurture”, a solution which “is no 
solution at all”.9 Development, she argues, 
can no longer be explained as a combination of  translated information from 
the genes (to make innate features) and information acquired from the 
environment (to modify, supplement, or complete those features). Nor can 
phenotypic features be divided into those that are programmed or biological 
and those that are not, or ranged on a continuum of  relative degrees of  
programming[.]10 
What this quotation hints at, and what Oyama reveals at the centre of her thesis, is that there are 
shared assumptions between even the opposing advocates of very different forms of 
interactionism. The crucial common assumption that she identifies is “a ‘preformationist’ attitude 
toward information” itself, information which “is seen to reside in molecules, cells, tissues, ‘the 
                                                 
8 Oyama, p. 2. 
9 Oyama, p. 5. 
10 Oyama, p. 3. 
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environment’, often latent but causally potent”.11 The significance of this list is that it reveals that 
all the actors in this debate – those that take a gene-centric, or environment-centric stance – 
locate information as the key to understanding development, and as existing “before its 
utilization or expression”.12 
 
Oyama’s answer to this underlying problem with our way of thinking about development is to 
apply the traditional criticism of preformationism of the organism to this preformationism of 
information. Equating the preformationism of form with that of information she identifies the 
problem as the notion “that form, or its modern equivalent, information, exists before the 
interactions in which it appears and must be transmitted to the organism either through the genes 
or by the environment”; the solution is to see that “[d]evelopmental information itself, in other 
words, has a developmental history”.13 
 
In his foreword to the second edition of The Ontogeny of Information, Richard Lewontin concludes 
that  
It is impossible to carry out scientific explanation without metaphors. Indeed 
we can hardly speak without them. The most we can demand is that we be 
conscious of  the metaphorical content of  our words and not be carried 
away…No metaphors are truly benign and without dangers. As Norbert 
Weiner observed, “The price of  metaphor is eternal vigilance.”14 
He is correct to highlight the importance, and dangers, of metaphors; a key element in Oyama’s 
ensuing critique is her categorisation and analysis of variants on what she calls the “cognitive-
causal” gene, or what Stephen M. Downes, in his review of the second edition, calls simply the 
“information gene”.15 In a chapter entitled ‘Variations on a Theme: Cognitive Metaphors and the 
Homunculoid Gene’ Oyama briefly examines metaphors of blueprints, plans, rules, instructions, 
programs, and, in detail, information in different guises. These metaphors constitute “a cluster of 
pervasive metaphors rather than being a legitimate component of an explanatory theory”; Oyama 
believes that “the information gene concept is a metaphor that has seriously misled us”.16 In this 
chapter I too will concentrate on some of the key metaphors in the debate; however, I will 
concentrate on their deployment in popular science writing and identify the mechanisms through 
                                                 
11 Oyama, pp. 1-2. 
12 Oyama, p. 2. 
13 Oyama, p. 23, p. 3. 
14 R.C. Lewontin, Foreword, in Oyama, p. xv. 
15 Stephen M. Downes, review of  Susan Oyama, The Ontogeny of  Information in Perspectives in Biology and 
Medicine, 44 (2001), 464-69 (p. 465). 
16 Ibid. 
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which these now standard metaphors support, primarily, a gene-centric, and thus more 
genetically deterministic, representation of biology in popular science. 
 
 
5.1.1  The Language of Genes 
 
It has become a cliché to refer to DNA as the ‘language of life’.17 But this metaphor, one of the 
most common, and indeed formative, in genetics, has its roots in another slightly different 
metaphor, one coined before even Crick and Watson had formulated their model of the structure 
of DNA. In 1944 the physicist Erwin Schrödinger first described the chromosomes as containing 
“some kind of code-script”, in his popular book What Is Life?: “Every complete set of 
chromosomes contains the full code” and this embodies “the entire pattern of the individual’s 
future development and of its functioning in mature state”.18 As Susanne Knusden has pointed 
out, the significance of the metaphor is that it is not simply descriptive of the chemical properties 
of DNA (Schrödinger actually thought the genetic code was held in ‘chromatine’), but also of 
process: “the figurative representation [of a code-script] suggests what the chromosomes do: they 
encode ‘the individual’s future development’”.19 It is partly this fact that results not only in the 
metaphor’s longevity, but also its central place in the subsequent theory-formation of genetics, 
and its adaptation and revision in subsequent decades. As Lenny Moss concludes, “Schrödinger’s 
artful rhetoric did much to shape the terminological linguistic, and thereby conceptual, space in which 
the Watson and Crick breakthrough was received a decade later”.20 
 
It is partly through a secondary metaphor of ‘translation’ that Schrödinger’s code metaphor finds 
itself increasingly elided with a metaphor of language in popular discourse. Knusden identifies 
George Gamow as responsible for introducing the ‘translation’ metaphor in 1955; but concerned 
as she is primarily with a diachronic study of the ‘code’ metaphor, she does not mention that the 
combination of the, at least partly, historically contingent fact of the identification of base pairs 
by the four letters A, G, T, C, and the, albeit incorrect, translation metaphor inevitably results in 
the evocation of language. Language is present, where the code metaphor is not, in the passage 
she quotes from Gamow:  
                                                 
17 An utterly unscientific Google search at the time of  writing for ‘language of  life DNA’ returns 
2,100,000 web pages. Similar results are to be had with ‘alphabet DNA’, ‘genes language’ and so on. 
This contrasts with fewer than a million pages returned for ‘DNA deoxyribonucleic acid’. 
18 Schrödinger, p. 22. 
19 Susanne Knusden, ‘Scientific metaphors going public’, Journal of  Pragmatics, 35 (2003), 1247-63, (p. 
1251). 
20  Lenny Moss, ‘The Meanings of  the Gene and the Future of  the Phenotype’, Genomics, Society and Policy, 
4 (2008), 38-57 (p. 38). 
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the problem reduces to finding a procedure by which a long number written in 
a four-digital system (four bases forming the molecules of  nucleic acid) can be 
translated in a unique way into a long word formed by about twenty letters 
(twenty amino acids which form protein molecules).21 
It is interesting to notice the way in which the metaphor of a digital, number system shifts via the 
word “translation” to a metaphor of language: a protein “word” formed of amino acid “letters”. 
This is despite the fact that it was the base pairs that had been assigned letters as identification, 
not the amino acids. 
 
Evelyn Fox Keller has argued that discourses play a crucial role in delimiting the course of future 
research within a scientific field. Thus, she has asked, 
What then do I mean when I say that the discourse of  gene action – now 
augmented with metaphors of  information and instruction – exerted a critical 
force on the course of  biological research? Can words have force in and of  
themselves? Of  course not. They acquire force through their influence on 
human actors. Through their influence on scientists, administrators, and 
funding agencies, they provide powerful rationales and incentives for 
mobilizing resources, for identifying particular research agendas, for focusing 
our scientific energies and attention in particular ways.22  
Certainly, in the case of the language metaphor, the power of the discourse in its potential to 
focus research energies in particular ways was greater even that its explanatory power on the 
theoretical level. Lenny Moss has noted that “[w]hile the heuristics of ‘nucleic-acid sequence as 
language’ did not prove to be biologically fruitful, it left an enduring legacy at the level of the 
speech-style used to describe and conceptualize molecular-level biology”.23 But more 
significantly, these failed attempts to reconcile the discourse of language with the theoretical 
problems in the field did not damage the perceived usefulness or accuracy of the discourse; on 
the contrary they curiously reinforced it. For example, Moss contends that the language metaphor 
was influential in suggesting methods of solving the problem of the ‘comma-free code’. The 
comma-free code problem may be explained most easily with an example. Imagine the following 
string of twelve bases (four codons) which specifies a protein made up of four amino acids, 
AATCGACATGAA; the codons are, therefore, AAT, CGA, CAT and GAA. However, if we 
start reading one base later the codons are instead ATC, GAC, ATG and AA?. This is the 
problem of frame-shifting: the lack of ‘commas’, or other markers of the boundaries of codons, 
                                                 
21 George Gamow, ‘On information transfer from nucleic acids to proteins’, Det Kongelige Danske 
Videnskabernes Selskab: Biologiske Meddelelser, 22 (1955) 1-7. Quoted in Knusden, p. 1252. 
22 Evelyn Fox Keller, Refiguring Life: Metaphors in Twentieth-Century Biology (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1995), p. 21. 
23 Lenny Moss, What Genes Can’t Do (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), p. 66. 
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means that we can’t know where each codon starts and ends. The solution proposed by Crick 
and others “consist[ed] of partitioning all the possible codons (sequences of three [bases]) into 
those which have ‘meaning’ and those that don’t [...] All the meaningful codons would then 
constitute a ‘dictionary’ by their terms. In this way a sequence would be read univocally and 
without the need for punctuation”.24 However, as it turned out this did not prove to be the 
solution to the comma-free code problem; in fact certain codons do act as start and stop markers. 
Despite this, the prevalence of the language metaphor was not affected: “Although this did not 
prove to be the solution to the comma-free code problem, the rhetoric of textuality grew further 
and prospered”.25  
 
Similarly, although Gamow’s ‘translation’ metaphor was indeed replaced by the more accurate 
‘transcription’ metaphor as the two-stage process of conversion of DNA to proteins was more 
precisely understood, the language metaphor would become a crucial part of the pedagogy of 
genetics. Although the metaphors of code, and later information, would in the end play more 
significant roles in theory-formation in genetics – indeed these metaphors have come to be 
considered by most scientists to be a non-metaphorical part of the scientific discourse of genetics 
– language remains the dominant pedagogic metaphor in popular accounts of genetics. I will 
show that, as it is ordinarily used, it simplifies the relationship between the level of the gene and 
the level of the phenotype (the traits manifested in the organism) by presenting language as an 
unproblematic, unambiguous system of communication. The following is a fairly representative 
example of the use of the language metaphor: 
Up to fifteen cistrons are strung together to give a transcription unit (scripton). 
The scripton corresponds to a compound sentence. Many hundred scriptons 
make up a replication unit (replicon), which can be compared with a paragraph 
of  text [...] Finally, the gene [...] corresponds to the complete text. The 
hierarchical organization of  a living system on the phenotypic level is directly 
reflected in the hierarchically organized structure of  genetic information.  
 The analogy between human language and the molecular-genetic 
language is quite strict [....] 
 There are admittedly limits to this analogy. For instance, the molecular-
genetic language [...] does not contain question marks.26 
The hierarchical organization of both the living system and of genetic information is noted; but 
their reflection in the hierarchical organization of language is left implicit. This nesting of units of 
language is significant because the logical progression – normally, as here, from smallest to largest 
                                                 
24 Moss, What Genes Can’t Do, p. 67. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Bernd-Olaf  Küppers, Information and the Origin of  Life (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), p. 23. 
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– from letter to full text implies an analogous logic to the progression from base pair to 
organism. This linear progression is even more explicit in the following example:  
The chain links [in DNA] can be likened to letters in a sentence, and DNA to a 
text or code that tells our bodies what to do. The alphabet consists of  four 
letters [...] Starting with this known alphabet, the task of  the Human Genome 
Project is to learn the sequence of  the letters and to read the text. The size of  
the text is enormous. The card catalogue for the DNA library requires 
enormous computing capacity.27 
Here the DNA is a “text [...] that tells our bodies what to do” – there is no implication of other 
environmental factors. Indeed, the idea that the text tells our bodies what to do (emphasis added) 
carries with it the suggestion of not only physiognomic traits, but behavioural ones.  
 
This reductive progression from gene to organism is a key element in the gene-centric argument; 
emphasising the role played by genes necessitates disambiguating the link between the gene and 
the organism. Those metaphors that prioritise the gene as the root cause of physical or 
behavioural traits tend therefore to work in similar ways rhetorically: by comparing genetics to 
systems in which the causal lineage is simpler, without the complexities of chemical, 
environmental, educational and social interventions, they analogously suggest the direct lineage 
between genes and the trait, playing down the role of environment. On the other hand, in the 
opposing environment-centric rhetoric, the unitary parts of the system used in the vehicle of the 
metaphor are imagined as sufficiently affected by environment to represent a holistic sum that is 
far enough removed as to deny causal priority to the gene.  
 
In general, the use of the language metaphor in popular science writing on genetics falls into the 
first of these two categories: it tends to reinforce gene-centrism. Language is represented as a 
system in which the progression from letters and words to meaning is simple, and unaffected by 
elements outside the system; the analogy suggests that the same is true of the relationship 
between genotype and phenotype. In order to show this, it is useful to identify three key features 
of the use of the language metaphor in representations of genetics. 
 
The first common form that the language metaphor assumes is what we may call the ‘physical 
manifestation of language’. In other words, language is normally represented in physical-tangible 
form – as a book, as a page, as a library. Language, as a metaphor for genetics in popular science 
writing, rarely means language as an abstract system, or even as speech or dialogue; rather, it 
                                                 
27 Ted Peters, Playing God?: Genetic Determinism and Human Freedom, 2nd Edition (New York: Routledge, 
2002), p. 3. 
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almost always means written words on a page. As a metaphor for the gene this emphasises the 
gene’s physicality, its locatability, its isolation and its unitariness: the gene becomes reified. As 
José Van Dijck has put it, the terms gene and genome “become crystallized into things, rather than 
being fleshed out as complex processes. Reified into entities, they start to function in society as 
signs with fixed meanings, only to become signifiers in other contexts”.28  
 
A pervasive double rhetoric, to be found primarily in media representations of genetics, of traits 
being ‘in the genes’ and of ‘genes for x trait’ underpins this reification, and thus in turn the 
simplification that is central to the gene-centric position. (Almost exclusively, this x trait is a 
physical or behavioural abnormality; Van Dijck and others have asked why we “read cover stories 
about researchers who have found the infidelity gene and the gene for homosexuality, but never 
hear of researchers looking for the gene for loyalty or for heterosexuality”.29) As Ruth Hubbard 
has argued, the public announcement of a successful location of a gene ‘for’ a disease carries with 
it the notion of a gene as a physical entity, definitely locatable on the chromosome, isolated from 
interaction with other genes, and from environmental stimuli.30 This, what we might call the 
‘single-gene cause’ conception of genetics, is appealing in its simplicity; but Van Dijck has also 
noted both the fact that it “provide[s] a means of explaining and predicting someone’s deviance” 
and that, furthermore, like other representations of the genome, the “localization of single genes 
is pivotal to the promotion of genetic therapy as the great eraser of all disease for future 
generations”.31 Within the Human Genome Project (HGP) context, and given the public 
perception of the HGP as primarily medical-science research, the social benefit of the HGP and a 
form of gene-centrism are, then, mutually supporting claims: in order to ‘treat’ or ‘fix’ genes ‘for’ 
diseases, they must be identifiable and locatable; the resulting implication is that genes as 
locatable entities are ‘for’ a trait – a distinctly gene-centric perspective.  
 
Having noted that the manifestation of the language metaphor is almost exclusively textual, the 
second salient feature of the language metaphor is the kind of texts that are invoked as part of the 
metaphor. Dictionaries, encyclopaedias, instructions, blueprints, recipes are the paradigmatic 
texts; there is no instance, to my knowledge, of DNA being described as, say, ‘the epic poem of 
life’. Consider the following examples:  
The [DNA] dictionary maps 64 code words onto 21 meanings [...] Human 
                                                 
28 José Van Dijck, Imagenation: Popular Images of  Genetics (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), p. 162. 
29 Van Dijck, p. 165. 
30 Ruth Hubbard and Elijah Wald, Exploding the Gene Myth: How Genetic Information is Produced and 
Manipulated by Scientists, Physicians, Employers, Insurance Companies, Educators, and Law Enforcers (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1993). 
31 Van Dijck, p. 165. 
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languages are numerous and changing [...] the 64-word DNA dictionary is 
universal and unchanging.32 
 
DNA can be regarded as a set of  instructions for how to make a body, written 
in the A, T, C, G alphabet of  the nucleotides.33 
 
The genome – the sum total of  an organism’s DNA – was understood to be its 
book of  life, life’s little instruction book.34 
These sorts of texts are chosen because the language is assumed to be unambiguous. The 
implication is that an unproblematic relationship between language and meaning is analogous to 
an unproblematic relationship between genotype and phenotype. The uncritical association of 
language with ‘meaning’ or ‘coding for’ is clear in the choice of texts that are used in these textual 
metaphors. The emphasis on communicative information, and the fixity of meaning in these 
texts, implies the unambiguous ‘translation’ of DNA into proteins, and thus into physical traits. 
 
But language is ambiguous, and this leads us onto the third feature of the language metaphor. The 
language metaphors in these books ignore the polysemy of language by taking a syntactic 
approach to language, rather than a literary one, and by using texts where the stated purpose is 
instructive or informative. But the result is that these metaphors of language in popular science 
books on genetics suggest the direct relationship between genotype and phenotype – in other 
words, gene-centrism. Discussing the similar metaphors of blueprints and programs, Thomas 
Fogle has observed that 
the comparison of  DNA with blueprints and programs engenders the 
interpretation of  genetics as a matching process between a single gene and a 
trait. This imposes a sense of  biological determinism onto what is basically a 
contingent relationship between biochemical pathways, cellular structures and 
physiological processes.35 
The same, I argue, is true also of the language metaphor.  
 
The exceptions in this case prove the rule. Just as the passages I have highlighted establish the 
centrality of the role of genes over environment through a language metaphor that limits or 
ignores the polysemy of language, other writers have used the language metaphor to present a 
more balanced interactionist position, one that acknowledges the importance of environmental 
                                                 
32 Dawkins, Ancestor’s Tale, p. 22. 
33 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 22-23. Unless 
otherwise specified, subsequent references are to this edition, hereafter SG, and will be made in the 
text. 
34 Nina V. Fedoroff, Nancy Marie Brown, Mendel in the Kitchen: A Scientist’s View of  Genetically Modified 
Foods (Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press, 2004), p. 81. 
35 Quoted in Van Dijck, pp. 149-150. 
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factors. Richard Pollack accomplishes this by shifting the ground of this metaphor from a 
linguistic, syntactic appreciation of the DNA ‘text’, to a more literary one; thus, just as literary 
critics propose multiple readings of texts, so “the cells of our bodies do extract a multiplicity of 
meaning from the DNA text inside them”.36 Pollack’s purpose in importing the concepts of 
literary criticism is to show that “the leap from DNA to protein is as arbitrary as the relation 
between signifier and signified”.37 Pollack is using the same metaphor as other popular science 
writers, but for exactly the inverse purpose. 
 
Lenny Moss has provided a similarly nuanced use of the language metaphor. He is even more 
explicit in citing linguistic and biological context as comparable. Just as – in, say, dialogue – 
“context [...] determines the significance of the word, not vice versa”, so the same might be 
argued of genes within context: 
Contexts, in a biological vein, would be found at the many levels of  structured, 
dynamic systems that are always in some relationship to other structured, 
dynamic systems, and/or a complex environmental ambience.38  
For Moss, it is not the language metaphor itself that is at fault for gene-centric representations of 
genetics, but the fact that it is misused. On the contrary, he sees the fact that “even the simplest 
free living cell is capable of considerable adaptive plasticity – i.e. successful participation in highly 
variant ‘dialogical contexts’” as arguing for the great “explanatory potential of depicting genes as 
words whose significance is context-dependent”.39 The introduction of context into the metaphor 
“serves precisely to undermine vectoral unidirectionism (all causality emanating outward from the 
genes as the ‘deep text which underlies all else’)”.40 What both Pollack and Moss show is that 
although the language metaphor can be deployed in support of a gene-centric position, it can also 
be used – indeed, is perhaps better suited – to support an interactionist position that places a 
greater emphasis on environmental influence.  
 
 
5.1.2  Language ‘Upgraded’: The Computer Program Metaphor 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, with the increasingly widespread use of computer technology, a new set 
of metaphors for genetics became available, and prevalent.  Out of the metaphors of language 
                                                 
36 Richard Pollack, Signs of  Life: The Language and Meanings of  DNA (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), 
p. 5. 
37 Van Dijck, p. 155. 
38 Lenny Moss, What Genes Can’t Do (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), p. 72. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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and code, related metaphors of computer language, computer programs and data emerged. Van 
Dijck has charted the rise in use of these images in the media, particularly in relation to the 
Human Genome Project (HGP), and he draws a number of conclusions from his analysis, only 
some of which are relevant to the present argument. He does, however, recognise the roots of 
this new set of metaphors in, firstly, the preceding metaphors of ‘code’, ‘information’ and 
‘language’ and also in the fact that “the development of genomics was thoroughly dependent on 
the emergence of computers”. Susan Oyama, in her thorough categorisation of “variants of the 
homunculoid, cognitive-causal gene”, distinguishes between metaphors of information, rules, 
programs and instructions; the distinction between such metaphors in popular science writing 
itself is, by contrast, often vague. Keller has described the “introduction of the metaphor of 
information [by Crick and Watson] to the repertoire of biological discourse… [as] a stroke of 
genius”, and the importance of the metaphor of information and information theory for genetics 
has been examined thoroughly both by Keller and Oyama.41 I wish to concentrate rather on the 
metaphor of the computer program, which undoubtedly has its roots in both Schrödinger’s 
“code” and in Crick and Watson’s “information”, but which is ubiquitous in popular science 
writing on genetics.  
 
For the purposes of this analysis, the new metaphors of computer data and programs can initially 
be seen to function in a remarkably similar way to that of language; I will argue that frequently 
the same implications identified in the use of language metaphors (the simplification of the causal 
connection between words and meaning, and thus genotype and phenotype) are also often 
inherent in computer metaphors. Towards the end of this section, I will also examine the ways in 
which the new set of computer metaphors differ from those of language, and the effects that 
these differences have on the representation of genetics, and genetic determinism. 
 
That the new metaphors do not really bring about a change in the representation or perception of 
genetics is a fact repeatedly acknowledged by Van Dijck: 
[This] new set of  related images, which, on the face of  it, seemed reinvigorated 
or updated by computer language [...] turned out to be far from innovative.42 
The new images should have allowed for a more complex understanding of the relationship 
between DNA and proteins, and indeed it seems likely that it was at least partly the increased 
complexity within the field of molecular biology in the 1980s – a move away from the uni-
directional understanding of this process, to one based on networks and information theory – 
                                                 
41  Keller, p. 18. 
42 Van Dijck, p. 121. 
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that was responsible for these new computer metaphors. However, in the popular literature, this 
increased complexity did not materialise, rather “the images that evolve along with information 
processing systems reflect anything but complexity”.43 So, the new breed of metaphors continue 
to recall the old. The computer metaphors may be sensibly divided into those which figure genes 
and genetics in terms of computer hardware, and those whose metaphoric vehicle is software. I 
shall investigate the former, smaller, and more straightforward subset first, before moving on to 
look at software in more detail.  
 
When computer metaphors gravitate towards hardware – the physical, concrete, rather than 
abstract, manifestations of the computer system – they strongly recall a similar predilection 
mentioned in the preceding section on language. To be more specific: just as the genes-as-
language analogy is frequently imaged in metaphors of books and libraries, so genes-as-data have 
been represented as floppy discs, hard drives, CDs, or the computers themselves. Thus Dawkins 
notes, in an elaborate metaphor (one that, intriguingly he claims is “not a metaphor, it is the plain 
truth”) in The Blind Watchmaker, that 
[i]t is raining DNA outside. [...] It couldn’t be any plainer if  it were raining 
floppy disks44 
and in The Ancestor’s Tale that 
the image of  the genome as an old hard disk, badly in need of  a spring clean, is 
one that will serve us from time to time45 
and Ted Peters imagines that  
The card catalogue for the DNA library requires enormous computing 
capacity.46 
The last example shows, in the mixed metaphor that combines the old and the new forms, that 
these different metaphors are essentially interchangeable. Van Dijck has noted how the idea of a 
“compact disk containing an inscription of a person’s genetic make-up” collapses the “digital, 
organic and metaphysical signifieds of the body”.47 Just as with language these examples involve a 
                                                 
43 Van Dijck, p. 123. 
44  Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2000), p. 135. All subsequent 
references are to this edition, hereafter BW, and will be made in the text. 
45 Dawkins, Ancestor’s Tale, p. 22. 
46 Peters, p. 3. 
47 Van Dijck, p. 123. 
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reification of DNA, or the genome, that suggests its physicality and locatability, with the 
consequences examined in the preceding section.  
 
There is something curious, almost perverse, about adopting the computer analogy for genetics, 
but manifesting it through images of discs and other hardware. Clearly the hardware is ordinarily 
the point of our own interface with a computer system; nonetheless, the software is the essence 
of a computer – the hardware is simply a point of access, or a device for storage, control, input or 
output. Without the software, the computer is a set of inert objects. It is therefore unsurprising 
that the second category of computer metaphors, those that compare genes and the genome to 
computer software, or programs, is by far the larger category. Indeed, as Oyama has pointed out: 
“The genome as constituting rules, instructions or program, either in the sense of a plan or in the 
sense of a computer program, is so common a notion as not to seem metaphorical at all”.48 But 
these metaphors replicate one of the central problems of the language metaphors: the 
increasingly potent metaphor of the genome as a computer program simplifies the complex 
relationship between the genotype and phenotype in exactly the same way as did the metaphor of 
words and meanings.  
 
The roundworm Caenorhabditis elegans, surely one of the most intensively studied organisms on 
earth, and the first to have its entire genome ‘mapped’, Pinker describes as 
a microscopic worm composed of  959 cells grown by a rigid genetic program, 
with a nervous system consisting of  exactly 302 neurons in a fixed wiring 
diagram. As far as behaviour is concerned, it eats, mates, approaches and 
avoids certain smells, and that’s about it.49 
Pinker is using this example to highlight the fact that “freedom and diversity of behaviour come 
from having a complex biological makeup, not a simple one”, comparing this worm’s genome 
with the human one. But what this example clearly shows is the connection between the 
metaphor of the computer program, here extended and almost demetaphorized in the standard 
image of neurons as wiring, and a gene-centric conception of development. The genetic program 
is shown to create precise, identifiable and predictable phenotypic characteristics, emphasised in 
the precision of the numbers and through the terms “grown”, “rigid”, “exactly”, “fixed” and 
“diagram”, and in the limited list of behaviours that lack all semblance of agency. Indeed, as we 
shall see later, as part of the rhetoric of genetic determinism genes themselves are frequently 
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described with more agency and animation than is this apparently genetically determined 
organism.  
 
Moreover, there is a revealing slippage between physical and behavioural characteristics. The 
passage does not explicitly claim that the behaviour of the organism is governed by its genetic 
program, but the structure of the passage – from the “genetic program” to the nervous system to 
the list of behaviours – and the paratactical relation between the physical and behavioural 
elements, certainly implies that these too are governed by the program. The distinction between 
the genetic determination of physical and behavioural phenotypic elements, while not in itself a 
necessary distinction, has nonetheless acquired a symbolic importance in the genetic determinism 
debate. 
 
On the very same page, Pinker also wonders “how many genes it would take to build a system of 
hard-wired modules, or a general-purpose learning program” – in other words a program 
metaphor on the level of the brain modules, and one that relies heavily on the computational 
terminology of cognitive psychology and neuroscience – and also describes “Gene-estimating 
programs [that] look for sequences in the DNA that are similar to known genes”, in other words 
a genuine computer program that is integral to the practice of genetic sequencing. This illustrates 
Van Dijck’s observation that there is a blurring of the boundary between the representations of 
the HGP and of the process of the scientific practice itself: the result of the HGP is both a 
collection of digital units and a methodology of “sequencing genes [...that] now fully consists of 
processing digital information”.50 In this very specific example, then, “[d]igital inscription devices 
and storage systems are not merely technological ‘upgrades’ of old information and language 
metaphors” but are almost “an unambiguous representation of physical reality”.51 
 
This confusion of the metaphorical and the literal is symptomatic of the computer metaphor’s 
ubiquity. Such has been its success that the OED’s definition for program, in the sense of a set of 
instructions for a computer, explicitly includes the transferable sense from genetics:  
program, 9 b. [...] A series of  coded instructions and definitions which when 
fed into a computer automatically directs its operation in performing a 
particular task. Also in extended use: something conceived of  as encoding and 
determining a process, esp. genetically.52  
                                                 
50  Van Dijck, p. 123. 
51 Van Dijck, pp. 123-4. 
52  programme | program, n. 9 b., Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edn, 1989, OED Online, Oxford University 
Press <http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50189636> [accessed 01 July 2010]. 
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It is interesting to note here not just the direct comparison between the computer program and 
the genetic one, but also the pairing of the terms “encoding” and “determining”, a combination 
that implies their similitude: computer programs are encoded, and determine; similarly, if genes 
encode, then they must also determine.  
 
In the preceding section on language I argued that metaphors that compare genes to language 
routinely limit the potential for the polysemy of language – the same is fundamentally true of the 
language of computer programs. Ambiguity within a computer program is potentially disastrous 
and the comparison of genes with the language of a computer program implies (even more 
strongly than a comparison with language) the fixity of the effect of a gene, and thus its 
deterministic, rather than environmentally contingent, nature. And as the metaphors of books 
and libraries have been ‘upgraded’ to those of computers and hard drives, so the idea of reading 
now “seems naturally to imply automatic decoding” performed by a machine rather than human 
reader.53 Again, the possibility of ambiguity and polysemy is reduced – a machine reader is unable 
to cope with the idea of interpretation, thus removing a possible impediment to the direct line of 
causation from the gene-as-data, through its precise and unalterable reading-as-decoding and 
therefore to its manifestation in the output – the phenotype. If the direct lineage between gene 
and characteristic implied in the metaphors of language and books is a simplification, then the 
relationship between computer program and output is even more reductive, decreasing or 
removing even the (often only latent) possibility of interpretative reading that is inherent in 
written language.  
 
Thus far, I have described the essential similarity between the language metaphors and those of 
computer programs. I have argued that while the move from metaphors of language to those of 
machines, and in particular computers and computer programs, should have entailed an increased 
complexity in the metaphorical representation of genes, in fact the new metaphors were simply 
‘upgrades’ of the old ones. By this I mean that while the vehicles of these metaphors changed to 
accommodate technological changes – changes having a profound impact on the practice of 
science itself – the effects and implications of these metaphors remained the same. However, I 
will proceed to argue that not only did the shift from the genes-as-language metaphor to the 
genes-as-computer-program metaphor not provide a more accurate metaphorical scaffold for 
talking about genetics, but rather this change further entrenched the majority of popular science 
writing on genetics into a gene-centric position, or at least an interactionism towards the gene-
centric end of the spectrum. It did little to encourage the supporters of an environment-centric 
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view, and less still to support a ‘constructionist interactionism’ or complex developmental 
systems approach such as that of Oyama. 
 
It has long been observed that the history of genetics, in particular of the theorisation of the 
gene, has resulted in a dual understanding of what a gene is. In his concise history in The 
Misunderstood Gene Michel Morange describes how the gene began simply as a term for hereditary 
‘factors’, and not a material object at all.54 Indeed, due perhaps to a fear of returning to a 
preformationist understanding of genetics, there was a resistance to the idea of a physically 
located ‘gene’. Nonetheless, through experimental research, culminating in Watson and Crick’s 
publication in 1953, the location of genes was identified with the chromosomes and then finally 
with DNA. However, with its localization, the gene did not lose its former sense of the process 
through which transmission of factors took place. Judith Roof has coined the term “DNA gene” 
to refer to the resulting composite concept: “The two categories – the gene as an organized 
operation, DNA as a chemical material – have merged conceptually, producing something like a 
‘DNA gene’”.55 This combining of physical object and the process of transmission is also noted 
by Evelyn Fox Keller. Arguing that creating a discourse, forging a “way of talking about genes”, 
was of critical importance to the development of genetics, Keller sees the concept of the gene 
that was created as “part physicist’s atom and part Platonic soul – at one and the same time a 
fundamental building block and an animating force”.56  
 
I want to argue that the crucial difference between the language-as-gene metaphors and those of 
computer programs, could equally well be described as the distinction between a “fundamental 
building block and an animating force”. The difference between, on the one hand, the 
relationship of language to the book or library in which it is contained, and, on the other, of a 
computer program to the machine that it is housed in, is the same as that between a building 
block and an animating force – the difference is agency. As I have shown, the forms of writing 
most commonly employed in the language metaphor are instructions, blueprints, recipes: forms 
that are intended to guide an actor through a prescribed set of actions. But they themselves are 
not the agent that brings about these actions. This problem, that genes (in a gene-centric 
argument) apparently carry out the instructions they contain, goes right back to Schrödinger, who 
believed that “the chromosome structures are [...] instrumental in bringing about the 
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55 Judith Roof, The Poetics of  DNA (Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota Press, 2007), p. 3. 
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development they foreshadow. They are law-code and executive power – or to use another 
simile, they are architect’s plans and builder’s craft – in one”.57 
 
In this way genes are frequently imagined as not just information, but also actors. Coining the 
term “matter-text”, similar to Roof’s “DNA gene”, Lenny Moss has put it most succinctly, noting 
that “[i]t is as matter-text that genes and DNA ascend to the status of sentiency and agency, as 
matter with its own instructions for use, and furthermore, as the user too”.58 He argues that the 
idea of genes as being both “physical templates for the synthesis of other molecules and 
determinants of organismic traits and phenotypes” requires genes to somehow “provide their 
own instructions for use” and that it is the idea of “genes being able to do this” that is conveyed 
in references to “genes as information, as programs, as blueprints, as encyclopaedias of life and 
the like”.59 Moss is correct to note that these metaphors imply action but these metaphors do not 
imply that the genes themselves are also the actors – “the user” in Moss’s words. This is where 
the computer program metaphor is critical in the gene-centric representation: computer programs 
cause the set of actions to be performed; they are, if you like, the quintessential performative 
speech-act, enacting their contents in a way that, perhaps, even Austin’s famous examples – bets, 
weddings, christenings – do not. Perhaps, then, the success of the computer program metaphor is 
due to the fact that it rhetorically solves Schrödinger’s problem – a computer program can almost 
be “law code and executive power” (programs, after all, are ‘executable’ files) and imply that 
genes carry out their own instructions. This hugely simplifies the biology of developmental 
systems – after all, genes don’t themselves ‘make’ anything, just as Lewontin points out that their 
‘self-replication’ is also reductive: “we do not speak of manuscripts ‘self-replicating’ in a 
photocopy machine”.60  
 
In an oft-quoted passage61 from The Selfish Gene Dawkins describes how proto-genes (what he 
calls primitive replicators) ended up “safe inside gigantic lumbering robots [...] manipulating 
[them] by remote-control”: the robots he is talking about are “you and me” as well as “all 
animals, plants, bacteria and viruses” (SG, 19-20). In an endnote from the second edition (SG, 
270-271) Dawkins defends his choice of words, and rightly criticises the authors of Not In Our 
Genes for misquoting his original description: rather than genes that “create us body and mind” 
                                                 
57 Schrödinger, p. 22. 
58 Moss, What Genes Can’t Do, p. 52. 
59 Moss, What Genes Can’t Do, p. xvii. 
60 R.C. Lewontin, Foreword, in Oyama, xii-xiii. 
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Our Genes, p. 287. 
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(SG, 20), they describe genes that “control us body and mind” (my emphasis) – a misreading that 
suits their (rather polemical) criticism of genetic determinism.62 Despite this, even if the original 
passage is not so explicit, the misquotation picks up on an implication: the passage does contain a 
sense of the replicators ‘controlling’ their survival machines from within. 
[W]hat was to be the fate of  the ancient replicators? They did not die out, for 
they are past masters of  the survival arts. But do not look for them floating 
loose in the sea; they gave up that cavalier freedom long ago. Now they swarm 
in huge colonies, safe inside gigantic lumbering robots, sealed off  from the 
outside communicating with it by tortuous routes, manipulating it by remote 
control […] they created us, body and mind […] we are their survival 
machines. (SG, 19-20) 
It is clear here that the gene is the ontologically prior element – but that is in keeping with 
Dawkins’s theory of genetics. What is more significant is that the gene is also the animate actor in 
this representation: the organism is a “robot”, a “machine” and a “lumbering” one at that. The 
genes, meanwhile, are described as organism-like, and specifically they might remind us of insects 
as they “swarm in huge colonies”. The genes are the subject of all the verbs in the passage: they 
‘swarm’, ‘communicate’, ‘create’ and ‘manipulate’. 
 
The implications of this passage are clearly associated with the computer program metaphor. For 
all Dawkins’s observations about robots in his end note, there is little doubt about the common 
connotations of the word: he asserts that robots “are no longer rigidly inflexible morons”, but I 
believe that the word retains that sense, despite advances in robotics and artificial intelligence. 
Indeed the epithets “gigantic” and “lumbering” seem to reinforce those stereotypical 
connotations. As computerised machines, robots require a program to transform them from 
simply inert electronics, and that program is supplied in Dawkins’s image by the genes “safe 
inside”. That we generally consider the machine an inanimate container for the animating 
program is obvious from the terms such as ‘computer virus’, ‘worms’, or a ‘bug’ that have 
crossed over from biology to computer programs. 
 
In this way genes are metaphorically figured as the animating program inside the passive 
container of the body. This agency attributed to genes is the crucial difference that makes the 
‘upgraded’ metaphors of genes as computer programs even more powerfully suggestive of their 
determination of an organism’s behaviour. Language ‘makes up’ the contents of a book; it is, to 
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use another image that is almost demetaphorized and to which I will turn in a moment, the 
‘building blocks’ from which a book is ‘constructed’. Computer programs, however, govern the 
behaviour of the machine in which they are run. This difference is analogous to a distinction 
between genes controlling the construction of organisms (their responsibility for physical 
phenotypic characteristics) and genes controlling the behaviour of the organism: the distinction, 
exactly, between ‘creating us body and mind’ and ‘controlling us body and mind’.  
 
 
5.1.3  Building a Body, Baking a Body 
 
The dynamics that I have already identified in the metaphors of language and computer programs 
are also present in the popular metaphor of the genes as a ‘blueprint’ for ‘building’ a body: I have 
argued that the presentation of the genome as a set of instructions, either in natural language or 
in computer code, is reductive in the specific sense that it implies a simplified relation between 
the genes and their phenotypic manifestation: that the ‘meaning’ ‘encoded’ in the genes is simply 
‘read’ off them without reference to environmental conditions. The metaphor of the genes as a 
blueprint works in the same way; I would argue that, indeed, the potential for polysemy in the 
diagrammatic blueprint metaphor is less than in the language or computer program metaphor. In 
this way, ‘blueprint’ metaphors are even more strongly suggestive of genetic determinism. In 
addition, since the building that is produced is little more than a scaled-up, three-dimensional 
version of that represented in the blueprint, this metaphor is suggestive not only of the 
unambiguous progress from genotype to phenotype, but  also strongly implies a preformationist 
and atomistic perspective. 
 
The blueprint/building metaphor also raises some of the same issues as that of the computer 
program in that it locates the agency of the development of the organism in the genes. The 
association between this metaphor and this problem is already present in Schrödinger’s 
comparison, “the chromosome structures are [...also] instrumental in bringing about the 
development they foreshadow [...] they are architect’s plans and builder’s craft”.63 Oyama has 
turned this simile around in a concise criticism of the blueprint metaphor: “Though a plan 
implies action, it does not itself act, so if the genes are a blueprint, something else is the 
contractor-construction worker”.64 Her conclusion is that the blueprint metaphor is not intended 
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“to illuminate developmental processes, but rather to assume them and [...] to impute cognitive 
function to the genes”.65 
 
In the building metaphor, then, the genes/DNA act as both architect and the builders of the 
body and are animate in a way that the building that is produced is not. In an extended 
metaphorical description in Richard Pollack’s Signs of Life, the division of a cell is imagined as one 
of the two World Trade Center towers copying itself to make a matching second tower.66 This 
description emphasises on the one hand the animation/vivacity of the processes involving DNA, 
whilst on the other the building itself is conspicuously inanimate. The building represents a cell, 
not a body; but nonetheless the contrast between the descriptions is sharp. The tower is 
described passively: it is “anonymous, filled with endless offices [...] brightly lit, well vented”; 
“pipes bring in and take out the necessary fluids, energy and heat”; the only active verb the 
buildings are ascribed is that “[they] vent their excess heat”.67 Whilst the activity surrounding the 
building is emphasised – “[p]rodigious numbers of people and vast amounts of information and 
money move in and out of these buildings” – they themselves “remain, quite unperturbed, much 
as they were on the day they opened”.68 
 
When we – the passage is addressed to the reader – enter the single WTC tower, the building is 
apparently lifeless: there are “corridors, elevators and such”, but there is no mention or 
implication of animation. Until, that is, we enter “the central core of the building”.69 Here, 
activity is constant, and present participles proliferate:  
personnel scurry back and forth [...] carrying sheaves of  computer printouts. It 
is not at all clear what work they are performing [....] 
 Officious staff  are carefully taking down one or another volume, 
photocopying an article, and replacing the volume. These clerks come and go, 
carrying out photocopies of  pages [...] and coming back with instructions for 
more copies.70  
As the cell is about to divide, the “library staff is suddenly excited; some are scurrying out of the 
library”. The cell division itself, however, located as it is on the scale of the cell – part of the 
machine not the program – is a surprisingly passive event. Presaged by a mere “soft vibration” 
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the tower splits “quite smoothly and silently”; “no one [...] seems to find anything unusual about 
this quiet, massive, precise doubling”.71 
 
Whilst the blueprint metaphor is a very common one in popular science on genetics, some 
writers have prominently questioned its usefulness, and identified some of its problematic 
implications. In Nature via Nurture Matt Ridley notes early on that “[g]enes are not puppet 
masters; nor blueprints [...] Somehow the adherents of the ‘nurture’ side of the argument have 
scared themselves silly at the power and inevitability of genes”; more significantly for my 
argument, however, he reminds us, in an image that recalls the importance of developmental or 
ontogenetic processes, that “bodies are not made, they grow”.72 Instead of the blueprint 
metaphor Ridley chooses a different sort of text: 
The genome is not a blueprint for constructing a body; it is a recipe for baking 
a body. The chicken embryo is marinaded for a shorter time in the Hoxc8 
sauce than the mouse embryo. This is a metaphor I shall return to frequently in 
the book, for it is one of  the best ways of  explaining why nature and nurture 
are not opposed to each other, but work together.73  
The shift from a concrete fixed blueprint to the slightly more fluid textual instruction of a recipe 
does indeed suggest a greater emphasis on environment. Rose, Lewontin and Kramin in their 
critique of genetic determinism, Not In Our Genes, employ the same image, though in their more 
gestalt equivalent the emphasis is entirely upon the idea of baking as a process: they ask us to 
“[t]hink, for example, of the baking of a cake”. The cake, they argue “is the result of a complex 
interaction of components – such as butter, sugar, and flour – exposed for various periods to 
elevated temperatures”.74 The deliberate vagueness of the constituent ingredients, and of their 
quantities and of the length and temperature of cooking, all deny this image any association with 
a recipe or set of instructions, whilst the emphasis on the combination and interaction of 
ingredients and on temperature, all emphasise the role of environment: the ambiguity about the 
baking process suggests the limits, in line with their stated agenda, of genetic determinism. 
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Dawkins, in his scathing review of Not In Our Genes, uses this very passage to argue that the 
targets of that book – supposed genetic determinists – are “not quite the naively atomistic 
reductionists they [Rose et al.] would desperately like them to be”: the image of the cake, he 
notes, was one that he himself had used to reveal the flaws in genetic atomism.75 Elsewhere, in 
The Blind Watchmaker, Dawkins has shown an even more specific awareness of the problems of 
the blueprint metaphor, and the (relative) benefits of the recipe metaphor, recognising in 
particular the preformationist implications of the blueprint metaphor:  
Modern preformationism – the blueprint theory – holds that the DNA in a 
fertilized egg is equivalent to a blueprint of  the adult body. [...]  Each bit of  the 
blueprint corresponds to a matching bit of  the building. There is a sense in 
which the blueprint is a miniaturized ‘preformed’ building[.] (BW, 294-295) 
This pitfall, Dawkins shows, is avoided by the recipe metaphor, since “a recipe is not a scale 
model, not a description of a finished cake, not in any sense a point-for-point representation. It is 
a set of instructions which, if obeyed in the right order, will result in a cake” (BW, 295). It is 
interesting to note that the recipe metaphor does lead Dawkins closer to a constructivist-
interactionist description of development, noting that the phenotypic expression of genes is 
highly dependent on the conditions during development: 
the effect that a gene has when it is turned on depends upon what there is, in 
the local part of  the embryo, to have an effect on [...] So, the effect, if  any, that 
a gene has is not a simple property of  the gene itself, but is a property of  the 
gene in interaction with the recent history of  its local surroundings in the 
embryo. (BW, 296) 
Despite this it is important to observe that as Dawkins continues with the recipe analogy, the 
factors that he describes as resulting in differences in the cake are all differences to the original 
recipe (the substitution of an ingredient, a change in oven temperature); they are not, to continue 
within the frame of the cake metaphor, differences in the kitchen in which the cake is baked, or 
the style of oven used, or the origin of the ingredients used, or the temperature of the cook’s 
hands, and so on. This still places the emphasis for differences in the organism (‘cake’) in the 
DNA (‘recipe’). Indeed, it is significant that the metaphor as Dawkins uses it here is very much 
the ‘recipe metaphor’; the emphasis is definitely placed on the recipe, not on the process of baking. 
As a point of contrast, Rose et al. do not, in their cake baking analogy, mention a recipe at all.  
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The very similar exposition of the blueprint/recipe metaphor comparison in The Devil’s Chaplain 
exhibits the same emphasis on the recipe – the preformationism of information, as Oyama would 
observe. Here, Dawkins again observes that you cannot map a recipe to a dish, point for point – 
nor can you reconstruct the recipe from the dish: 
A blueprint is a detailed, point-for-point specification of  some end product 
like a house or a car. [...] Give an engineer a car and he can reconstruct its 
blueprint. But offer to a chef  a rival’s pièce de resistance to taste and he will fail to 
reconstruct the recipe.76 
This difficulty in reconstructing the recipe from the dish shows that the recipe metaphor, unlike 
the blueprint metaphor, is non-reversible. This is an important distinction for Dawkins’s 
argument because the impossibility of moving from the dish to the recipe (from the organism 
back to the genes) describes the impossibility of inscribing acquired characteristics in the genes, 
and therefore the impossibility of inheriting these acquired characteristics. In other words, the 
move from the blueprint to the recipe metaphor is a necessary one in avoiding the suggestion of 
Lamarckism. The reason that he gives for this non-reversibility is that the interaction of the 
elements specified in the recipe make the reconstruction impossible: but this ignores the other 
essential element that impedes reconstruction of the recipe from the dish – the variability of 
environmental conditions under which the recipe was carried out. 
 
* * * * 
 
It is not my intention, in this analysis, to claim that the writers quoted here explicitly support, to a 
greater or lesser degree, a form of genetic determinism. Indeed, many of the authors are keen to 
stress the problems with genetic determinism and assert their adherence to a more balanced form 
of interactionism. My examination of the presentation of genetics is concerned more with 
showing how a rhetoric of gene-centrism has become both pervasive and entrenched. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that these writers are not caught up in describing a 
‘conceptually vacuous’ form of interactionism of the kind that Oyama rightly criticises; nor does 
it mean that their gene-centric rhetoric does not lead them into suggestions of determinism even 
as they deny them.  
 
The description of genes via a metaphor of language has a long pedigree, pre-dating even the 
discovery of DNA. However, I have shown how the common form of the metaphor in popular 
science writing on genetics associates genes with physically locatable textual instructions or 
                                                 
76 Richard Dawkins, A Devil’s Chaplain: Selected Essays (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003), p. 105. 
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information, and in so doing shuts down the potential polysemy of language, in particular its 
dependence on context. The result is a metaphor that suggests the directness of the connection 
between genes and their manifestation in the phenotype. This same emphasis can also be seen in 
the similar set of computer program metaphors; indeed, I argue that the potential for multiple 
meanings and context-dependence is excluded to an even greater degree in computer program 
metaphors. Furthermore, these metaphors locate an important part of the agency of the organism 
in the genes: just as software does not simply provide instructions but in some way also causes 
actions, so, it is implied, genes are also in some way the actors that create and govern a body. The 
genes become an updated homunculoid.77 
 
Dawkins’s own criticisms of the blueprint metaphor reveal that he recognises the problems of the 
preformationism inherent in that particular pedagogic metaphor. Replacing it with the metaphor 
of a recipe may reduce or even remove some of the preformationist implications, and it certainly 
in its non-reversibility removes the possibility of the inheritance of acquired characteristics; but 
an emphasis on the recipe, the set of instructions that produce the cake, rather than on the 
process of making the cake and the environmental context in which the cake is made, maintains a 
strong gene-centric perspective. Although recipes are not one of the metaphors that Oyama 
identifies in The Ontogeny of Information, Dawkins’s replacement of blueprints with recipes is a 
perfect example of the form of interactionism that she criticises – it sees development as just 
“encoded nature with varying doses of contingent nurture”.78 Furthermore, the recipe itself is a 
good example of the tendency to simply transfer the preformationism to some concept of 
‘information’, and as such is no improvement on the blueprint metaphor. 
 
In the Afterword to the second edition of The Ontogeny of Information, Oyama notes that the 
asymmetrical application of mentalistic language in descriptions of genetics creates difficulties, 
“perhaps even feeding a subtle biological determinism that the analysts themselves may try to 
disavow”.79 It has been my intention in this chapter to show that these dynamics are in play in the 
use of metaphors of language, of computer programs and of blueprints and recipes. In the next 
chapter, I will show that similar problems arise in popular discourse around evolutionary biology: 
in particular, that the use of certain metaphors and the construction of narratives can reinstate 
into popular science texts a form of determinism – a teleological view of evolution – that their 
authors would expressly deny.  
 
                                                 
77 Oyama, p. 54. 
78 Oyama, p. 5. 
79 Oyama, p. 201. 
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5.2  Evolutionary Determinism  
 
There is a tendency, one born of human arrogance, to see the development of our own species as 
the pinnacle of the process of evolution. In the Prologue to his book of essays Ever Since Darwin 
(1980), Stephen Jay Gould quotes from the essay in which Freud argues that the implications of 
Darwin’s theory of evolution, as set forth in On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or 
the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life, represented one of the three fundamental 
‘blows’ or ‘wounds’ that man has suffered to his “self-love”.80 The first of these, the cosmological 
blow, Freud assigns to Copernicus, a result of undermining the dominant view of the universe 
with the earth at the centre; the “third blow, which is psychological in nature”, he reserves for his 
own work, a consequence of the revelation that “the ego is not master in its own house”.81 It is the 
second blow, “the biological blow to human narcissism”, that Freud attributes to Darwin’s theory 
for putting “an end to this presumption on the part of man” that he is “a being different from 
animals or superior to them”.82 Whether or not one agrees with the wider claims of Freud’s (far 
from humble) assessment, it is undeniable that this implication of Darwin’s work – the de-
centring, or demoting of man from his position of superiority – was a major cause of the outcry 
over the Origin of Species on its publication and a factor in the subsequent one hundred and fifty 
year backlash against the theory and its successors.83 
 
Gould, however, “submit[s] that the knowledge of this relegation [from having been specially 
created to being a descendant from the animal world] is also our greatest hope”.84 Both Gould 
and Richard Dawkins repeatedly criticise the anthropocentric attitude that places man at the 
centre of the natural order, or at the ‘top’, or sees man as the culmination of evolution’s 
‘progress’. In River Out of Eden (1995), for example, Dawkins follows a brief description of insects’ 
perception of “flicker” by observing that “[t]he world as seen through an insect’s eyes is so alien 
to us that to make statements based on our own experience when discussing how ‘perfectly’ an 
orchid needs to mimic a female wasp’s body is human presumption” and warns that “we must 
beware of using human intuition” when thinking about evolutionary adaptation.85  
 
                                                 
80  Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of  the Complete Psychological Works, trans. and ed. by James Strachey, 
24 vols, (London: Hogarth Press, 1953-74), XVII, 143. 
81   Ibid. 
82  Freud, p. 141. 
83  This backlash continues unabated. Witness the recent (March 2009) revival of the debate over the 
teaching of evolution by the Texas School Board. 
84  Stephen Jay Gould, Ever Since Darwin: Reflections in Natural History (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980), p. 
17. All subsequent references are to this edition, hereafter ESD, and will be made in the text. 
85  Richard Dawkins, River Out of Eden (New York: Basic Books, 1995), p. 66, p. 67. All subsequent 
references are to this edition, hereafter RE, and will be made in the text. 
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Similarly, Gould, in the opening chapter of Life’s Grandeur (1996), criticises our anthropocentric 
tendencies through an analysis of the “iconographic tradition of painting successive scenes to 
illustrate the pageant of life through time”:86 
The last few paintings always depict humans, even though we are but one 
species in a small group of  mammals [...] while the greatest successes of  
mammalian evolution – bats, rats, and antelopes – remain invisible. [...] If  these 
pageantries only claimed to be illustrating the ancestry of  our tiny human twig 
on life’s tree, then I would not complain[;] (LG, 14) 
 
much as we may love ourselves, Homo Sapiens is not representative, or symbolic, 
of  life as a whole. We are not surrogates for arthropods [...] or exemplars of  
anything either particular or typical. (LG, 15) 
However, despite this criticism of anthropocentrism we see that the exclusion of man from these 
texts is impossible. We can compare this with Gillian Beer’s observation, in her seminal work 
Darwin’s Plots, that there is in Darwin’s treatise an ostensible removal, an absenting, of man; man 
is not the subject of the Origin, and this fact undermined the prevailing contemporary conception 
of man as the centre of the natural world. In a chapter entitled ‘Fit and Misfitting: 
Anthropomorphism and the Natural Order’, Beer argues that Darwin deliberately downplayed 
the implications of his theory for man’s position in the natural world by excluding man from the 
text of The Origin:  
Man is a determining absence in the argument of  The Origin of  Species. In the 
first edition he appears only once as the subject of  direct enquiry; that 
appearance is in the Conclusion of  the work and is cast in the future tense. [...] 
Any enquiry into the implications for man of  Darwin’s ideas is held beyond the 
bounds of  the text. (DP, 58-9) 
Citing letters from Darwin to Wallace and Jenyns that reveal that Darwin intended to “avoid the 
whole subject [of man]”, Beer notes that “the avoidance of the topic of man is, according to 
Darwin, tactical” (DP, 59) and argues that it is this absence, and hence the implied demotion of 
man from his position at the pinnacle of a hierarchy of plant and animals kingdoms, that made 
The Origin “deeply disquieting”: “The absence of any specific reference to man as the crowning 
achievement of the natural and supernatural order made the text subversive” (DP, 60). Removing 
man formed part of Darwin’s attempt “to subdue the hierarchical nature of man’s thought which 
places himself always at the pinnacle or centre” (DP, 60).  
 
                                                 
86  Stephen Jay Gould, Life’s Grandeur: The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin (London: Vintage, 1996), 
p. 9. All subsequent references are to this edition, hereafter LG, and will be made in the text. 
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The inherent anthropocentrism of language, however, precludes the complete exclusion of man. 
Beer argues that despite Darwin’s “decision to exclude man from his discussion” (DP, 61), man is 
present in the text, and not merely as an inevitable consequence of the fact that, as she has 
identified elsewhere, “writing is itself the inscription of human distinctiveness”.87 Darwin effects 
a strategic re-insertion of man that does not involve a re-centring, but ranges man alongside all 
the other forms of life, supporting Darwin’s view of man’s kinship with the rest of the natural 
world. Certainly for Beer, “language is anthropocentric, persistently drawing the human back to 
the centre of meaning”,88 but the presence of man in The Origin is more strategic than this: “man 
is a familiar in The Origin though concealed in its interstices” (DP, 61). Beer believes this 
concealment to be deliberate and strategic:  “Without his [Darwin’s] analysing or needing to 
analyse his reasons, therefore, there seem to have been as good social as there were religious 
reasons for Darwin to attempt to conceal man in the interstices of his text” (DP, 63). 
 
Man may never be the subject of enquiry in The Origin, but he is frequently present as “the second 
term in metaphors” (DP, 60). The metaphorical yoking of the animal kingdom with man implies 
the continuum between the two that was central to Darwin’s theory. Beer asks “Is the sub-text of 
The Origin simply unavoidably full of human reference (because cast in human language) or is it 
knowingly, even strategically, so? And if so, to what ends?” (DP, 62). Clearly for Beer this sub-
text is strategic; through such references Darwin “sought to restore man to his kinship with all 
other forms of life” (DP, 63). 
 
Just as in The Origin, man is present in popular science accounts of evolution, such as those of 
Dawkins and Gould, in the form of anthropomorphic metaphors. The suggestion of 
consciousness and motive, which I will term ‘intentionalism’, involved, for example, in describing 
genes as ‘selfish’, draws man back to the centre of meaning.89 The significance of this re-centring 
of man is that, as we shall see, this is part of a larger representation of evolution as essentially 
teleological or progressive: man comes to be figured as the end-point or goal of evolution, a fact 
that lends to the process of evolution a suggestion of inevitability. That anthropocentrism 
identified by Freud – the human arrogance that sees man as the pinnacle of evolution – has deep 
roots, and is not weeded out by Darwin’s intervention.  
                                                 
87  Beer, Open Fields, p. 155. 
88  Ibid. 
89  It is ironic that Dawkins’s own concerns over the accuracy of the title focus rather on the concept of 
the gene, vaguely “defined as a piece of chromosome which is sufficiently short for it to last, 
potentially, for long enough for it to function as a significant unit of natural selection” (SG, 36). 
Suggesting alternative, more accurate titles, Dawkins revises this word, but the word ‘selfish’ remains: 
“To be strict, this book should be called not The Selfish Cistron nor The Selfish Chromosome, but The slightly 
selfish big bit of chromosome and the even more selfish little bit of chromosome. To say the least this is not a catchy 
title.” (SG, 33). 
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Despite Dawkins’s deliberate attempts to distance himself from literal readings of the phrase 
‘selfish gene’, reviewers have been struck by the intentionalism of Dawkins’s title.90 Mary Midgley 
memorably opened her polemical review of Dawkins’s book by announcing that “[g]enes cannot 
be selfish or unselfish, any more than atoms can be generous, elephants abstract, or biscuits 
teleological”.91 Midgley’s review is more sophisticated than many, and the objection to the idea of 
‘selfish genes’ is not a mistaken literal reading but rather, as she explains in a later article, an 
objection to the use of “the term selfish [...] which centres its normal meaning on motive, not on a 
fixed range of acts”.92 She cites Dawkins’s defence that “it [the word ‘selfish’] is, he says, a 
harmless, well-known technical term” used in a “special, restricted sense” but she objects that “a 
restricted sense ought to be one which forms part of the normal meaning of the word. It cannot be 
one which falls, as this does, right outside it”.93 
 
Her objections, as she realises, should be aimed more generally than simply at Dawkins: “this 
question should be put to a whole school of biologists”.94 But even this is not broad enough – for 
the problem of language that is suggestive of motive, intention or consciousness is pervasive 
throughout the sciences. In his defence of metaphorically intentionalist language Dawkins could 
have legitimately quoted Darwin’s response, from the Preface to the third edition of The Origin, to 
similar criticism:  
In the literal sense of  the word, no doubt, natural selection is a misnomer; but 
whoever objected to chemists speaking of  the elective affinities of  the various 
elements? – and yet an acid cannot strictly be said to elect the base with which 
it will in preference combine [...W]ho objects to an author speaking of  the 
attraction of  gravity as ruling the movements of  the planets? Everyone knows 
what is meant and is implied by such metaphorical expressions; and they are 
almost necessary for brevity.95 
The phrase ‘natural selection’ is indeed a misnomer, pulling in two directions simultaneously: the 
word ‘selection’ implies consciousness, an implication that is counteracted, but not eradicated, by 
the word ‘natural’. The image of a “Blind Watchmaker”, used in another Dawkins title, reveals a 
similar dynamic – the consciousness implied by the image of a watchmaker is not really negated 
by the fact of his blindness. In The Blind Watchmaker, Dawkins opens a chapter with a discussion 
                                                 
90  See SG, 47 and 50-1; and UR, 189. 
91  Mary Midgley, ‘Gene-Juggling’, Philosophy, 54 (1979), 439-58, (p. 439). 
92  Mary Midgley, ‘Selfish Genes and Social Darwinism’, Philosophy, 58 (1983), 365-77, (p. 367). 
93  Ibid. 
94  Ibid. 
95  From Darwin’s Preface added to the 3rd Edition. Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species: A Variorum Text, 
ed. by Morse Peckham (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959), p. 165. 
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of the Argument from Good Design, beginning: “Natural selection is the blind watchmaker, 
blind because it does not see ahead, does not plan consequences, has no purpose in view”. (BW, 
24) There are considerable problems with a rhetoric that rejects the Argument from Intelligent 
Design, replacing the intelligent designer with the process of natural selection, but in doing so re-
associates this non-conscious process with a conscious designer through the metaphor of the 
‘blind watchmaker’; and not just any conscious designer – the image of the watchmaker, of 
course, is from Paley’s Natural Theology (1802), the most well known exposition of the Argument 
of Good Design.96 Put simply, just as ‘natural’ does not remove the idea of intention inherent in 
‘selection’, the modifying adjective ‘blind’ does not remove the element of consciousness. But 
beyond the attribution of consciousness there is here an additional element of anthropocentrism, 
as the metaphorical creator or designer in this case is not a deity, but a ‘watchmaker’; in this 
metaphor the creator, natural selection, is cast in man’s image. Man is not merely reinstated as at 
the centre of God’s creation, but is imaged as the creator himself. 
 
Unlike in Darwin’s Origin, it is not left to anthropomorphic metaphors to reintroduce man into 
Dawkins’s and Gould’s texts; man is also more explicitly reinserted. He is present not merely as 
the second term in metaphors, but also as a direct subject of enquiry. Both writers follow Darwin 
in their rejection of anthropocentrism; but unlike Darwin, man, far from being a ‘determining 
absence’, is instead a determining presence. The explicit aim of their books is to expound a 
particular element or reinterpretation of evolutionary theory; but the subsequent application of 
theory to the specific case of humankind is an important element in both writers’ works. It is 
tempting to speculate that whilst Darwin removed man as the subject of enquiry in the Origin to 
shift the focus away from some of the controversial implications of his theory, man is implicitly 
the subject of most current popular science writing in the field of evolutionary biology precisely 
because the application of evolutionary theory to man seems controversial, and is therefore more 
marketable.97 Dawkins’s final chapter of the 1976 edition of The Selfish Gene, in which he coins the 
term ‘meme’ for the cultural equivalent of a gene, begins “[s]o far, I have not talked much about 
man in particular, though I have not deliberately excluded him either”; he goes on to apply the 
theory of gene-level selection, elaborated in the previous chapters, to culture, the one thing that, 
for Dawkins, “is unusual about man”.98 In the last chapter of River Out of Eden Dawkins again 
                                                 
96  William Paley, Paley’s Watchmaker: An Abridged Version of William Paley’s Natural Theology, ed. and intro. 
by Bill Cooper (Chichester: New Wine Press, 1997). 
97  That there is this correlation between controversy and publishing success is difficult to prove, but the 
blurb for the Penguin edition of The Blind Watchmaker, for example, advertises the book as “brilliant 
and controversial”. Similarly, it is conspicuous that Penguin chose for the front of Wonderful Life, a 
book primarily about palaeontology and the Burgess Shale, an excerpt from the Sunday Times review 
that describes the book as “a milestone in man’s view of himself”. 
98  Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), Ch. 11. 
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turns his attention more explicitly to man, briefly discussing various cultural ‘thresholds’ such as 
the “Language Threshold”, “Cooperative Technology Threshold”, “Radio Threshold” and 
“Space Travel Threshold” (RE, 157-160). Similarly, Gould in Life’s Grandeur proposes a general 
model for “view[ing] trends in an entirely different way: as changes in variation within complete 
systems” (LG, 1),  and then applies this model to two examples: one is the “resolution of the 
problem of progress in the history of life” (LG, 2); the other the unashamedly anthropocentric 
(not to say nationally specific – Gould includes “A Baseball Primer for British Readers”) subject 
of “the disappearance of 0.400 hitting in baseball” (LG, 1). 
 
This tendency to explicitly elucidate the implications for mankind of any specific aspect of 
evolutionary theory can be seen as moving towards the anthropocentrism which Dawkins and 
Gould criticise in, say, iconographic representations of evolution. It is an understandable 
tendency: readers want to read about their own origins. It has been observed that popular science 
books on cosmology and evolutionary biology outnumber those on other fields because they 
purport to explain the origins of, respectively, the universe and life on earth – and therefore also 
to explain our own existence. Again, savvy publishers are aware of this: the back cover of the 
Harper Perrenial edition of Matt Ridley’s Nature via Nurture carries the question “What makes us 
who we are?” in large letters; the blurb for The Blind Watchmaker, already cited, ends with “the 
biggest question of all: why do we exist?” (BW, back cover); the first chapter of Dawkins’s The 
Selfish Gene is entitled “Why are people? (SG, 1); and both the blurb and chapter headings of 
Johnjoe McFadden’s Quantum Evolution are replete with such rhetorical questions – “How did life 
start?”, “How did we get here?”, “What does it all mean?”.99  
 
The reinsertion of man back into the popular accounts of Dawkins and Gould, both explicitly as 
the subject of enquiry and also through anthropomorphic metaphors, can be seen as working 
against the resistance on the part of both Dawkins and Gould to the idea of ‘progressive’ 
evolution. Both writers explicitly, and frequently, dismiss the idea of progressive evolution in the 
sense of improvement through evolutionary time. This rejection of progressive, teleological 
evolution requires the demotion of man from his perceived position at the end or peak of 
evolutionary improvement, but the presence of man in these texts implies his continuing 
centrality. In the next section I will examine in more detail this resistance to a teleological bias, 
and will argue that despite a conspicuous denial of teleology, a process of exclusion and 
reinstatement is again at work: just as man re-enters the texts despite attempts to resist an 
                                                 
99  Ridley, Nature via Nurture, back cover; Johnjoe McFadden, Quantum Evolution (London: HarperCollins, 
2000), inside front cover, Chapter 4 title, Chapter 9 title.  
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anthropocentric perspective, so the notion of progress evolution re-asserts itself despite the 
rejection of a teleology of evolutionary improvement. 
 
 
5.2.1 Teleology 
 
Gould dedicates one of his essays in his collection Ever Since Darwin to a discussion of 
iconographies of evolution: the popular conception of gradual evolutionary progress as a ‘ladder’, 
to which he opposes his own view of evolution based on rapid, possibly allopatric, speciation 
followed by decimation or mass extinction, a process that he images as a ‘bush’. His point, made 
in reference to the problem of reconstructing the evolution of modern man, is a resistance to the 
notion of evolutionary ‘progress’: 
Evolution usually proceeds by ‘speciation’ [...] not by the slow and steady 
transformation of  these large parental stocks. Repeated episodes of  speciation 
produce a bush. Evolutionary ‘sequences’ are not rungs on a ladder, but our 
retrospective reconstruction of  a circuitous path [...] from the base of  the bush 
to a lineage now surviving at its top (ESD, 61)  
Gould elaborates on this short essay in the first chapter of Wonderful Life, entitled ‘The 
Iconography of an Expectation’, examining images of the ‘march of progress’ associated with the 
gradual and progressive ‘ladder’ view of evolution and also the classic image of the ‘tree of life’.100 
Both systems of iconography, Gould contests, are “chosen to validate our hopes of predictable 
progress”: the ‘march of progress’ clearly depicts the gradual improvement of life towards its 
culmination, man; likewise, the “conventional iconography [of the tree of life] has fastened upon 
a primary model, the ‘cone of increasing diversity’, an upside-down Christmas tree. Life begins 
with the simple and progresses ever upward to more and more and, by implication, better and 
better” (WL, 38). Gould isolates more precisely the slippage in the ‘cone of increasing diversity’ 
as a conflation of meanings: the vertical axis on a cone ostensibly represents time, but “we also 
read upward movement as simple to complex, or primitive to advanced” (Ibid.). 
 
Although it is Gould who is frequently held up, and as frequently holds himself up, as a 
representative of this view of non-progressive evolution (possibly because of confusion with 
Gould’s origination of the idea of evolution as non-gradual, what he and Eldredge termed 
                                                 
100  Stephen Jay Gould, Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1991), chapter 1. All subsequent references are to this edition, hereafter WL, and will be made 
in the text. 
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‘punctuated equilibrium’),101 this resistance is present from the beginning of evolutionary theory. 
Darwin struggled with it, writing a note in his copy of Robert Chambers’s The Vestiges of Creation 
reminding himself to “Never use the words ‘higher’ and ‘lower’”, and so identifying the same 
connotations of the vertical hierarchy as Gould.102 Dawkins similarly rejects the idea of 
evolutionary ‘improvement’, concisely noting in The Blind Watchmaker that “[l]ife isn’t like that. 
Evolution has no long-term goal. There is no long-distance target, no final perfection to serve as 
a criterion for selection, although human vanity cherishes the absurd notion that our species is 
the final goal of evolution” (BW, 61). This observation also shows clearly the connection between 
the teleology of progress, the perception of a “long-term goal” for evolution, and the “human 
vanity” of anthropocentrism; the obverse of this is that the re-centring of man in popular biology 
texts is an important part of the reinstatement of a teleology of evolution. 
 
Earlier in this chapter I argued, quoting from The Blind Watchmaker, that there were problems 
with denying the Argument from Intelligent Design with an anthropomorphic metaphor that 
brings into presence the very conscious and intelligent designer Dawkins seeks to deny. 
Returning to this sentence – “Natural selection is the blind watchmaker, blind because it does not 
see ahead, does not plan consequences, has no purpose in view” (BW, 24) – it is clear that there is 
an even more striking problem in terms of Dawkins’s rejection of a teleology of evolutionary 
progress. The combination of the blindness of the watchmaker and the (dead) metaphors of 
vision for forward planning – “see ahead”, “purpose in view” – result in the desired implication 
that natural selection does not plan ahead. But this does not remove the fact that a watchmaker, 
blind or otherwise and unlike natural selection, does have a “purpose”, does “plan 
consequences”, does (to use another metaphor of vision) have foresight. Paley chose his example 
well: purpose is inherent in the example of the watchmaker – the purpose of a watchmaker is, 
quite simply, to make watches. In other words, the watchmaker literally ‘embodies’ the idea of 
improvement or progress. Just as anthropomorphic metaphors re-centre man despite the 
criticism of the anthropocentric perspective, so here the metaphor works against the explicit 
statement of the non-purposiveness of evolution. The image of the watchmaker at least partially 
reinstates the notion of design and purpose and thus a teleology of increasing perfection. 
 
                                                 
101  N. Eldredge and S.J. Gould, ‘Punctuated Equilibria: An alternative to phyletic gradualism’ in Models in 
Paleobiology, ed. by T.J.M. Schopf (San Francisco: Freeman Cooper, 1972) pp. 82-115. 
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If metaphors may – but do not necessarily – imply the idea of progress towards an end goal, then 
narrative, almost by necessity, does.103 Narrative normally contains not simply the idea of 
progress in the sense of “Motion forwards, as opposed to rest or regress; advance” but the sense 
of progress towards an end point.104 As a narrative develops “the choices become more and more 
limited and the final choice seems not a choice at all but an inevitability”.105 The paradigmatic 
example is detective or mystery fiction – which, interestingly, often provides a model for popular 
science writing: to borrow the rhetoric of Good Designers, detective stories reveal the existence 
of a designer.106 I want to examine here one particular narrative often constructed by popular 
science writers, and interesting in its own right, but one that can also be seen to play an important 
part in suggesting the inevitable progress of evolution in the texts I have already examined in this 
section.  
 
Ron Curtis, in his article ‘Narrative Form and Normative Force: Baconian Story-telling in Popular 
Science’, sees a “close formal analogy between the narrative of resolution and this method [of 
induction by elimination]”, and argues that the construction of narratives in popular science 
writing “is a way to moralize while appearing only to describe”: as the writer’s “interpretation and 
emplotment slips out of notice, so also – if to narrate is to moralize – do his normative 
judgements, which are therefore not readily open to criticism”.107 The result is that “only one 
theory of science [Baconian induction by elimination] is readily but tacitly expressed and 
endorsed, not only to a popular audience but also as part of a continuing debate among scientists 
themselves”.108 A normative account or science is written into these narratives.  
 
It is this normative narrative of scientific discovery that I would like to examine, an account that 
presents the cumulative, progressive and improving state of scientific knowledge. However, my 
argument goes beyond that presented by Ron Curtis: I argue that this normative narrative of 
science represents a teleology of progress that, in popular science writing on evolutionary theory, 
takes the place of and is conflated with evolutionary adaptation. Science becomes an end-point of 
evolutionary progress. The popular science books that I focus on construct normative narratives 
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of scientific discovery; but they also isolate the idea of scientific self-knowledge as a telos of the 
progression of both scientific discovery and also, by a fundamental slippage, of evolutionary 
progress. The two systems are conflated and the teleology of scientific progress – which ends 
with self-knowledge and that particular form of self knowledge that is awareness of our own 
origins, the discovery of evolutionary theory – is exported back into the realm of evolutionary 
theory itself. 
 
Of course, to a degree, this normative narrative of scientific discovery can be identified in 
professional science writing as well as in popular science writing. On the level of both individual 
‘discoveries’ and also on the larger scale of the history of scientific progress, both popular and 
professional science writing is frequently involved in the construction of a linear narrative of 
progress. Peter Medawar has observed that “the scientific paper is a fraud in the sense that it 
does give a totally misleading narrative of the processes of thought that go into making a 
scientific discovery”.109 Greg Myers, in a chapter entitled ‘Making a Discovery: Narratives of Split 
Genes’, focuses on how a “discovery narrative” enters into popular interpretations of scientific 
research, “between texts, in the interpretation of one text by another, as a process of reading as 
well as writing”, creating a story with an easily identifiable ‘eureka moment’.110 Myers takes it for 
granted that a level of narrative distortion has already taken place by the time of the scientific 
paper: “It doesn’t worry me here that all research reports are idealized versions of what went on 
in the lab”.111 The initial distortion is a movement away from a narrative of discovery, removing 
essential narrative elements – historical chronology, actors, and audiences; in popular science 
writing these elements are often reintroduced to recreate an, albeit partially fictional, narrative. 
On the level of the history of science the same process of portraying a progressive narrative takes 
place. Thomas S. Kuhn, for example, has noted that text-books and popularisations reveal “a 
persistent tendency to make the history of science look linear and cumulative”.112  
 
In the case of popular science writing it is tempting to dismiss the tendency to create narratives 
of discovery as merely an attempt to make popular accounts more readable, but recall Leane’s 
warning that “it is naive to dismiss the narrative structure of science popularizations as mere 
pedagogical scaffolding”.113 Narratives, like metaphors, play a far more significant role in the 
                                                 
109  P.B. Medawar, ‘Is the Scientific Paper a Fraud?’, in P.B. Medawar, The Threat and the Glory: Reflections on 
Science and Scientists (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), pp. 228-33 (p. 233). 
110  Greg Myers, ‘Making a Discovery: Narratives of  Split Genes’ in Narrative in Culture: The Uses of  
Storytelling in the Sciences, Philosophy and Literature, ed. by Christopher Nash (London: Routledge, 1990), 
pp. 102-26 (pp. 102-3). 
111  Myers, ‘Making a Discovery’, p. 107. 
112  Kuhn, p. 139. 
113  Leane, p. 131. 
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expository process than mere pedagogy – they perpetuate an image of scientific advance as 
“seamless and progressive”.114 Curtis criticises popular science writing’s over-reliance on the 
detective story narrative, advocating more variation in form, and suggesting the Socratic dialogue 
as a viable alternative. Part of his criticism is precisely that “popular science, written in the 
narrative mode, is a powerful tool for promoting a particular normative view of science.”115 Imre 
Lakatos’s Proofs and Refutations, a brilliant example of a dialogic exposition of a theory of scientific 
progress supports this assertion: written as the discussion between a teacher and his pupils – 
Pupil Alpha, Pupil Sigma etc. – this account is precisely anti-normative, identifying the normative 
force of ‘formalism’ which tends to “disconnect the history of mathematics from the philosophy 
of mathematics” and to “identify mathematics with its formal axiomatic abstraction”.116 
 
The reason for the normative force of narrative is, ironically, suggested concisely by Gould 
himself, though in inverted form. Early in Life’s Grandeur he observes that “[w]e are story telling 
creatures, products of history ourselves. We are fascinated by trends, in part because they tell 
stories by the basic device of imparting directionality to time” (LG, 30), and later that “humans 
[...] are trend-seeking creatures (perhaps I should say “storytelling animals,” for what we really 
love is a good tale – and [...] we view trends as stories of the best sort)” (LG, 78-9). But if trends 
are minimal stories, clearly the inverse also applies – stories imply trends. Concentrating for the 
most part on Wonderful Life, I will show how the narratives constructed imply the parallel, and in 
the end conflated, trends of scientific progress and teleological evolution. 
 
Wonderful Life is self-professedly, self-consciously at times, a narrative of scientific discovery. In 
his Preface Gould describes how “[t]he reinterpretation of the Burgess Shale is a story, a grand 
and wonderful story [...] I have come to view this temporal sequence as an intense drama” (WL, 
15). Already inherent in the chronological presentation of the reinterpretation is the idea of a 
scientific revolution, of overthrowing the status quo with a dramatic and brilliant new insight. 
Gould may describe it as “A Quiet Revolution” (WL, 79), but the clichés of painstaking and 
time-consuming hard work, leading to a moment of insight, are still evoked. Gould writes that 
“all the standard images of scientific discovery were violated by the revision of the Burgess Shale. 
All the romantic legends about field work, [...the] weeks of blood, sweat, toil and tears, the 
intrepid scientist [...] the most inaccessible point on the map” (WL, 80) – none of these, Gould 
claims, apply to the reinterpretation of the Burgess Shale. However, numerous examples of 
precisely these descriptions of meticulous study leading to intellectual breakthrough can be found 
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throughout Gould’s narrative. There may be no blood, sweat and tears but we learn that 
Whittington’s expedition “split about seven hundred cubic meters of rock” (WL, 77), that 
Whittington “used the oldest method of all as his primary mode of illustration – patient and 
detailed drawing” (WL, 85), and that Whittington’s “brilliant and eclectic student [...] made a 
systematic search through all the drawers” (WL, 80). Similarly Gould tells us how Whittington 
and his students dissected the fossils “by hand [...] grain by grain or flake by flake” (WL, 88), how 
they spent “countless hours” (WL, 92) mentally rotating the reconstructions, and how “Harry 
Whittington spent four and a half years just writing his first monograph on the genus Marrella” 
(WL, 107). 
 
If Gould is aware of the “standard images of scientific discovery”, he appears even more aware 
of the problems surrounding the depiction of moments of insight. In the standard image, 
following the weeks of field-work, the scientist “splits a rock [...] and cries Eureka! as he spies the 
fossil that will shake the world” (WL, 80). Later Gould is even more self-aware: 
I now come to the fulcrum of  this book. I have half  a mind to switch to upper 
case, or to some snazzy font [...] I am about to describe the key moment in this 
drama, but I am also committed to the historical principle that such moments 
do not exist. [...] Key moments are kid stuff. [...] I have laboured to master all 
the details and to arrange them in proper order. How can I now blow all this 
effort on the myth of  eureka? (WL, 129-30) 
Yet Gould cannot quite resist the construction of, as he puts it, “a Rubicon of sorts” (WL, 129). 
Gould describes this ‘moment’ in a pair of sentences: the first establishes an expectation, presents 
the information that the reader will require in order to appreciate whether or not there has been a 
‘discovery’; the second reveals the reality, the overthrowing of the expectation, and by implication 
the intellectual status quo: 
So Harry dissected, in full confidence that he would find the jointed 
appendages of  an arthropod. Harry dissected – and he found nothing under the 
carapace. (WL, 131) 
Gould may not use upper case, but instead he switches to italics; he also moves, in the space of 
the previous paragraph, from calling his protagonist Whittington, to Harry Whittington, to Harry. 
Moreover, the first sentence constructs Harry Whittington as “the perfect fool, with no 
preconceptions”, not expecting to overturn conventional classification of the Opabinia fossil; the 
result is that his discovery is all the more objective, an essential element in Gould’s narrative, 
because it contrasts with Walcott’s ‘shoehorn’ – a result of preconceived ideas. Finally, it is to be 
presumed that the dissection of the Opabinia fossil, especially given the time-consuming nature of 
 129 
the work described elsewhere, took days, probably weeks. In Gould’s narrative of the ‘moment of 
discovery’, this length of time, the gradual realisation that must have dawned on Whittington, is 
compressed into an all-encompassing dash.  
 
There is the suggestion in Gould’s narrative of a fluctuation between his resistance to the idea of 
these key moments of discovery, and his construction of a narrative in which they figure as part 
of the advancement or progress of science. This is in evidence in his attitude towards 
Whittington’s monograph on Opabinia: he first describes it as “one of the great documents in the 
history of human knowledge” (WL, 136) but almost immediately pulls back to a less 
sensationalist position – “Opabinia, just one case, is a shrug of the shoulders, not a discovery 
about life in general” (WL, 136). The same tension can be seen in a single sentence later in 
Wonderful Life: “But science is cumulative, for all its backings and forthings, ups and downs” (WL, 
207). This same normative narrative of linear progressive science also surfaces in Dawkins’s 
books. For example, he summarises the progress of the “remarkable theory [of the bacterial 
origin of mitochondria] championed by the redoubtable Lynn Margulis of the University of 
Massachusetts at Amherst, from heterodox origins, through grudging interest to triumphant near-
universal acceptance today” (RE, 45). Here, the three-stage progression emphasises the linearity 
of scientific advancement. 
 
One of the most striking pieces of evidence that there is a, as it were, ‘covert’ narrative of linear 
scientific advancement in Wonderful Life, is also one of the most surprising. Describing Simon 
Conway Morris’s first five monographs on the Burgess Shale’s “curiosities”, Gould reverts to the 
very icon of linear progress that he has often criticised, and to which he has dedicated two 
complete chapters in his books, including one in Wonderful Life itself. Not once, but twice, Gould 
images Conway Morris as climbing “the ladder of evidence”: 
Conway Morris mounted one rung higher on the ladder of  evidence with his 
second treasure of  1976[;] (WL, 147) 
 
Simon’s third mystery animal carried him another rung up the ladder of  
evidence. (WL, 149) 
These remarkable sentences show that the narrative of the reinterpretation of the Burgess Shale is 
one of cumulative improvement, a narrative founded on a teleology of scientific progress.  
 
This story is, however, not the only narrative in Wonderful Life. The history of this scientific study 
is told alongside a narrative of a contingent history of evolution which, Gould claims, is the 
necessary result of the Burgess reinterpretation. In a number of passages these two histories 
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meet, and, to an extent, combine. I will argue that in the partial conflation of these two narratives, 
and through other channels, the teleology of progress associated with scientific advancement 
seeps back into the apparently non-teleological depiction of evolution. At the very beginning of 
the book Gould describes the Burgess Shale as a “window upon that most crucial event in the 
history of animal life” but in the very next sentence notes that “[t]he story of the Burgess Shale is 
also fascinating in human terms” (WL, 24). Similar statements abound: “[This book is] first and 
foremost, a chronicle of the intense intellectual drama behind the outward serenity of this 
reinterpretation. Second, and by unavoidable implication, it is a statement about the nature of 
history and awesome improbability of human evolution” (WL, 24). In the Preface the two 
narratives are drawn into the same sentence, separated by a semi-colon: “Opabinia and company 
constituted the strange and wonderful life of a remote past; they have also imposed the great 
theme of contingency in history upon a science uncomfortable with such concepts” (WL, 14).  
 
This conflation between the narrative of evolution and the narrative of scientific discovery is 
visible in a fairly unsurprising, but revealing, slippage. Scientific study and knowledge, in its 
exalted position, becomes not only a part of, but the culmination of, man’s evolution. This is 
particularly true of scientific self-knowledge, of which the study of evolution, of our own origins, is 
the prime example. In these authors’ books evolutionary theory becomes evolution’s own end-
point, imparting to the theory a teleology which it expressly denies. Dawkins opens his first book, 
The Selfish Gene, with a paragraph that immediately suggests the progress of evolution towards the 
watershed of scientific self-knowledge: 
Intelligent life on a planet comes of  age when it first works out the reason for 
its own existence. If  superior creatures from space ever visit earth, the first 
question they will ask, in order to assess the level of  our civilization, is: ‘Have 
they discovered evolution yet?’ (SG, 1) 
The implication is clear: the theory of evolution is the point towards which intelligent life 
progresses. The next sentence implies the corollary – intelligent life is also the point towards 
which evolution progresses: 
Living organisms had existed on earth, without ever knowing why, for over 
three thousand million years before the truth finally dawned on one of  them. 
(SG, 1) 
In exactly the same way, in Life’s Grandeur, Gould, during a paragraph in which he denies that 
man is representative of mammalian success, still insists that “we are possessors of one 
extraordinary evolutionary invention called consciousness – the factor that permits us, rather 
than any other species, to ruminate about such matters” (LG, 15). This is not quite the grand 
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teleological narrative described by Thomas Lessl, or “a New Epic of Science” in Egers’s phrase, 
in which “[c]osmic evolution, beginning with the big bang, begets chemical evolution, which 
begets biological evolution, which begets human evolution, which begets scientific evolution”.117 
Nonetheless evolution is imagined as moving towards the end point not only of intelligent life, a 
standard anthropocentric attitude, but towards a form of life able to theorise their own origins. 
 
An even more striking example comes from a passage from Wonderful Life that includes many of 
the features of popular science writing that I have sought to elucidate. Gould has been using an 
analogy of an intelligent-designer deity, “the Great Token-Stringer”, putting together parts from a 
“grabbag” of basic anatomical features to form organisms of the diversity of those in the Burgess 
Shale. The end of this section runs: 
Perhaps his [the Great Token-Stringer’s] natural vanity finally got the better of  
him. Perhaps he couldn’t bear the thought of  running such an exquisite play 
for so long, and having no chronicler to admire the work. So he let the token 
for more brain tumble from compartment 1 of  the primate bag – and 
assembled a species that could paint the caves of  Lascaux, frame the glass of  
Chartres, and finally decipher the story of  the Burgess Shale. (WL, 218) 
I would like to identify two implications contained in this passage. The first is that which I have 
observed above in Dawkins and elsewhere in Gould – the figuring of science, and especially 
evolutionary science, as the end-point of evolutionary progress. Here, this implication is 
strengthened by placing scientific study, of the Burgess Shale specifically, at the culmination of a 
three-part progression which runs from Palaeolithic cave art, through the religious art of 
Chartres, “and finally” to scientific study. The reference to Chartres recalls Henry Adams’s 
observation that “All the steam in the world could not, like the Virgin, build Chartres”, but 
inverting Adams’s hierarchy in which science could never represent a force capable of creating 
Chartres cathedral.118 Here Chartres is one point in a chronology that runs from Palaeolithic, 
through Medieval to Modern; but as Gould says of the cones of increasing diversity, we naturally 
conflate movement through time with progress in the sense of ‘advancement’. The second 
implication comes close to embodying a form of the anthropic principle. In, albeit playfully, 
imagining the Great Token-Stringer, representing natural selection, as creating man because he 
wanted a species capable of understanding the process of natural selection itself, evolution is seen 
as a consequence of the need for intelligent life to arise, much as the anthropic principle sees the 
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‘suitability’ of the universe for carbon-based life as a consequence, not a cause, of the need for 
the development of intelligent life.119  
 
Gould and Dawkins’s popular science books reveal, then, a tendency to simultaneously represent 
science as a teleological progression and to evoke scientific self-knowledge, unsurprisingly 
evolutionary theory in particular, as a telos of evolution: science is projected as a linear and 
cumulative advancement towards knowledge, but this knowledge also represents the end-point 
towards which our own evolution progresses. 
 
 
* * * * 
 
As is clear from the earlier analysis of representations of genetics in popular science writing, that 
subject is intimately connected to the degree to which genes can be seen (or said) to ‘cause’ or 
‘determine’ organismal traits. Often in popular science writing, as we have seen, this is an 
uninterrogated assumption; at most, writers may go as far as altering the respective ‘doses’ of 
encoded nature and contingent nurture, but rarely of rejecting the model entirely. In recent 
fiction which has taken an interest in genetics, on the other hand, the assumption of gene-
centrism has often become the basis for ethical and epistemological concern – and as a result, 
interrogation. Thus, if one group of recent fiction writers seized upon the supposedly inherent 
indeterminacy implied by twentieth-century physics (chapter 4) following the lead of popular 
science accounts of quantum mechanics (chapter 3), it is precisely the implication of genetic 
determinism, or a gene-centric account of development, that has interested other writers. Despite 
this contrast, it is once again around issues of causality and determinism that these engagements 
with science have often revolved. It is to these engagements that I will now turn. 
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6 Representing Biological Determinism in  
 Contemporary British Fiction 
 
 
6.1  Representing Genetics 
 
As Patricia Waugh has noted in an excellent chapter on science and fiction in the 1990s, that 
decade saw a shift away from the physics and cosmology that in the 1980s had captivated the 
general public in popular science books and also exercised considerable influence over novelists.1 
If, she claims, the 1980s were the decade of physics then the 1990s saw interest swing towards 
the biological sciences and, with the press coverage of the impending culmination of the Human 
Genome Project, towards genetics in particular. It is no surprise, then, to find novelists 
embracing the topic in the 1990s, and perhaps even more so in the years since the announcement 
of the completion of the sequencing of the human genome in 2000. 
 
In Chapter 4 I showed how by incorporating references to the new physics Ian McEwan’s novels 
repeatedly engage with causality, determinism and inevitability. This connection is paralleled in 
McEwan’s extensive use of the biological sciences in his novels. Saturday establishes many strata 
of determinism, but central is a presentation of the validity of both gene-centrism and reductive 
biological determinism: McEwan’s central protagonist, Perowne, is convinced of the genetic 
cause of Baxter’s condition. As far as he is concerned, Baxter’s fate comes down to: 
Chromosome four [...] an excessive repeat of  a single sequence – CAG. Here’s 
biological determinism in its purest form. More than forty repeats of  that one 
little codon, and you’re doomed. Your future is fixed and easily foretold. 
(Saturday, hereafter S, 93) 
McEwan’s interrogation of biological determinism, and indeed his broader epistemological 
argument, begins by linking the inevitability of the onset of Baxter’s disease to various other 
strata of determinism both within the novel’s plot and outside it. On the simplest level this means 
that Perowne, we might say uncritically, attributes the very particular course of Baxter’s (violent) 
actions after their initial car accident, to the onset of his Huntington’s disease, and therefore to 
genetic, as opposed to environmental, factors. Although Perowne notes that “[violence] is not 
always a pathology; self-interested social organisms find it rational to be violent sometimes” (S, 
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88) (note the “not always [...] sometimes”), at the moment of Baxter’s first punch Perowne 
diagnoses “reduced levels of GABA among the appropriate binding sites on striatal neurons” and 
muses that “there is much in human affairs that can be accounted for at the level of the complex 
molecule” (S, 91). This is strongly reminiscent of Pinker’s description quoted above (Chapter 5.1, 
p. 92) of ‘greedy reductionism’ as the attempt to explain “education, conflict resolution, and 
other social concerns by studying the biophysics of neural membranes or the molecular structure 
of the synapse”.2 
 
Uncritical this reductionist gene-centrism may be, but it is in line with other views (Perowne’s, we 
may presume) expressed elsewhere in the novel. Take, for example, this comment on parenting: 
It’s a commonplace of  parenting and modern genetics that parents have little 
or no influence on the characters of  their children [...] what really determines 
the sort of  person who’s coming to live with you is which sperm finds which 
egg, how the cards in two packs are chosen, then how they are shuffled, halved 
and spliced[.] (S, 25) 
This may be Perowne’s view, but there is evidence even within the novel to the contrary: 
Perowne’s confidence in this apparent commonplace is counterpointed by the important role that 
the children’s maternal grandfather has played in their upbringing. John Grammaticus, the 
‘famous poet’, instilled their artistic callings – music and poetry – in the children. Henry Perowne 
wonders whether he ever could have imagined that he would “one day father a blues musician” 
(S, 26), and although he “showed the nine year old Theo how it [the blues] worked” after that 
“grandfather took over” (S, 27). Likewise, it was Grammaticus who shaped the literary education 
of Daisy, having her learn poems and recite them to him. In the evening, when Theo and Daisy 
enter the room they “present a tableau of their respective obsessions and careers, precious gifts, 
Henry unjealously concedes, from their grandfather: Daisy holds a copy of her bound proof, her 
brother grips his guitar in its case by the neck” (S, 202). Grammaticus’s influence is 
environmental, rather than genetic, and has profoundly shaped the children: blues and poetry are 
now central constituents of their lives and identities. As such, Grammaticus, the poet, contradicts 
the genetic determinism that Perowne, the scientist figure, espouses. 
 
But Perowne’s perspective remains a gene-centric one. Later in the novel, when Baxter returns to 
exact revenge for his earlier humiliation and holds Perowne’s family at knife-point, Perowne 
asserts that it is “the unique disturbances, the individual expression of his condition – 
impulsiveness, poor-self-control, paranoia, mood swings, depression balanced by outbursts of 
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temper, some of this, or all of it and more” that have brought Baxter here, and are “driving 
Baxter on now” (S, 210). Baxter’s violent actions may be unusual, but Perowne still sees them as 
‘expressions’ (a word with strong genetic overtones) of his genetically caused condition. 
 
Given my readings of popular science writing on genetics in the previous chapter it is particularly 
interesting to note how Perowne expresses his conviction in the genetic inevitability of Baxter’s 
condition. In Chapter 5 I showed how popular science writing on genetics frequently utilises the 
metaphor of language, and of writing in particular, to emphasise a level of genetic determinism, 
or gene-centrism; certain forms of texts were shown to be particularly suited to this strategic 
metaphor. In Saturday McEwan, or perhaps Perowne, adopts precisely the same metaphor to 
describe Baxter’s ‘fate’: 
Anyone with significantly more than forty CAG repeats in the middle of  an 
obscure gene on chromosome four is obliged to share this fate in their own 
particular way. It is written. No amount of  love, drugs, Bible classes or prison 
sentencing can cure Baxter or shift him from his course. It’s spelled out in 
fragile proteins, but it could be carved in stone, or tempered steel. (S, 210) 
The writing metaphor emphasises the permanence and fixity of the encoded information, 
enhanced here by the image of the carved stone or steel. Compare this with Matt Ridley’s use of 
the same image, in the service of criticising the gene-centric approach: “genes are not immutable 
things handed down from our parents like Moses’ stone tablets but are active participants in our 
lives”.3 This comparison also highlights not just the gene-centrism, but the connection to a 
fatalism with religious overtones that is picked up again at the very end of the novel: “This is his 
dim, fixed fate, to have one tiny slip, an error of repetition in the codes of his being, in his 
genotype, the modern variant of the soul” (S, 279). “It is written” – the italics draw attention to the 
phrase, underlining the conviction of the statement, but they also illustrate the metaphor – 
Baxter’s fate is written like this, it is as written as this. Going further, the italics testify that Baxter’s 
future is not just written in his genes, but it is also written here, in this novel. Self-consciously 
exposing the textuality of this narrative – of the written nature of Baxter’s life – reveals an 
important aspect of our reading of McEwan’s engagement with science and determinism: a 
certain metafictive awareness of the connection between determinism and narrative. I will return 
to this in a moment. 
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Perowne’s biologically deterministic view is in evidence again towards the end of the novel. 
Seeing through his window the office workers and “the broken figures that haunt the benches” in 
the square outside his house,  
Perowne, the professional reductionist, can’t help thinking it’s down to invisible 
folds and kinks of  character, written in code, at the level of  molecules. (S, 272) 
But in the moment of his greatest fears, Perowne has doubts about the genetic determinism that 
he maintains elsewhere in the novel: 
But for all the reductive arguments, Perowne can’t convince himself  that 
molecules and faulty genes alone are terrorising his family and have broken his 
father-in-law’s nose. Perowne himself  is also responsible. He humiliated Baxter 
in the street in front of  his sidekicks[.](S, 210) 
This hints at an alternative causality, one based not on genetic, biological or pathological 
determinism, but on a responsibility for our conscious decisions. The words ‘responsible’ and 
‘terrorizing’ would seem to link this alternative argument to the novel’s political dimension: the 
anti-war marchers, we might suggest, are aware that the consequences of actions must be 
weighed. At the very end of the novel Perowne again acknowledges his responsibility: “He’s 
responsible, after all; twenty hours ago he drove across a road officially closed to traffic, and set 
in train a sequence of events.” Perowne decides to drop the charges against Baxter and ensure 
that he is provided with good care as his condition deteriorates. Contrary to the biologically 
deterministic perspective, Perowne knows that “the difference between good and bad care is 
near-infinite” and that this “is one area where Henry can exercise authority and shape events” (278, 
my italics). Baxter’s fate is not entirely ‘in his genes’, and Perowne can, to a limited extent, affect 
it.  
 
* * * * 
 
If the Human Genome Project was one catalyst for novelists’ interest in genetics in the 1990s and 
2000s, the successful cloning by Ian Wilmut and his colleagues of Dolly the Sheep, the first 
mammal to be cloned from an adult somatic cell, was surely another. Although she makes no 
explicit reference to Dolly, the news of Dolly’s birth in July 1996 must surely have been an 
influence for Margaret Atwood who had, by the time she started writing Oryx and Crake (2003) in 
March 2001, already “been clipping small items from the back pages of newspapers for years, and 
noting with alarm that trends derided ten years ago as paranoid fantasies had become 
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possibilities, then actualities”.4 Cloning, and genetic modification – ‘crosses’ of, say, pigs and 
baboons – are a central part of the dystopian society in Oryx and Crake, but also the key to 
Crake’s ‘children’, a breed of ‘improved’ humans who will re-populate the earth – a genetically 
engineered genesis.5  
 
Clones, or ‘fabricants’, are also the focus of Somni~451’s story, one of the six interlocking 
narratives in David Mitchell’s Cloud Atlas (2004), and of Kathy H.’s account of her life in Kazuo 
Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go (2005).6 In both novels, clones represent an underclass controlled by 
and for the benefit of non-cloned society: in Cloud Atlas, Somni~451 and the other clones take 
on the menial jobs in a distant future society; in Ishiguro’s sinister vision of a 1990s Britain 
“somewhat adjacent to the one we know”, set “not in a Britain-yet-to-come, but in a Britain-off-
to-the-side” as Margaret Atwood puts it, clones are kept as organ ‘donors’ for society.7 
 
In both Cloud Atlas and Never Let Me Go, the links between human cloning and determinism are 
strong. Both novels enact (and, interestingly, ventriloquize) the coming to consciousness of 
clones – the realisation of the pre-determined state of their lives; in both novels too the clones – 
Somni~451 in Cloud Atlas and Kathy H. and Tommy in Never Let Me Go – attempt to break free 
from their fates, and in both cases their attempts are essentially futile. Somni’s story takes the 
form of an interview with an archivist conducted, we quickly learn, before Somni’s “xecution in 
the Lighthouse” (CA, 189), and tells how she was rescued from the determined world of her 
serving job by anti-cloning terrorists. We follow her as she ‘ascends’ from her drug induced 
intellectual apathy, leaves her dinery prison and joins the terrorist organisation Union to act as a 
fabricant ambassador: we see the transformation in her life as a shift from the completely 
determined monotony of her serving life to what appears to be greater freedom and free will. As 
her story draws to a close, however, we learn that the transformation is an illusion, a fact which 
has been subtly signalled at the very moment of the hinge in her narrative, when Somni is given a 
(Hobson’s) choice by the Unionman Mr Chang:  
I could leave the dinery that morning, go Outside and repay my Investment in 
a new way; or I could remain in Papa Song’s [...] and wait for my ascension to 
                                                 
4 Margaret Atwood, ‘Perfect Storm: Writing Oryx and Crake’. 
5  Margaret Atwood, Oryx and Crake (New York: Anchor Books, 2004). 
6 David Mitchell, Cloud Atlas (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 2004); Kazuo Ishiguro, Never Let Me Go 
(London: Faber and Faber, 2005). All subsequent references are to these editions, hereafter CA and 
NLMG, and will be made in the text.  
7 James Wood, ‘The Human Difference’, review of  Kazuo Ishiguro, Never Let Me Go in The New Republic 
Online, 12 May 2005 <http://www.powells.com/review/2005_05_12.html> [accessed 10 April 2010]; 
Margaret Atwood, ‘Brave New World’, review of  Kazuo Ishiguro, Never Let Me Go in Slate, 1 April 
2005 <http://www.slate.com/id/2116040> [accessed 10 April 2010]. 
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be brought to lite and to suffer its consequences. 
 
Not much of  a choice. 
It was the first choice of  my life, and simpler than most since. 
     (CA, 208) 
At the culmination of her story, Somni describes her capture by Unanimity, the state police, and 
we learn that even the apparently free life she has led since leaving the dinery was in fact scripted, 
pre-determined for the purpose of propaganda: 
You are implying that you xpected the raid, Somni?  
Once I had finished my manifesto, the next stage could only be my arrest. 
 
What do you mean? What ‘next stage’ of  what? 
Of  the theatrical production, set up while I was still a server in Papa Song’s. 
 
[....] 
 
Do you regret the course of  your life?  
How can I? ‘Regret’ implies a freely chosen, but erroneous, action; free will 
plays no part in my story. 
     (CA, 363, 365) 
The dynamics of free will and determinism in Cloud Atlas are mostly played out against a 
backdrop of Nietzschian ‘will to power’ rather than of deterministic science. Thus Somni’s fated 
life, pre-determined for her, is as much a consequence of her enslavement and the scripting of 
her life by the dominant powers in her society, as it is of her genetic makeup. But the ‘genoming’ 
of the fabricants, the genetic alterations made to them, is a crucial part of society’s control over 
them. As Somni herself points out “[a]s a fabricant xpires after forty-eight hours without a highly 
genomed Soap [fabricant food] whose manufacture and supply is the Corp’s monopoly, ‘it’ will 
not run away” (CA, 341). Of course, genoming is simply a technologically advanced form of 
control – a similar system is devised, in an echo of the kind typical of Cloud Atlas, by the 
nineteenth-century missionaries of Bethlehem on Raiatea, who have “instill[ed] in the slothful so-
an’-sos [Polynesians] a gentle craving for this harmless leaf [tobacco]” to “give him an incentive 
to earn money, so he can buy his baccy [...] from the Mission trading-post” (CA, 501). 
 
Never Let Me Go tells the story of a group of childhood friends. The details of the gossip and 
relationships at their school are wonderfully banal, but are set against a backdrop of bleak 
inevitability: as the narrative progresses it becomes clear that the fates of these friends are 
predetermined – as clones they live to provide organs for non-cloned members of society. 
Towards the end of the novel the narrator Kathy H and her lover Tommy come to believe 
rumours that their ‘donations’ can be delayed because they are in love. The rumour is unfounded 
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– the course of their life cannot be diverted. As James Wood sees in his review of Never Let Me 
Go, the completely predetermined nature of the cloned children’s lives is really an allegory for the 
futility of our own:  
Their [the cloned children’s] lives have been written in advance, they are 
prevented and followed, in the words of  The Book of  Common Prayer. Their 
freedom is a tiny hemmed thing, their lives a vast stitch-up. 
 
We begin the novel horrified by their difference from us and end it thoughtful 
about their similarity to us. After all, heredity writes a great deal of  our destiny 
for us [...].8 
If the clones are genetically (and to a degree socially) determined, then it is only an extension of 
the ways in which we are ourselves. Clones seem to represent genetically determined beings par 
excellence (though they are not, perhaps, any more so than twins), but if genetic determinism holds, 
it holds for us as well.  
 
The connection between narrative and determinism that is evident in these novels can also be 
seen in Saturday, in Perowne’s realisation of the inevitability of Baxter’s arrival at the Perowne 
house in the novel’s second major confrontation: 
It is, of  course, logical that Baxter is here. For a few seconds, Perowne’s only 
thought is stupidly that: of  course. It makes sense. Nearly all the elements of  his 
day are assembled; it only needs his mother, and Jay Strauss to appear with his 
squash racket. (S, 206) 
Within the diegesis, Perowne’s feeling – ‘Of course!’ – is one we might recognise. But looking 
from a perspective outside the narrative (this metafictive perspective is again signalled by the 
typographical change to italics) it is indeed logical that Baxter has returned to centre stage; and 
the feeling of the designed assembly of Perowne’s day is also unsurprising – McEwan is, after all, 
bringing together the narrative elements required for his dramatic denouement. Given the drama 
of the climactic scene, Henry’s game of squash with his colleague Jay Strauss and his visit to his 
mother, might initially seem like interruptions to the novel’s narrative. But, with Perowne’s 
realisation that their appearance would complete the assemblage, McEwan draws them back into 
the narrative, asserting the role that they play.  
 
Perowne’s game of squash with Jay Strauss complements and extends his violent exchange with 
Baxter that immediately precedes it. In many ways, it is the narrative’s proxy for Baxter’s reaction 
to his humiliation. Consistently following, as it does, Henry Perowne’s passage through his day, 
                                                 
8 James Wood, ‘The Human Difference’. 
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the narrative cannot examine Baxter’s own thoughts: as a result, the chain of events that links 
Perowne’s earlier encounter with Baxter with the finale is kept from the reader. The aftermath of 
that altercation is instead represented in the surrogate of the squash game. The frustration of 
defeat, and the anger that stems from such a defeat, is made apparent by, and to, Perowne; the 
game enacts the similar and simultaneous ‘off-stage’ emotions of Baxter. As such, the inevitability 
of Baxter’s return is not signalled in the narrative (we do not see Baxter deciding that he will go 
to Perowne’s house) – but that inevitability is later apparent to Perowne, and is signalled in the 
formal system of the novel.  
 
This strict form acknowledges the determinism of narrative itself. By having Perowne realise the 
relevance, or at least the connectedness, of the day’s events McEwan draws back the veil to reveal 
that this highly formal circadian novel has a narrative inevitability or determinism, even 
predictability – and he does so at the point at which he most needs to maintain the plausibility of 
the narrative. This same flaunting of implausibility occurs during the finale, at the precise 
moment that Baxter may or may not have been affected by Daisy’s reading: 
his grip on the knife looks slacker, and his posture, the peculiar yielding angle 
of  his spine, suggests a possible ebbing of  intent. Could it happen, is it within 
the bounds of  the real, that a mere poem of  Daisy’s could precipitate a mood 
swing? (S, 221) 
Given the fragility of this moment’s plausibility, the phrase “within the bounds of the real” 
daringly risks collapsing the delicate realism. On one level, that of the diegesis, this is Perowne’s 
question; on another it is McEwan’s – Saturday “poses the question: what does literature do?”, or 
as Deryn Rees-Jones frames it, “What are poems for?”.9 At other moments in the novel we can 
hear a similar intrusion of McEwan’s voice through Perowne’s thoughts – often when Perowne 
contemplates literature: 
Unlike in Daisy’s novels [recommendations to Perowne from his daughter], 
moments of  precise reckoning are rare in real life; questions of  
misinterpretation are not often resolved. Nor do they remain pressingly 
unresolved. They simply fade. (S, 156) 
Unlike the previous example, this is rather more difficult to interpret. The simplest reading might 
attribute this to what we could call Perowne’s ‘literary scepticism’: literature, as I will show in a 
                                                 
9 David Amigoni, ‘“The Luxury of  Storytelling”: Science, Literature and Cultural Contest in Ian 
McEwan’s Narrative Practice’ in Science and Literature, ed. by Sharon Rushton (English Association: 
Boydell and Brewer, 2008), pp. 151-67 (p. 161); Deryn Rees-Jones, ‘Fact and Artefact: Poetry, Science, 
and a Few Thoughts on Ian McEwan’s Saturday’, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 30 (2005), 331-40 (p. 
331). 
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moment, has little epistemological value in Perowne’s view. But there is a metafictive irony at 
Perowne’s expense – he does not believe in ‘moments of precise reckoning’, and yet Saturday 
presents us with several examples: the moment the policeman waves him across Tottenham 
Court Road, his diagnosis of Baxter’s condition, or Daisy’s reading of ‘Dover Beach’. This 
illustrates the way in which Saturday carefully positions its critique of competing epistemological 
systems. Perowne, the scientific realist, the rationalist, is rightly critical of the reductionism of 
even realist novels; and yet this novel draws us into an examination of the power of those 
moments of reckoning, by placing them at the heart of its narrative. By gently reminding us, at 
crucial moments, of the fictionality of his novel, McEwan appears to ask us to consider whether 
or not these representations correspond to real life – whether, in other words, art can contain 
truth. As we shall see, the novel seems to resist any easy answer to this question. 
 
In the two moments of potentially violent conflict in which Perowne finds himself on this day, 
McEwan presents us, evidently, with two resolutions achieved in different ways. In the first, 
Henry Perowne uses his diagnosis of Baxter’s condition – built up from observations made out 
of professional habit – and his knowledge of its genetic basis, to undermine Baxter’s authority 
and to escape the situation relatively unharmed. His diagnosis is, in emulation of the scientific 
method, based on the accumulation of evidence: 
The persistent tremor [of  Baxter’s hand] also draws Perowne’s professional 
attention. (S, 87) 
 
Perowne’s attention, his professional regard, settles once again on Baxter’s right 
hand. It isn’t simply a tremor, it’s a fidgety restlessness implicating practically 
every muscle. (S, 90) 
 
Watching him unobserved for a few seconds, Perowne suddenly understands – 
Baxter is unable to initiate or make saccades – those flickering changes of  eye 
position from one fixation to another. (S, 91) 
 
Even as he turns back [...] there remains in a portion of  his thoughts a droning, 
pedestrian diagnostician who notes poor self-control, emotional lability, 
explosive temper, suggestive of  reduced levels of  GABA among the 
appropriate binding sites on striatal neurons. (S, 93) 
The emphasis here is on observation – ‘attention’, ‘watching’, ‘regard’ – and this culminates in a 
full diagnosis: 
small alterations of  character, tremors in the hands and face, emotional 
disturbance, including [...] sudden, uncontrollable alterations of  mood, [...] 
helpless jerky dance-like movements, intellectual dilapidation, memory failure, 
agnosia, apraxia, dementia, [...] nightmarish hallucinations and a meaningless 
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end. (S, 94) 
In the initial observations the gradual accumulation of evidence is accompanied and emphasised 
by the progression from non-technical (“tremors”) to highly technical (“saccades”, “striatal 
neurons”) vocabulary. This same progression is also evident in the diagnosis – with the exception 
of the final subjective prognosis, which instead glances forwards to Perowne’s visit later in the 
day to his mother. On the face of it, then, the means by which Perowne is able to escape more 
serious injury is a model of inductive scientific reasoning.  
 
In the later conflict in Perowne’s home, in which Baxter holds a knife to Rosalind’s throat and 
threatens to rape Daisy, Perowne appears powerless – indeed, his rational approach repeatedly 
dismisses ideas of heroism as unrealistic. Instead, it is Daisy’s reading (technically, recital) of 
‘Dover Beach’ which changes the momentum of the situation. Baxter is apparently overwhelmed 
by the poetry, and his mood changes to one of manic euphoria, and the worst of the danger is 
passed. To put it crudely, the earlier solution is scientific, the later artistic. 
 
“On the face of it,” David Amigoni observes, “McEwan seems to participate in and extend C.P. 
Snow’s ‘two cultures’ perspective on science, the humanities and the cultural contest in which 
they are involved”.10 In Saturday, just as with Joe and Clarissa in Enduring Love (which I will 
examine later), the opposition is manifested in the positions and disagreements of Perowne and 
Daisy, with the two cultures divided along the same gender lines in both novels. Perowne’s 
inability to appreciate literature, what I earlier called his literary scepticism, runs in parallel with, 
and is connected to, his respect for science: “He doesn’t seem to have the dedication to read 
many books all the way through” and he mocks the “so-called magical realists” who do not even 
present a “recognisable physical reality” citing a number of examples – including, amusingly, the 
scene from McEwan’s own The Child in Time in which the protagonist sees “through a pub 
window his parents as they had been some weeks after his conception, discussing the possibility 
of aborting him” (S, 66, 67). Perowne is, in Daisy’s view, “a coarse, unredeemable materialist” (S, 
134) and he himself asks what, really, he learned from Anna Karenina and Madame Bovary other 
than that “adultery is understandable but wrong, that nineteenth-century women had a hard time 
of it” and so on: Perowne does not want “the world reinvented; he wants it explained” and 
science, in his view, does this in a way that literature cannot (S, 67, 66). His, then, is an exclusively 
scientific epistemology, which does not admit of the possibility of literature as a form of 
knowledge, or even really of literature being in any way ‘useful’. Even though poetry proves to be 
exactly that in the novel’s denouement – as John Grammaticus says, “[w]ho would have thought 
                                                 
10 Amigoni, p. 154. 
 143 
that learning poems by heart for pocket money would turn out to be so useful” (S, 232) – it is not 
at all clear that Perowne’s conviction will change.  
 
In this regard Perowne is similar to those other scientific, male protagonists of McEwan’s recent 
novels. In Enduring Love, Joe Rose laments the “derisory” science collection of the London 
Library where “[t]he assumption appeared to be that the world could be sufficiently understood 
through fiction, histories and autobiographies”, and asks whether the “scientific illiterates who 
ran this place, and who dared call themselves educated people, really believe[d] that literature was 
the greatest intellectual achievement of our civilization?” (EL, 42). Michael Beard, in Solar, gives 
himself a crash-course in Milton and in the process comes to “suspect a monstrous bluff. The 
reading was a slog, but he encountered nothing that could remotely be construed as an 
intellectual challenge, nothing on the scale of difficulty he encountered daily in his [physics] 
course”.11 
 
However, even if his principal characters appear to be unproblematically scientific (or, with his 
female characters, literary) the temptation to locate McEwan’s writing as lying comfortably within 
a ‘two cultures’ model should be resisted. In an article on “poetry, science and a few thoughts on 
Ian McEwan’s Saturday”, Deryn Rees-Jones attempts to “think through the kind of knowledge a 
poem constitutes” – a complex question a version of which I will ask in the conclusion to this 
thesis. She asks: “Is McEwan then on the side of poetry, even as he celebrates, through Henry, 
the rationalism of science?” (335). McEwan does not, I think, takes ‘sides’ in Saturday; even if a 
clear opposition between literature and science is created, the novel’s position is critical of 
precisely this division. I read Saturday as trying, in a similar way to Rees-Jones’s own article, to 
think through the kinds of knowledge that scientific and literary discourses might constitute, and 
in what ways scientific knowledge in particular is contested and contestable; in this I agree with 
Amigoni’s assessment that “McEwan’s fiction interrogates what science may mean in the lives of 
western subjects [...] It acknowledges a broader cultural narrative of which scientific discourses 
are an insistent, authoritative and in some sense contested component. McEwan’s fiction 
contributes subtly, intelligently and imaginatively to that process of contestation”.12  
 
Science (particularly genetics and medical science) and art (represented by literature and, 
especially, poetry) are placed in opposition in this novel, especially in the two central ‘crises’ of the 
narrative; but an appreciation of this apparent ‘two cultures’ model must also realise that the 
details of the resolutions to both crises add considerable complexity to the simple binary 
                                                 
11  McEwan, Solar, p. 201. 
12 Ibid. 
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(science/arts) reading just offered. On the simplest level, the earlier, scientific approach does not 
in fact defuse the situation, but exacerbates it. Rees-Jones is right to observe that “it is the 
fallibility of the human scientist which provokes the invasion into the private world of the 
family”, but is not so clear cut as her claim that in “a melodramatic showdown towards the end 
of the novel, it is, however, poetry which saves the day” and later that “symbolically it is poetry 
and music which repel the dangerous invader”.13 I would argue that the later artistic intervention 
is not a deliberate attempt to resolve the danger of the situation (Daisy is not, it seems fair to say, 
attempting to wrest control of the situation as Perowne self-consciously does after the car 
accident), nor does it in itself remove the immediate danger, though it does alter Baxter’s mood. 
Perowne is aware that the danger has not passed: Baxter’s state of mind remains “delicately 
poised, easily disturbed. It’s important not to surprise or threaten him”, but “Rosalind and Daisy 
remain in their embrace – hard to believe they think they’re out of danger” (S, 222, 224)) In the 
end the situation is resolved by Perowne’s deceit and some fake science, as Perowne tells Baxter 
he has details of a possible cure upstairs, and ultimately by violence, as Theo and Henry together 
throw Baxter down the stairs. Indeed, even the poetry reading itself is a deception. Baxter is 
impressed less by the poem, than by the fact that Daisy wrote it – “You wrote that” he keeps 
repeating (S, 222); but the poem, of course, is Arnold’s. 
 
Similarly, the earlier scientific resolution has also qualities of the non-scientific. Perowne’s 
diagnosis may be classically inductive, but at the point at which he acts on his conclusions 
Perowne “has the impression of a witchdoctor delivering a curse” (S, 94) and is aware that “[t]hey 
are together, he [Baxter] and Perowne, in a world not of the medical, but of the magical. When 
you’re diseased it is unwise to abuse the shaman” (S, 95). These comments reveal the fact that 
although the basis for Perowne’s dominance in the ensuing exchange with Baxter may be the 
knowledge that he has arrived at through his scientific observation and training, the model for 
this power dynamic is anything but unique to scientists. 
 
An alternative reading could, instead of seeing Saturday as a paean to the rationality of science, 
attribute the successful resolution of both situations to the ability of both Perowne and Daisy to 
fictionalize, to create a convincing narrative. The line between fiction and deception is indistinct: 
Perowne, thinking of a poem of Daisy’s – ‘The Ballad of the Brain on my Shoe’ – that “resulted 
from Daisy’s visit to the operating theatre one morning to watch her father at work”, wonders at 
“art’s essential but – he had to suppose – forgivable dishonesty” (S, 139). Daisy entrances Baxter, 
she “recited a poem that cast a spell on one man [...] he was transfixed by it [...] Baxter heard 
what Henry never has [...and it] touched off in Baxter a yearning he could barely begin to define” 
                                                 
13 Rees-Jones, p. 337, p. 334, p. 337. 
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(S, 278-9). But even before she does so, Perowne has told Baxter a story, one that he desperately 
wants to hear, of “a new drug, not on the market, but just arriving here for trials [...] I can get you 
on the trial” (S, 215). Perowne knows that Baxter “wants to be convinced” (S, 216) – he 
identified the same desire, “a hunger for information, or hope”, in their earlier confrontation: 
“Perowne is familiar with this impulse in patients, this pursuit of the slenderest of leads [...] it’s 
necessary for Baxter to check. And check again. Someone might know something he doesn’t” (S, 
96-7). After the car accident, Perowne begins to reconstruct Baxter’s narrative, starting with the 
rather dramatic line “Your father had it. Now you’ve got it too.” Perowne continues to draw out 
Baxter’s story – his parents, where he grew up, where he lives – until “he’s accepted Perowne’s 
right to interrogate. They’ve slipped into their roles” (S, 94-6). Narrative, Perowne sees, has its 
own momentum – “nothing can be predicted, but everything, as soon as it happens, will seem to 
fit” (S, 87). 
 
 
6.2  Representing Evolution 
 
Saturday presents, and critiques, Perowne’s belief that the events that take place on that eventful 
February day are a result, albeit an indirect one, of Baxter’s genetically determined condition. Like 
Saturday, Enduring Love is also concerned with the factors that affect our lives, and likewise sees 
our fates as partly shaped by a form of biological determinism. But whilst in Saturday this 
biological determinism is written in Baxter’s genes, in Enduring Love it is the result of our instincts 
instilled over the course of our evolutionary development. 
 
The same reductive determinism that I identified in Perowne’s tendency to look for explanations 
for the dreadful situation in which he and his family find themselves “at the level of the complex 
molecule” (S, 91) can also be found in Joe’s interpretation of the world. Describing the balloon, 
for example, Joe thinks of the helium inside:  
that elemental gas forged from hydrogen in the nuclear furnace of  the stars, 
first step along the way in the generation of  multiplicity and variety of  matter 
in the universe, including our selves and all out thoughts. (EL, 3) 
This excellent pastiche of popular science writing further underlines the arbitrary notional 
beginning to this narrative (see Chapter 4). But the absurdity of trying to explain the balloon, and 
the balloon accident, via a history of the universe also illustrates the problems of ‘hard’ or 
‘greedy’ reductionism. Furthermore, this particular lineage – from elemental gas, to matter, to 
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humans, to conscious thought – should also remind us of the anthropocentric teleology identified 
in popular science writing on evolution in Chapter 5. 
 
A similar reductionism, and a form of biological determinism, is in evidence in Joe’s attempt to 
explain the men’s decisions to let go of the ropes through the biological and social evolution of 
selfishness and altruism. Like Henry Perowne in Saturday and the popular science writers 
examined in Chapter 5, Joe Rose (also, of course, a popular science writer) turns to the metaphor 
of writing to express the unalterable and inevitable, in this instance the conflict of co-operation 
and selfishness established in our natures by evolution:  
[...] there was a deeper covenant, ancient and automatic, written in our nature. 
Co-operation – the basis of  our earliest hunting successes, the force behind 
our evolving capacity for language, the glue of  our social cohesion. [...] But 
letting go was in our nature too. Selfishness is also written on our hearts. (EL, 
14) 
Their behaviour, in Joe’s view, is governed by instincts formed by our evolutionary development. 
Initially Joe describes his decision to hang on to the rope in rational terms: “The child was 
incapable, and was about to be borne away. Two miles to the west were high-voltage power lines. 
A child alone and needing help. It was my duty to hang on”. But when it comes to it he realises 
that “The child was not my child, and I was not going to die for it”. The reference here, of 
course, is to the relevance of kinship in governing ‘altruistic’ behaviour – an important factor in 
the socio-evolutionary study of inter-personal behaviour. In an interview with Ramona Koval 
McEwan remarked, in a brief exchange about E. O. Wilson, that “there’s plenty of evidence that 
suggests people will go a lot further to defend their child than someone far away whom they can’t 
see”.14  
 
Later, having decided that the threat that Jed Parry poses is serious, Joe buys a gun from some 
ageing, disillusioned hippies, and afterwards stops in some woodland to try firing it. Finding that 
his “bowels had gone watery” (EL, 106) Joe walks off into the woods, and as he squats he scoops 
up a handful of soil: 
I brought my palm close to my face and peered. In the rich black crumbly 
mulch I saw two black ants, a springtail, and a dark red worm-like creature with 
a score of  pale brow legs. These were the rumbling giants of  this lower world, 
for not far below the threshold of  visibility was the seething world of  the 
roundworms – [...] even these were giants relative to the inhabitants of  the 
microscopic realm[.] (EL, 207) 
                                                 
14 Ramona Koval, ‘Ian McEwan’, Books and Writing (Radio National), 22 September 2002 
<http://www.abc.net.au/rn/arts/bwriting/stories/s679422.htm> [accessed 8 March 2010]. 
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Seeing and imagining these creatures, fungi and bacteria in the soil Joe notes the “blind 
compulsion of these organisms to consume and excrete” which makes “possible the richness of 
the soil” (Ibid). Joe looks for consolation in the fact that we are “still part of this natural 
dependency”, but instead concludes that we are “no longer in the great chain” (Ibid). What 
brings Joe to this apparent realisation is the thought of his vehicle, his gun, the roads, the city, his 
apartment – objects of modern civilization that are outside the ‘natural’ order. Amigoni argues 
that in McEwan’s fiction humans are necessarily in both the natural and social orders at the same 
time, finding evidence for this in Enduring Love in passages such as that in which Joe Rose, 
engaging “simultaneously [...] in two of life’s central, antithetical pleasures, reading and fucking”, 
manages to be “in two places at once” (EL, 161, 158). Humans sit in two worlds: on the one 
hand, we are in a determined narrative, still bound by the “blind compulsion” of instinct that 
governs the organisms in the soil – it is, after all, precisely the same “compulsion [...] to [...] 
excrete” which drives Joe into the woods “to enrich the forest floor”; but on the other, we are 
also in a “mess of our own unmaking” (EL, 207), in a non-determined narrative governed by our 
conscious decisions, by our post-natural rationality. Or, as Amigoni puts it, we are “in a world 
conditioned by both biological determinism and indeterminate proliferating social and cultural 
meanings”.15 
 
This adheres well to the narrative model of Enduring Love. I have shown how Joe’s narrative is 
affected by contingency in the shape of the balloon in chapter 4 (see above, p. 79 ff.); but it is 
also affected by his instincts shaped over evolutionary time and by his own rational decisions. As 
I have already discussed, when Joe lets go of the rope, instinct wins out over rationality: not a 
rational decision, but an instinctive reaction that is itself the consequence of evolution. Even 
John Logan’s momentary hesitation Joe attributes to the “flame of altruism” which “burned a 
little stronger” in him (EL, 15), as opposed to a conscious decision. Whether or not this is true is 
impossible to ascertain, since our perspective is focussed through Joe’s opinions. Logan may have 
acted in the assumption that, contrary to Joe’s belief that even if there was “a vague communality 
of purpose, we were never a team” (EL, 10), they would all continue to work together. The basis 
for such an assumption would be a rational assessment, as opposed to an instinctual reaction 
based on our evolutionarily conditioned tendency for self-preservation, and preservation of our 
kin. But it is in keeping with Joe’s perspective that he attributes Logan’s hesitation to the “flame 
of altruism”, part of the “covenant, ancient and automatic, written in our nature” (EL, 15, 14). 
 
On the other hand, when Joe does his research into de Clérambault’s Syndrome, say, or decides 
to meet the threat of Jed Parry with violence, and sits down to find in his address book a friend 
                                                 
15 Amigoni, p. 153.  
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able to procure him a gun, he acts rationally – beyond the instincts displayed by the insects. This 
opposition between instinct and rationality can also be seen played out in an incident soon after 
the balloon accident. Reading for an article on the decline of narrative in science, Joe reads an 
anecdote about a dog which appears to exhibit rational decision making and an awareness of the 
consequences of its actions. Distracted, Joe stops his note-taking: “the last words I had written 
before losing control of my thoughts had been ‘intention, intentionality, tries to assert control over the 
future’. These words referred to a dog when I wrote them, but re-reading them now I began to 
fret.” (EL, 43) The point about the story of the dog is: does it act rationally, or does it act 
according to basic non-conscious instincts? This is the reason that it is so apposite that the words 
‘intention, intentionality, tries to assert control over the future” (EL, 43) can apply to both the dog and to 
Joe – because this asks the same question of Joe as he is asking of the account of the dog: do we 
attribute behaviour to rationality, to conscious choice, or to instinct? Perhaps Joe feels 
uncomfortable – the “pricking along my nape and a rawness in my gut which resolved itself, for 
the third time that day, into an unreliable urge to crap” (EL, 40) – not because of the perceived 
threat of a stranger, but rather because the story asks questions of his actions that he is not asking 
of himself – whether his letting go of the rope was instinctive, and so to a degree biologically 
determined, or a rational, and thus selfish, decision. 
 
Joe Rose’s examination of the forest soil bears a striking resemblance to a description from A.S. 
Byatt’s ‘Morpho Eugenia’, the first of the two stories that together form Angels and Insects.16 
William Adamson, the protagonist, is searching for ants: 
Under his gaze the whole wood-floor became alive with movement, a 
centipede, various beetles, a sanguine shiny red worm, [...] He took out his 
magnifying lens and looked at a patch of  moss, pebbles and sand, and saw a 
turmoil of  previously invisible energies, striving, striving, white myriad-legged 
runners, invisible semi-transparent arthropods, button-tight spiderlings. His 
senses, and his mind attached to them, were like a magnetic field, pulled here 
and there. (A&I, 37-38) 
Insects, and their “blind compulsion”, are the basis for the extended analogy used in this novella, 
which likewise addresses the twin worlds of instinct and rationality. In Byatt’s own words, the  
idea for the story was fairly simple. A young scientist marries the daughter of  
an old clergyman-collector and becomes trapped in a country house which 
turns out to resemble an antheap, in that it is uncertain whether the source of  
                                                 
16 A.S. Byatt, Angels and Insects (London: Chatto & Windus, 1992). All subsequent references are to this 
edition, hereafter A&I, and will be made in the text. Byatt quotes the passage from Enduring Love in 
‘Ancestors’ in On Histories and Stories, pp. 65-90 (p. 83). 
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authority is the incessantly childbearing females or the brisk sexless workers.17 
The story is simple enough, but the analogical structure is complicated. It is true that Bredely Hall 
does come to resemble an antheap: as William studies the ant colonies in the grounds, and as he 
begins to understand the dynamics of the household, the reader sees the similarities between the 
two. The allegory is carefully constructed and maintained, with regular references to the 
correspondence. Lady Alabaster, the fecund queen, is pampered and waited upon, and the long 
description of her closely resembles those of the ant Queens: 
The room was a nest of  cushions [...] She seemed to spend most of  her day 
drinking – tea lemonade, ratafia, chocolate mild, barley water, herbal infusions, 
which were endless moving along the corridors [...] She also consumed large 
quantities of  sweet biscuits [...] which were also freshly made by Cook, carried 
from the kitchen, and their crumbs subsequently removed, and dusted away. 
She was hugely fat [...] William felt that this immobile, vacantly amiable 
presence was a source of  power in the household. (A&I, 27) 
William frequently muses on “his own drone-nature, as he increasingly perceived it” (A&I, 105): 
he was hard put to it not to see his own life in terms of  a diminishing analogy 
with the tiny creatures. [...] His vision of  his own biological processes – his 
frenzied, delicious mating, so abruptly terminated, his consumption of  the 
regular meals prepared by the darkly quiet forces [...] brought him insensibly to 
see himself  as a kind of  complex sum of  his nerve-cells and instinctive 
desires[.] (A&I, 100) 
In many ways the ants, as Jon Turney observes of the clones in Never Let Me Go, “underpin an 
allegorical story”: “To ask,” William Adamson realises in a piece of writing for the popular 
science book he writes with Matty Crompton, “what are the ants in their busy world, is to ask, 
what are we” (A&I, 116).18 
 
But the comparison between the insect societies and human society is complicated by Byatt’s 
reminders of the dangers of analogy. In a discussion that moves from slavery in ants to the 
“unfortunate slaves” “across the Atlantic”,  Matty shows an awareness of the problem – “I do 
not know quite where these thoughts may lead us” – and William concludes even more explicitly 
that “‘Analogy is a slippery tool [...] Men are not ants’” (A&I, 100). Later, he repeats the 
conclusion to himself: “Men are not ants, said William Adamson to himself, and besides, the 
                                                 
17 A.S. Byatt, ‘True Stories and the Facts in Fiction’ in On Histories and Stories, pp. 91-122 (p. 116). 
18 Jon Turney, ‘Science communication in fiction’ in Practising Science Communication in the Information Age, 
ed. by Richard Holliman, Jeff  Thomas, Sam Smidt, Eileen Scanlon, and Elizabeth Whitelegg (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 166-77 (p. 173). 
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analogy will not do” (A&I, 106). And if Byatt warns us about comparing men to ants, she also, in 
this story and elsewhere, expresses her concerns about comparing insect societies to human ones: 
I began with an instinctive aversion to anthropomorphic personifications – 
Maeterlinck’s Queen Ant in her bridal veiling, committing infanticide, or 
whimsical parallels between insect armies, rulers and ‘servants’ with human 
hierarchies. I worry about anthropomorphism as a form of  self-deception.19 
Having read an account that William writes of the merciless behaviour of the hive or nest 
towards the male bees and ants, Matty rather knowingly responds:  
‘Very eloquent [...] I am quite overcome with pity for these poor, useless male 
creatures. I must admit I had never seen them in that light before. Do you not 
think you may have been somewhat anthropomorphic in your choice of  rhetoric?’ 
(A&I, 104) 
Here, the situation is more complex; Matty, William will later realise, often speaks in riddles, and 
here she is not being entirely candid. Ostensibly, Matty is responding to anthropomorphic 
comparisons in the story that describe the ants as human – “the males, too, have become 
specialised, as factory-hands are specialised hands for the making of pin-heads or brackets” (A&I, 
103), for example – but she also perceptively sees that William is increasingly identifying himself 
as a drone. Analogies, as I discuss below, are often invertible. Her veiled criticism, then, is rather 
of the implicit zoomorphism. Seen this way, and within the wider context of the story, we can 
translate her comment thus: ‘Do you not think that you may have taken the analogy too far? You 
are not actually an ant, trapped within an incestuous and determined society, responsible only for 
brief intermittent mating; you are not ruled by instinct, Predestination or determinism.’  
 
This novella’s attention to the opposition of instinct and reason is signalled early in the piece, 
when William Adamson, dancing for the first time with Eugenia Alabaster (the woman he will 
woo and marry), felt the  
unmistakable stirrings and quickenings of  bodily excitement in himself  [...and] 
reflected – he was, after all, a scientist and an observer – that these dances were 
designed to arouse his desire in exactly this way [...] He remembered the palm-
wine dance, a swaying circle which at a change in rhythm broke up into 
hugging couples who then set upon and danced round the one partnerless 
scapegoat dancer. He remembered being grabbed and nuzzled and rubbed and 
cuddled with great vigour by women with brown breasts glistening [...] 
 Nothing he did now seemed to happen without this double vision, of  
things seen and done otherwise, in another world. (A&I, 6)  
                                                 
19 A.S. Byatt, ‘Ancestors’, p. 80.  
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Instinct still has a power over the most rational characters: Joe Rose, Henry Perowne, William 
Adamson all behave, at times, in ways governed by instincts fashioned by our evolutionary 
development. What links these characters so strongly is the rational analysis of precisely those 
instinctive reactions. William thinks rationally on the causes of his bodily reaction, and goes on to 
see the cross-cultural universality (albeit with differences) of dance as part of courtship, implying 
without explicitly stating its biological basis in sexual selection. In this, he resembles Joe Rose 
when he proffers his socio-biological explanation (defence?) of why the men holding the ropes 
first held on and then, in the end, let go. Both men offer rationalized explanations of instinctive 
behaviour.  
 
But William’s reflection has, appropriately, a double meaning. On the one hand, William’s 
‘reflection’ is his rational consideration: later, in a piece of writing, the word is associated with 
other similar phrases, “‘intelligence’ – foresight, rational analysis, reflective thought” (A&I, 112), 
as opposed to ‘instinct’. But William’s reflection is also his mirror-image, the other half of his 
‘double vision’, a William that ‘sees and does things otherwise’. A little later, watching Harald 
(Eugenia’s father) deliver his sermons leads William, via a circuitous route, to think of 
Amazonian ceremonies forbidden to women: 
He remembered the fleeing women, faces covered, sitting amongst the 
decorous English family, men on one side, women on another, watching 
Eugenia’s pink tongue moisten her soft lips. He felt he was doomed to a kind 
of  double consciousness. Everything he experienced brought up its contrary 
image from out there, which had the effect of  making not only the Amazon 
ceremonies, but the English sermon, seem strange, unreal, of  an uncertain 
nature. (A&I, 24) 
William’s double consciousness is the doubling that is brought about by metaphor, by analogy. It 
is, in effect, the double consciousness of the author – which, in the end, is what both Matty and 
William become. This double consciousness, is linked, for Byatt, to the way in which 
metaphorical or analogical ‘vehicles’ and ‘tenors’ are mutually affected. What William realises, 
listening to Harald’s sermon, is that it is not only that the English sermon makes the Amazon 
seem Othered, but that the inverse also applies: the analogy is bi-directional. This is also what 
Matty sees in William’s anthropomorphic descriptions of antheaps: on the one hand we describe 
them using the terms of human societies (workers and Queens), but on the other we also look to 
these insect societies as analogies for our own.  
 
 152 
This double consciousness complicates simple analogies, and binary oppositions. We imagine, 
perhaps, that the Amazon might represent instinct, or pre-Lapsarian paradise, and indeed William 
almost says as much:  
And yet that is in so many ways the innocent, the unfallen world, the virgin 
forest, the wild people in the interior who are as unaware of  modern ways – 
modern evils – as our first parents. There are strange analogies. Out there, no 
woman may touch a snake. (A&I, 30) 
But William is also careful to point out that it is not so simple: “When I was in the Amazons, [...] 
I was haunted by an image of an English meadow in spring [...] It seemed to me that such scenes 
were truly Paradise” (Ibid.). 
 
William is acutely aware of the interplay of instinct and rationality – the two worlds, in Amigoni’s 
argument that I explored above, that humans inhabit. The extended analogy between humans 
and insects asks to what extent we may be governed by instinct as we might suppose the ant and 
bee colonies are – by the “blind compulsion” Joe Rose identifies in the insects in the soil. In 
particular, William’s tendency, in his melancholy, to see himself as an ant within the Bredely Hall 
‘nest’ can be read as representative of his lack of free will, and the determined nature of his life – 
a result, perhaps, of his instinctive sexual desire for Eugenia, to whom he is  “bodily in thrall” 
(A&I, 105) in the strict sense of “bondage, servitude; captivity”, just as Seth is in thrall to Dame 
Cottitoe Pan Demos in Matty’s story ‘Things Are Not What They Seem’.20 William, 
like almost all his contemporaries, [...] was half  afraid to give full expression, 
even to himself, of  his very real sense that Instinct was Predestination, that he 
was a creature as driven, as determined, as constricted, as any flying or creeping 
thing. He wrote about will and reason, but they did not feel to him [...] to be 
very powerful or important entities. (A&I, 116)21 
Elsewhere, however, William reveals an awareness of the complexity of the debate concerning 
instinct and rationality, or intelligence. In a piece of writing for the popular science, William 
“debate[s] with himself on paper” (A&I, 109) and concludes that the error may not be in the 
analogy between ourselves and the insects, but in seeing them as “automata [...] little mechanical 
                                                 
20 thrall, n.1 (a.1), Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edn, 1989, OED Online, Oxford University Press 
<http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50251567> [accessed 26 April 2010]. 
21 The “flying or creeping thing” may also recall to us the description of  Satan in Book II of  Paradise 
Lost: “So eagerly the fiend / Ore bog or steep, through strait, rough, dense, or rare, / With head, 
hands, wings, or feet pursues his way, / And swims or sinks, or wades, or creeps, or flyes”. This echo 
would seem to link William’s concerns regarding Predestination to the problems of  Predestination at 
the heart of  Paradise Lost. 
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inventions whirring about like clockwork in motion” (A&I, 110). Such a view wrongly leads to 
seeing ourselves as living a determined existence: 
The terrible idea [...] that we are biologically predestined like other creatures [...] 
treads softly behind the arrogant judgement that makes of  the ant a twitching 
automaton. (A&I, 113) 
Just as I showed with Joe Rose’s narrative, William’s is also affected in quite discrete ways by 
chance, by his instincts, and finally by his capacity for rationality. Initially, it is the traumatic 
contingency, to reuse Wood’s phrase, of his shipwreck, and the loss of his specimens, that brings 
William to Bredely Hall and obliges him to stay, although his decision to do so is also affected by 
his desire for Eugenia. This desire is explicitly presented as irrational – in his journal after dancing 
with Eugenia William writes: “I believe I am a rational being”, but a “kind of landslide [...] has 
taken place in my soul” (A&I, 13). Much later, in the same passage concerning Predestination 
and instinct quoted above, William notes that we may lose “the capacity to reason which makes 
us human [...] under the pressure of extreme desire” (A&I, 113). 
 
In the end it is Matty Crompton who is the architect of “William’s liberation from [the] trap” of 
seeing himself as an enslaved male ant, with no will beyond that of the nest.22 Matty is associated 
with rationality as opposed to instinct – she is cerebral as Eugenia is bodily. Indeed, even as 
William begins to discern her intellect, he continues to see her as “a sexless being” – “She was 
dry, was Matty Crompton” (A&I, 105). But Matty’s fable, ‘Things Are Not What They Seem’ 
(A&I, 119) hints at her own doubling. It is she that is the architect of his eventual freedom: it is 
at her suggestion that he begins to accompany her and the girls on nature walks and with her that 
he writes the popular science book that gives him financial independence from the Alabaster 
family. Indeed, Matty can be seen in some respects as a designer or author of William’s narrative: 
during an anagram word game with the children Matty reveals her awareness of the incestuous 
relationship at the heart of Bredely Hall, receiving the word INSECT from William and returning 
it as INCEST. But the game also, as June Sturrock observes, shows William a way out of that 
society – the sequence of words (insect, incest, sphinx, phoenix) is William’s story in little:  
First he must understand the relation between incest and insect—that is, he 
must see that Bredely Hall is, like the ant-hills, essentially an incestuous society 
[...] Only then is he enabled to see Matty as the sphinx who set him this 
liberating riddle [...] After this, he can liberate himself  and become like the 
                                                 
22 June Sturrock, ‘Angels, Insects, and Analogy: A.S. Byatt’s “Morpho Eugenia”’, Connotations, 12 
(2002/2003), 93-104 (p. 99). 
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phoenix, reborn out of  his own ashes.23 
Speculating on the coincidence of the letters, William thinks:  
The luck of  the letters was uncanny. It gave him the feeling that occasionally 
comes to most of  us, that however we protest we are moved by chance, and 
struck by random shocks and blows, in fact there is Design, there is fate, it has 
us in its grip. 
 It was possible, of  course, that she had somehow shaped his cards. She 
liked riddles. (A&I, 153) 
The three possibilities that William considers are chance, fate, or Matty’s deliberate manipulation 
of the game. These are the factors, in this order, that shape William’s wider narrative: initially 
contingency, then the ‘grip’ of his determined life at Bredely Hall, and finally Matty’s deliberate 
intervention. As she modestly puts it, “I watch, and contrive, and write letters, and consider your 
nature” (A&I, 156). Matty represents, then, the power of rationality and free will to overcome 
the determinism of instinct – as Byatt says, if Eugenia was named “because the story was 
something to do with Sexual Selection as well as Natural Selection”, Matty was invented as a 
character who is “not confined to her biological identity”.24 William is initially unable to see 
Matty’s double identity, even though he is able to see his own. Early in the story, as he learns 
about Bredely Hall, William sees himself as “at once detached anthropologist and fairytale prince 
trapped by invisible gates and silken bonds in an enchanted castle” (A&I, 21), but does not 
imagine that Matty may also have an alter-ego. It is only at the end of the story that she can tell 
him “My name [...] is Matilda. Up here at night there is no Matty. Only Matilda.” (A&I, 157).  
 
* * * * 
 
In Saturday a comparison of the epistemologies of science and literature is played out in two 
moments of conflict and their different resolutions. In Enduring Love the “cultural contest” 
between science and literature is expressed through the very different reactions of two characters 
to the same situation: Joe Rose is a popular science writer; his partner Clarissa a Keats scholar.25  
 
Just as in Saturday, the narrative perspective of Enduring Love appears to privilege the scientific 
over the artistic. Rees-Jones claims that Saturday is “skewed towards, if not totally embracing, 
scientific rationalism”, and Ian McEwan himself has said in interview that Enduring Love is in 
some ways a celebration of rationality: “I thought it was time to speak up for it [rationality]. I 
                                                 
23 Sturrock, p. 99. 
24 Byatt, ‘True Stories and the Facts in Fiction’, p. 117. 
25 Amigoni, p. 154. 
 155 
mean Frankenstein is the great anti-rational novel. [...] It’s very hard to write a novel as fine as that 
in praise of rationality, but still I think one has to have a go”.26 McEwan also claims that in 
Enduring Love “the hero is rather super-endowed with a belief in rationality but he turns out to be 
right. And the reader, and the police, and his wife, are all wrong”.27 This may be true, but dangers 
attend a reading which sees Enduring Love as endorsing a hierarchy of knowledge with science and 
rationality at the top. I have shown how such a reading does not take account of complexities in 
the narrative of Saturday; similar details also undermine a simplistic binary reading of Enduring 
Love.  
 
In Saturday the free indirect style expresses the thoughts of Perowne but nobody else, and in 
Enduring Love the autodiegetic narration, by Joe Rose, foregrounds his (scientific) beliefs; but in 
both cases the opinions of the protagonists are also presented for scrutiny.  Our reading of both 
novels must pay attention to the authorial interrogation that attends this privileging. As Patricia 
Waugh has noticed, for example, Enduring Love often suggests that invoking science is a means of 
“disavowing personal responsibility or displacing difficulty of judgement with a fatalistic or 
deterministic perspective”.28 This certainly appears the case in the above example of Joe’s 
scientific explanation for letting go of the rope. Not only is he “not prepared to accept that [he 
was the first to let go]” (EL, 14), but the tenor of his explanation does not even admit of a 
decision at all. Joe’s description of “the mammalian conflict” (ibid.), of co-operation and 
selfishness as ‘written’ in our natures, absolves him of the responsibility for the decision to let go 
– the reason is buried in millennia of evolution, and in his nature. Even the moment of decision 
itself is something imposed from the outside: “The moment I glimpsed a body fall away [...] the 
matter was settled; altruism had no place” (EL, 15). 
 
Joe’s narration means that his own scientific perspective is overwhelmingly dominant in Enduring 
Love, even more so than Perowne’s in Saturday; nonetheless there are moments in which McEwan 
provides an alternative perspective that reveals the problem with his scientific arrogance, and by 
extension “the dangers of imperialism and overreaching” of science more broadly.29 One such 
insight comes from Jed Parry, whose own religious conviction is another example of an 
epistemology that forcibly excludes alternatives. In a letter to Joe he notes his reaction to Joe’s 
popular science articles: “I hated you, Joe for your arrogance [...] There’s never a moment’s doubt 
or hesitation or admission of ignorance.” (EL, 137) This criticism becomes even more pertinent 
when we combine it with Joe’s own earlier admissions that the theory on which he hangs his 
                                                 
26 Koval, ‘Ian McEwan’. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Waugh, p. 66. 
29 Waugh, p. 65. 
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journalistic piece on narrative in science is “not one that [he] believed in necessarily” (EL, 48), 
and that “what [he] had written wasn’t true. It wasn’t written in pursuit of truth, it wasn’t 
science.” (EL, 50) 
 
A more extended criticism of Joe’s scientism comes from the second textual document in the 
novel. Clarissa’s letter, reproduced as the penultimate chapter, is written in the aftermath of a row 
with Joe and gives a glimpse of her view of events, and an external perspective on Joe himself. 
The central criticism of Clarissa’s letter is that Joe’s scientific approach to the problem led him to 
some correct conclusions, but blinded him to other sorts of knowledge; or, as she puts it, “being 
right is not a simple matter” (EL, 216): 
You did the research, you made the logical inferences and you got a lot of  
things right, but in the process you forgot how to take me along with you, you 
forgot how to confide. (EL, 217) 
In this description, Joe resembles a clichéd research scientist – doing the research, coming to the 
correct conclusions, but being unable to communicate with others. The irony, of course, is that 
Joe’s recurrent fear is that he no longer carries out research, but merely communicates other 
people’s conclusions.  
 
Clarissa recognises that there are more kinds of knowledge that are relevant to the events of the 
novel than simply a diagnostic understanding of Parry and his likely actions: 
You were right, you acted decisively and you’re right to take some pride in that. 
But what about the rest? – why it happened, how it changed you, how it might 
have been otherwise, what it did to us – that’s what we’ve got now, and that’s 
what we have to think about. (EL, 218) 
Insofar as Clarissa stands for the literary and artistic epistemologies, she here espouses the 
importance of humanistic knowledge: the ‘why’, the counter-factuals, the impact on human 
relationships. There is a telling echo in Clarissa’s “how is might have been otherwise”, and in her 
letter in general, of Bernard Harrison’s view of literature’s epistemological role: 
Literature’s role is not to impart Great Truths but to unhinge and destabilize 
them. What it has to say is never ‘this is how it is’ but always, rather, ‘might it 
not be otherwise than an unwise and epistemic confidence leads you to think? 
Might it not be...like this?’30 
                                                 
30 Harrison, p. 11. 
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In this letter Clarissa makes the argument for a broader epistemology than the exclusively 
scientific one with which we are presented through Joe’s narration. Indeed, the autodiegetic 
narration is itself a critique of a monistic world-view: from within his narration we rarely get the 
opportunity to see Joe’s behaviour from the outside, and as a result we are carried along by his 
own perception of his rationality. The image of Clarissa’s face in the moment after Joe shoots Jed 
in the climactic scene, which “afflicted [Joe] during [his] sleepless night in the cell, and lingered 
for days afterwards”, is a momentary insight:  
then I saw the expression on Clarissa’s face. She was on her feet and she was 
staring at the gun in my hand with an expression of  such repulsion and 
surprise that I thought we would never get past this moment. (EL, 214) 
What Clarissa’s expression exposes, for a moment, is that even if Joe does “turn out to be right”, 
in some sense, his also is a mania, an obsession.31 As Clarissa says, “[y]ou were manic, and driven, 
and very lonely” (EL, 217). With this realisation, we can identify Joe’s obsessiveness elsewhere in 
the novel, his paranoia, and the parallels between Joe and Jed. Reading Jed’s letters, Joe notes that 
he “learned how to scan these letters [...] linger[ing] only on the accusations or expression of 
frustration” (EL, 142); describing the veiled threats in the letters he says  
I wanted more than that. I longed for it. Please put the weapon in my hands, 
Jed. One little threat would have given me enough to take to the police, but he 
denied me, he played with me and held back, just as he said I did. [....] But he 
never mentioned his decision not to talk to me again, and I was suddenly 
bereft[.] (Ibid.) 
The tone of longing here reveals, as Clarissa realises, that “He [Jed] brought something out in you 
[Joe]”. Joe needs Jed, almost as much as Jed needs him:  
This was love’s prison of  self-reference but, joy or despair, I could not get him 
to threaten me, or even talk to me. Three times I crossed the street towards 
him with my hidden tape recorder turning, but he would not stay. 
 ‘Clear off  then!’ I shouted at his retreated back. [...] Come back and talk 
to me, was what I really meant. (EL, 143) 
The “prison of self-reference” that Joe refers to is Jed’s “world determined from the inside” in 
which he “illuminated the world with his feelings, and the world confirmed him at every turn his 
feelings took” (ibid.). Jed is “always scrutinising the physical world, its random placements and 
chaotic noise and colours, for correlatives of his current emotional state – and always finding 
satisfaction” (EL, 143); but the vocabulary here (physical world, chaotic noise, correlatives) 
reveals that this description could equally be of Joe’s scientific scrutiny. Joe’s rational approach, 
                                                 
31 Koval, ‘Ian McEwan’.  
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as Clarissa possibly sees, is in some ways as self-fulfilling as Jed’s irrational one: “You saved my 
life, but perhaps you put my life in jeopardy – [...] by guessing his [Jed’s] every move as if you 
were pushing him towards it.” (EL, 218) 
 
As Waugh realises, “McEwan [...] is writing in a tradition of British fiction that has always sought 
to subject scientific claims of epistemological exclusivity to its own broader conceptualisation of 
knowledge, reason and understanding”.32 Joe’s constant recourse to science not only exempts him 
from examining his own responsibility, but also from the necessity of appreciating an alternative 
emotional system of understanding the world – how Clarissa sees the world – which instead he 
dismisses. His monocular scientific perspective, that the novel through its autodiegetic narration 
perfectly captures, is responsible for the breakdown in their relationship. Just as Clarissa’s 
emotional perspective is associated with an artistic, as opposed to scientific, epistemology, Joe 
stands metonymically for the danger of a monistic scientific epistemology. Joe, as McEwan says, 
“turns out to be right”, and Clarissa admits as much in her letter (“your being right”, “however 
right you were”, “you got a lot of things right”, “you were right”); but even Joe finally realises 
that, firstly, “being right in this case was also to be contaminated by the truth”, but more 
importantly that “there isn’t only ever one system of logic” (EL, 214). It is epistemological 
pluralism, then, rather than simply rationality, that is endorsed by Enduring Love. 
 
* * * * 
 
In both Enduring Love and Saturday material held outside the narrative proper appears to make a 
claim for factual accuracy of these texts. With its appendix consisting of an apparent journal 
article “reprinted from the British Review of Psychiatry” (EL, 233) detailing Jed Parry’s de 
Clérambault’s syndrome, Enduring Love suggests that it is based on a real case history; meanwhile, 
in Saturday McEwan acknowledges, in detail, the importance of observing surgeons at work and 
the suggestions of a number of neurosurgeons, conspicuously including their qualifications: “Neil 
Kitchen MD FRCS (SN)”. In both cases these post-scripts might appear to simply extend and 
confirm the perceived privileging of scientific rationalism in the narratives themselves. 
 
But just as with the contestation of scientific priority that is presented within the narrative, we 
must be careful of simplification here. The acknowledgements in Saturday may suggest the 
importance of the medical and scientific details, but in the Vintage paperback edition these 
acknowledgements follow a copy of ‘Dover Beach’, reprinted for the easy reference of the reader: 
the juxtaposition should remind us of the equal importance of literature in the novel. Similarly, 
                                                 
32 Waugh, p. 67. 
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the scientific case-study that ends Enduring Love is actually fictional – another example of the 
deceptive power of fictions to go alongside those of Daisy and Perowne. Enduring Love, as a piece 
of literature, draws its power from narrative, not from its foundation in actual events. In the end 
literature’s power does not lie in its capacity for correspondence with reality at all: to judge 
literature in this way is to import a standard from a correspondence theory of truth that is 
perhaps irrelevant. As I will suggest in the conclusion which follows, literature’s value may be 
precisely to question whether this is the only form of truth or knowledge that is valid. 
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7 Conclusion  
 
 
In the preceding chapters I have examined the representation of determinism as it is affected by 
the conclusions and implications of two distinct fields of science, and as presented in two distinct 
genres of writing. Simplifying considerably, some broad conclusions can be drawn.  
 
In the field of the new physics, universal determinism has been presented as collapsing under the 
weight of the new theories, particularly quantum indeterminacy. In the popular science writing on 
the subject, this argument has been emphasised rhetorically by a number of metaphors that 
distance the new physics from fully deterministic models (often associated with Laplace and 
Newton). Can we speculate as to the motivations for these specific representations? Firstly, it 
may be a response to widespread suspicion of deterministic models of the world, which may 
seem to contradict our perception of our free will. Part of the re-positioning of the new physics 
by these popular science texts involves foregrounding its connections with consciousness – both 
explicitly (asserting the importance of the consciousness of the experimenter), and implicitly (in 
metaphors that suggest the consciousness of elementary particles, for example). As a result the 
new physics is presented as congruent with our perception of the free will that consciousness 
seems to afford us. The combination of the connections established between the new physics and 
consciousness and the apparent demise of universal determinism as a result of the new physics 
seem, then, to suggest the greater compatibility of quantum mechanics with our sense of our 
capacity to affect the future, as compared with classical mechanics. 
 
Such an argument would face significant logical counter-arguments, of course, not the least of 
which are whether the indeterminacy of quantum mechanics is ontological or merely 
epistemological, and whether the introduction of the random element of quantum states can 
‘save’ free will from determinism anyway. But that is not the point – I am not suggesting that 
these popular science writers are trying, in their representation of quantum mechanics, to cut the 
complex Gordian knot of free will and determinism in a way that has any philosophical rigour. 
But it does seem that the presentation of the new physics in terms that associate it with 
consciousness not only make it less imposingly deterministic, but also more amenable to free will, 
and so to our human sense of the world. The details of quantum mechanics may be depicted as 
counter-intuitive, but the larger implications can be portrayed as closer (closer at least than those 
of universal determinism) to our common-sense view of the world. 
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The representation of the new physics in fiction and drama overlaps with that in popular science. 
Certainly the importance of consciousness is asserted as it is in popular science writing, but 
connected to this is a greater emphasis, compared to popular science, on the inherent uncertainty 
and limits of knowledge that the new physics seems to imply. This focus is motivated less by the 
desire to shift the focus to the human, than to highlight the incompleteness of scientific 
knowledge and perhaps to deny the total superiority of science as an epistemological system. That 
this is indeed the motivation is supported by the fact that many of these texts are also clearly 
engaging more broadly with the idea of the limits of knowledge and the difficulties in attaining it 
(as in Copenhagen, Arcadia, and Gravity’s Rainbow).   
 
It is tempting also to suggest a connection with narrative: that the appropriation of the idea of 
the demise of universal determinism at the hands of the new physics can be used to lend a 
narrative a sense of uncertainty. Narratives (with the rare exceptions of ‘Choose You Own 
Adventure’ books, or hypertexts1) are wholly determined, but our reading of them often involves 
the voluntary suppression of our knowledge of this fact: our fascination with narratives would 
seem to require the possibility of alternative sequences of events, alternative outcomes. The 
image of unpredictability associated with the quantum scale suggests this possibility. 
 
More obviously, the implication of a limit on our ability to achieve a complete scientific 
description of the world that can be deemed to be a consequence of quantum indeterminacy, has 
been seized upon by some writers as analogical to the impossibility of complete knowledge in 
other areas, and also as representative of the essential incompleteness of scientific explanations. 
Both Stoppard and Frayn’s plays conclude that there are just some things – human relations, 
ethics, motivations – that science may not be able to account for. 
 
There are fields of the biological sciences, of course, that do indeed believe that their findings 
illuminate these areas. Popular accounts of genetics have certainly stressed the importance of 
genes in determining our behaviour. In popular science writing on evolution or genetics or (as 
very often) both, biological processes – the evolution of a species, the adaptation of a species, the 
development of an individual organism – are frequently presented in such a way as to suggest the 
determined or teleological nature of these processes. But whereas in popular physics texts the 
indeterminism implied in the texts’ metaphors sits comfortably with the explicit contention of 
                                                 
1  John Fowles’s The French Lieutenant’s Woman (London: Jonathan Cape, 1969), with its two alternative 
endings, might represent a rare literary example of  the former category.  
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indeterminacy, the suggestion of a level of evolutionary inevitability or genetic determinism is at 
odds with the openly stated beliefs of these popular science writers.  
 
For example, ostensibly it is almost universally accepted that genes are responsible for only a part 
of an organism’s development, which is also affected by developmental processes on a molecular 
and cellular level, and on environmental conditions on both a molecular and organismal level. 
However, the representations of the role of genes in the development of the individual organism 
in popular science books suggest a level of genetic determinism: the metaphors used to describe 
genes, DNA and the expression of genes in the phenotype, not only emphasise the role that 
genes play, but also imply the simplicity and directness of the connection between genes and the 
phenotypic expression in the organism. Similarly, in representations of biological processes over 
evolutionary timescales a concealed suggestion of inevitability or determinism is to be found in 
the idea of evolution as a teleological process. Although many of the popular science books on 
evolution explicitly deny that evolution is progressive, asserting instead that it is simply adaptive 
to environmental and selective pressures, still the images used and the narratives constructed 
strongly suggest that evolution has been directed towards the current point, with particular 
emphasis on our own evolution as the necessary end point.  
 
Suggesting possible motivations for these representations of evolution and genetics as 
deterministic processes may not be as straightforward as it is for the inverse pattern in popular 
physics texts. In the case of evolution there is presumably an anthropic principle at work – a 
desire to see our own existence as inevitable, necessary or as a culmination of evolution. (Of 
course, this is not to suggest here that the popular science writers are consciously guilty of such 
naivety, but that this anthropic bias nonetheless comes across in the representation of evolution.) 
In the case of genetics, determinism in its ‘hard’ form would not, I think, be any more popular a 
notion here than it is in physics, as genetic determinism would deny our free will just as would a 
‘clockwork universe’. However, in its ‘soft’ form – “it’s in my genes” – this idea has become 
extremely pervasive. Clearly, the implication of a degree of determinism in representations of 
genetics enhances the importance of genetics as a discipline, but it may have its roots less in 
popular science than in public science.2 As Van Dijck notes, funding for the HGP and for the 
wider study of genetics is predicated on the assumption that the results are of medical benefit.3 In 
other words, genetics needs to show that it can be used to identify and treat disease. It is clear 
that strengthening the causal link between genes and the development of a particular trait 
(including disease) strengthens this case; stressing the contingency of developmental processes 
                                                 
2 See above, page 24, for the distinction between popular and public science.  
3  See above, chapter 5, p. 101. 
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and the role of environmental pressures weakens it. Again, this argument does not require that 
these popular science writers are trying, consciously or not, to present this argument, only that 
they are utilising metaphors that have their origin in this strategic representation. 
 
* * * * 
 
I began this thesis by observing that it could hardly be contested that contemporary authors were 
influenced by scientific ideas, and furthermore that it is reasonable to infer that they may derive 
their knowledge of these currents in scientific thought from popular science books. In exploring 
how and, crucially, to what purpose scientific concepts have been incorporated into fiction I have 
found that these influences and appropriations are far from neutrally adopted. A central finding 
of my thesis is that these authors are not simply ‘borrowing’ from science, but are engaging with 
it on an epistemological level. In the texts that I have examined this often takes the form of a 
wariness of science as the dominant epistemological system.  
 
Despite his public support for science and rationalism, Ian McEwan’s novels, for example, are 
not universally sympathetic towards science: Joe Rose’s actions are logical, but in the end 
questionable; Henry Perowne’s scientific rationalism is set, in the novel, against the persuasive 
emotive effect of poetry and, in my reading, against the power of deception and fictionalising; 
and Michael Beard, the third in this trio of male scientist protagonists, is the least sympathetic 
character in a novel nearly devoid of sympathetic characters. Michael Frayn’s Copenhagen and Tom 
Stoppard’s Arcadia both enact the insufficiencies of science, portraying gaps in its explanatory 
capacity. In Copenhagen two icons of twentieth-century physics attempt to understand the 
motivations behind Heisenberg’s earlier visit; but despite their repeated attempts, representative 
not only of the redrafting of a scientific paper but also the replication of scientific experiments, 
their methods cannot in the end reach any conclusion. In Arcadia, the mathematical research of 
Valentine parallels the literary research of Bernard, but both are frustrated by the ‘noise’ in the 
system. Like Stoppard, Thomas Pynchon introduces ‘noise’ into his narratives, which frustrates 
the rational efforts not only of his characters but also of his readers and critics.  
 
These writers use the appropriations from science to criticise, or at least to question, science 
itself. Clearly, literature is not in a position to critique the veracity of the theories themselves: the 
questioning is not ontological, it is broader and epistemological. But what epistemological 
criticism can literature offer? It would seem that literature cannot stand alongside science as its 
epistemological equal if, firstly, we judge literature according to its capacity to contain truth or 
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knowledge and, secondly, we continue to use a conception of knowledge that is itself founded on 
a post-scientific correspondence theory of truth.  
 
The first response, then, may be to choose to value literature on grounds other than that of truth. 
Lamarque and Olsen take this line: they argue that literary value should not be located in the 
truthfulness of literature, and that doing so reduces literature to a species of philosophy or social 
science. They are willing to accept that literature has the capacity to tell the truth, but deny that 
this is where literary value lies. As David Novitz summarises, “According to the ‘no-truth’ theory 
of literature that they [Lamarque & Olsen] defend, ‘the concept of truth has no central or 
ineliminable role in critical practice’ (p. 1), and it is simply false that literary works ‘have the 
constitutive aim of advancing truths about human concerns’ (p. 368)”.4  Instead, Lamarque and 
Olsen argue that the cognitive value of literary works lies “not in any truths that they might 
contain, but from their presentation, interpretation and development of themes (such as free will 
and determinism), which are assessed not in terms of truth but as more or less interesting”.5  
 
This characterisation of literature as presenting ‘more or less interesting’ interpretations of 
themes, but as having no role in the assessment of truth, reveals that such an argument assigns a 
role to literature that is, epistemologically, little more than a concession, leaving literature as 
insubstantial as compared to science or philosophy. This may not be considered a problem, but it 
is unclear where this leaves literature’s engagements with science: is literature, then, simply 
parasitic on science for its truths, passively adopting an understanding of the world that is 
established by science? And if not, what can literature say about science that has epistemological 
validity? 
 
Little better are some of the pro-truth arguments: Peter Mew, for example, proposes that 
literature’s role in knowledge production might be to generate hypotheses that can be tested 
empirically by other disciplines.6 But Carroll criticises this “hypothesis/confirmation approach”, 
realising, correctly it seems to me, that “the concession here is at best grudging” since 
“hypotheses available from art and literature are, in general, woefully vague”.7 Additionally, it 
makes literature a second-order discipline, supplying ideas to be tested by the sciences.  
 
                                                 
4 David Novitz, ‘The Trouble with Truth’, Philosophy and Literature 19 (1995), 350-59 (p. 351). 
5  Alex Neill, review of Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen, Truth, Fiction and Literature: a 
Philosophical Perspective in The Philosophical Quarterly, 47 (1997), 241-43 (p. 243). 
6  Mew, pp. 329-37. 
7  Carroll, p. 5. 
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More persuasive is Carroll’s own argument that literature can fulfil a similar role to thought 
experiments in philosophy (what Daniel Dennett also calls ‘intuition pumps’), reorganising 
cognitive elements that are already in place to bring about ‘new’ conclusions – new knowledge. 
Carroll focuses on what he calls ‘virtue wheels’ in novels, in which a variety of characters are 
presented with various virtues and vices and played through situations so that the reader can 
assess the relative virtues of each character. But it seems likely that this capacity of literature will 
be more effective in some areas (ethics, free will) than in others (ontology).  
 
Of course, literary thought experiments need not be as constrained as philosophical or scientific 
ones. Alan Lightman’s novella Einstein’s Dreams, for example, is composed of a series of thought 
experiments.8 It is simultaneously an exploration of possible understandings of time and also a 
comment on scientific method. The representation of time in each of the chapters is entirely 
fictional – indeed fantastical – and Einstein’s Dreams does not explain Einstein’s theories of time; 
but it does lead us, via a sequence of dream vignettes, to an appreciation of Einstein’s new, 
counter-intuitive conception of time – particularly of its new relation to space. The book 
questions our preconceived common-sense view of time, in exactly the same way as did Einstein 
at the beginning of the twentieth century.  
 
This is not to say that reading Einstein’s Dreams gives the reader the same understanding of 
relativity as does grasping the mathematics of Einstein’s special theory of relativity: the same 
truth is not contained in the novella as in the mathematical statement of the theory. But this may 
be precisely the point – the literary work does not provide the same sort of knowledge. Perhaps 
the rock on which pro-truth theories of literature founder is in taking a conception of truth that 
derives almost directly from a correspondence theory of truth. What Einstein’s Dreams does 
instead is to ask ‘might it not be like this?’, to jettison correspondence with reality and present the 
counter-factual – in parallel with the way in which Einstein apparently began re-conceiving time.  
 
It seems sensible, then, to acknowledge that literature does not contain truths of the same nature 
as scientific statements, and instead shift the grounds of the argument. Bernard Harrison does 
this, in his book Inconvenient Fictions, by asking us to change how we think about what sort of 
knowledge literature can impart to us. The broader project of this book is, simply put, to 
reconcile a critical humanism (the idea that literary texts have something to tell us about reality) 
with deconstructionism. He argues that although the undermining of logocentrism by 
deconstructionism is often thought to have brought about the downfall of critical humanism, it is 
rather a series of conclusions that are mistakenly believed to follow from deconstructionism that 
                                                 
8  Alan Lightman, Einstein’s Dreams (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993). 
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oppose critical humanism.9 Harrison attacks, in particular, ‘formalism’ (that the meaning of a text 
derives only from relationships within itself and with other texts, not with extra-textual elements) 
and ‘textual solipsism’ (that texts have no determinate meaning, that critics should not seek to 
explain them, and that texts are only about themselves and other texts). His attempt, then, is to 
construct a critical humanism that believes that it is possible to relate the textual to the extra-
textual, but in ways that are not logocentric and are therefore reconcilable with deconstruction. 
 
The reconciliation with deconstruction is not particularly relevant here – but the implications of 
Harrison’s position are pertinent to the question I put above: ‘can literature have an 
epistemological role in relation to science?’. Harrison’s view is that current conceptions of 
knowledge all take a “Humean vision of knowledge as an amenity”: “we take it for granted that 
the function of knowledge in general is not to change us but to enable us to master and change 
the world”.10 But there is an alternative, what Harrison calls ‘dangerous knowledge’: not 
knowledge as impersonal fact, but rather knowledge that has the power to change us by showing 
us that there are other perspectives than the ones that we previously considered – we see the 
“possibility that some truths about how things stand in the world may just not be accessible from 
the standpoint of a person with my present tastes, habits and assumptions; and may be accessible 
from the standpoint of a person differently constituted in those respects”.11 
 
In this view, then, literature does not ‘represent’ the world, or present us with truths about it; but 
instead can show us the limits of the ways in which we think about the world. “[T]heoretical 
knowledge, admirable and useful possession though it is, does not steadfastly or even very often 
call upon its possessors to question their own limitations as knowers”, which, Harrison argues, is 
what literature can do: 
Literature’s role is not to impart Great Truths but to unhinge and destabilize 
them. What it has to say is never ‘this is how it is’ but always, rather, ‘might it 
not be otherwise than an unwise and hasty epistemic confidence leads you to 
think? Might it not be... like this?’ 12 
We may want to disagree with some aspects of Harrison’s argument, but the central tenets – that 
literature can show us firstly how things might be otherwise, and also remind us of the 
                                                 
9 The logocentrism involved in wanting to see texts as ‘truthful’ lies in seeing propositions in literature 
as having an extra-textual, non-linguistic meaning – their having a ‘centred’ and ‘grounded’ meaning 
outside of  the text and the language in which they are expressed, one that is not tied to the language 
of  its expression. 
10  Harrison, p. 4. 
11  Harrison, p. 3. 
12  Harrison, p. 6, p. 11. 
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unwiseness of epistemic over-confidence – are useful in this discussion of literature’s 
epistemological relation to science. In this way literature might fulfil an important function within 
the field of knowledge production, a field dominated by science in our society; in fact, it is 
precisely this dominance that opens up the role for literature. Simply put, literature can act as a 
check to science. 
 
I think that the analysis of contemporary British fiction in this study shows that these novelists 
and playwrights are doing precisely this: questioning the epistemic over-confidence of science, 
emphasising the incompleteness of scientific knowledge, utilising appropriations from scientific 
disciplines to ask whether science does actually have the capacity to form a complete description 
of the world, and acting – to quote Harrison again – “as a standing rebuke and irritant to the 
dominant paradigm of knowledge”.13 
 
The second important function that literature can fulfil is to draw attention to the language of 
science: clearly this also affords literature a rich opportunity in relation to popular science writing.  
This is not to go so far as to wonder, as Paul de Man does, whether it is even “certain that 
literature is a reliable source of information about anything but its own language”, but rather to 
follow a different conclusion seemingly implied by the same essay and realise that literature can 
have an important role in revealing the workings of ideology – in this case, that of science.14 As 
critics like Evelyn Fox Keller and Susan Oyama have shown with regards to genetics in the 
twentieth century, the language in which that field of science has expressed itself has had a 
formative effect on the path of its theory construction. As literature borrows concepts from 
science it can remind us, through its awareness of the polyvalency of the language in which it 
couches these appropriations, of the dangers of assuming that language can act as a neutral 
container for meaning, and the danger of allowing metaphors such as those that surround 
genetics to slip the bounds of their metaphoricity. For ultimately, the chapters on popular science 
in this thesis demonstrate that the language of popular science writing is worthy of the attention 
of literary scholars, and that such attention can identify the epistemological assumptions that 
underpin the metaphors and narratives deployed by these writers. 
                                                 
13  Harrison, p. 4. 
14  Paul de Man, The Resistance to Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p.11. 
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